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Abstract
This thesis addresses an interpretive question at the heart of the discourse surrounding the United
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP); the meaning of the
principle of Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC). It argues that interpreting and
implementing UNDRIP and specifically the articles requiring FPIC needs to be done in a way
that meaningfully engages with and incorporates the laws of Indigenous peoples (Indigenous
Legal Traditions or ILTs). This thesis explores why it is essential to discuss UNDRIP through
the lens of ILTs, explores the scholarship and major interpretive schools of thought regarding
FPIC, and concludes that at least within the Canadian context, they have not meaningfully
engaged with ILTs. This thesis also addresses the ways in which Canada’s current approach to
consultation (the duty to consult) engages with ILTs. It concludes with an examination of the
impact that Anishinaabe law can have on the interpretation of FPIC.
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Summary for Lay Audience
The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (“UNDRIP”) is an
international human rights declaration. UNDRIP addresses a variety of subject matters including
the health, traditional knowledge, economic development, and children’s rights of Indigenous
peoples around the world. It also requires states to secure the free, prior, and informed consent
(“FPIC”) of Indigenous peoples in a number of different circumstances, including: (i) when a
state wishes to remove Indigenous peoples from their lands; (ii) when adopting laws that may
affect Indigenous peoples; (iii) when states plan to store or dispose hazardous materials on
Indigenous territories; and (iv) when planning things like resource development projects that
affect the territories of Indigenous peoples.
There are debates amongst politicians, academics, Indigenous leaders, and others about how to
define FPIC and precisely when it is required. Some in Canada suggest that since Canadian law
already includes a duty to consult Indigenous peoples that Canada is in compliance with the
UNDRIP articles referencing FPIC. This thesis takes the position that any interpretation of FPIC
should be informed by a consideration of the laws of Indigenous peoples. It examines the debate
over how to interpret FPIC for the purposes of UNDRIP through a detailed examination of the
scholarship to try and determine if the scholarly writing about FPIC is engaging with the laws of
Indigenous peoples. This thesis also explores whether Canada’s duty to consult makes room for
ILTs, before providing the reader with an example of how the laws of Indigenous peoples can
impact the interpretation of FPIC.
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Introduction
In 1982, Canada repatriated its constitution from the United Kingdom, via the Constitution Act,
1982. Section 35 of the Constitution Act 1982 recognizes and affirms the existing aboriginal and
treaty rights of Canada’s aboriginal peoples:
Recognition of existing aboriginal and treaty rights
35 (1) The existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are
hereby recognized and affirmed.
Definition of aboriginal peoples of Canada
(2) In this Act, aboriginal peoples of Canada includes the Indian, Inuit and Métis peoples
of Canada.1
Despite this constitutional recognition concerns were raised about the possibility of infringement
of these Aboriginal and treaty rights by the Crown. Given the Canadian economy’s reliance on
extractive industries, Indigenous peoples are concerned about significant and perhaps irreparable
harm that could be caused by mining, pipelines, or other resource development projects on their
lands, resources, and way of life. In order to address these concerns the Supreme Court of
Canada has imposed an obligation on the Crown to consult Indigenous peoples before taking
action that may adversely affect rights under s.35 of the Constitution Act, 19822 (the “duty to
consult” or “the duty to consult framework”).
This duty to consult framework has guided government, Indigenous peoples, and industry on the
proper process for consultation (and sometimes accommodation) when potential or established
Aboriginal or treaty rights may be affected by resource development projects. Despite the
significant impact that the duty to consult framework has had on the protection of Indigenous

1

Constitution Act, 1982, s 35, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11. [Constitution
1982].
2
Haida Nation v British Columbia (Minister of Forests), 2004 SCC 73 at para 35 [Haida].

1

rights in Canada, the duty remains subject to intense political and legal debate. Questions remain
regarding the appropriate level of Indigenous participation in resource development, the ability
of Indigenous peoples to control what occurs in their traditional territories, and the role that
Indigenous systems of law should have in how the duty to consult is interpreted and applied.
Recent developments in international law have also become relevant to these debates.
In September 2007, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the UN Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples (“UNDRIP” or the “Declaration”). The Declaration was the
culmination of several decades of work by Indigenous leaders, the UN Working Group on
Indigenous Populations (“WGIP”), and the UN Human Rights Council. The Declaration
addresses a variety of subject matters, and includes several references to the free, prior, and
informed consent (“FPIC”) of Indigenous peoples.3
Since 2007 the meaning of FPIC has been the focus of debate amongst pundits, journalists,
politicians, and academics. Anyone who follows Canadian politics will have noted the lack of
consensus about the definition of FPIC and the implications of the UNDRIP articles that refer to
it. This was exemplified by the high-profile opposition by Wet’suwet’en hereditary chiefs (and
others) to the Coastal GasLink pipeline in February 2020. In countless op-ed pieces and
statements before the Canadian Senate individuals have presented entirely different conceptions
of what FPIC requires.4 The conversation has largely focused on whether the articles requiring
3

United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, GA Res 61/295, UN Doc A/res/61/295 (13
Sept 2007), 46 ILM 1013 (2007), Articles 10, 11, 19, 28, 29, and 32 [UNDRIP]
4
Brian L. Cox, “Wet’suwet’en supporters should stop distorting law to promote protest agenda” (28 February
2020), online: The Star <https://www.thestar.com/opinion/contributors/2020/02/28/wetsuweten-supportersshould-stop-distorting-law-to-promote-protest-agenda.html>; Alicia Elliott, “A pipeline offers a stark reminder
of Canada’s ongoing colonialism” (13 February 2020), online: Washington Post
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/02/13/pipeline-offers-stark-reminder-canadas-ongoingcolonialism/>; Senate of Canada, Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on Aboriginal Peoples, 43-2
(May 31, 2021) (Shannon Joseph, Vice President, Government Relations and Indigenous Affairs for the

2

FPIC grant Indigenous communities a “veto” over things like resource projects if UNDRIP is
made part of Canadian law. In other words, many have asked whether UNDRIP recognizes the
right of Indigenous peoples to say no and forestall certain projects that may impact Aboriginal or
Treaty rights. Academics, politicians, Indigenous leaders, and others have presented conflicting
answers to this question5 with responses ranging from “consent as a preferable but not
necessarily mandatory outcome of consultation procedures…[to] more substantive/robust
conceptions of FPIC as a right to say ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to a given project”.6
For example, in testimony before the Standing Committee on Aboriginal Peoples, Ross Pattee
Assistant Deputy Minister (Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern Affairs Canada) stated
that FPIC was “…not defined in the UN Declaration, and there is no international or domestic
agreement on the meaning of the principle of free, prior and informed consent”.7 However, the
Deputy Minister went on to note that there was support from people like James Anaya, former
UN Special Rapporteur, for interpreting FPIC as requiring parties to make “…every effort
towards mutually acceptable arrangements, allowing Indigenous peoples to generally influence
the decision-making processes”.8 In contrast, Senator Murray Sinclair, speaking before that same

Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers); Senate of Canada, Proceedings of the Standing Senate
Committee on Aboriginal Peoples, 43-2 (May 28, 2021) (Mauro Barelli); Senate of Canada, Proceedings of the
Standing Senate Committee on Aboriginal Peoples, 43-2 (May 14, 2021) (Ross Montour, Chief, Mohawk
Council of Kahnawake); Senate of Canada, Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on Aboriginal
Peoples, 43-2 (May 10, 2021) (Dr. Sheryl Lightfoot)
5
Mia Rabson, “Without Indigenous consent for pipelines, experts say there will be more confrontations” (5
March 2020), online: CTV News <https://www.ctvnews.ca/politics/without-indigenous-consent-for-pipelinesexperts-say-there-will-be-more-confrontations-1.4839713>.
6
Martin Papillon et al, “Free, Prior and Informed Consent: Between Legal Ambiguity and Political Agency”
(2020) 27:2 Int J on Minority and Group Rights 223 at 224 [Papillon FPIC Between].
7
Senate of Canada, Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on Aboriginal Peoples, 42-1, Issue 55
(May 28, 2019) (Ross Pattee, Assistant Deputy Minister, Implementation Sector, Crown-Indigenous Relations
and Northern Affairs Canada).
8
Ibid.
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Committee, rejected the idea of FPIC constituting a veto. In Senator Sinclair’s opinion FPIC is
about a right to give or withhold consent.9
Recent political events have only served to heighten the debates surrounding FPIC. Although
Canada was one of four countries that initially voted in opposition to UNDRIP, Canada has
removed its permanent objector status10 and committed to implementing UNDRIP as soon as
possible. On December 3, 2020 the Trudeau Government tabled Bill C-15,11 An Act respecting
the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. The legislation, which
received Royal Assent on June 21, 2021, commits that Canada will implement the Declaration
and “affirm[s] the Declaration as a universal international human rights instrument with
application in Canadian law.”12 In announcing Bill C-15, the Department of Justice indicated that
the legislation will be “…a key building block in fully recognizing, respecting, protecting, and
fulfilling the rights of Indigenous peoples”.13
Although the passage of Bill C-15 appears to demonstrate a serious commitment to the principles
in UNDRIP, some fundamental questions remain: How should we interpret the articles requiring
FPIC? And what do these articles obligate state actors to do? Establishing a well-grounded
answer to these questions is essential since, as Professor Dwight Newman has pointed out,

9

Senate of Canada, Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on Aboriginal Peoples, 42-1, Issue 55
(May 28, 2019) (Senator Murray Sinclair).
10
Tim Fontaine, “Canada removing objector status to UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples” (8
May 2016), online: CBC News <https://www.cbc.ca/news/indigenous/canada-position-un-declarationindigenous-peoples-1.3572777> [Fontaine].
11
Ryan Patrick Jones, “Liberal introduce bill to implement UN Indigenous rights declaration” (3 December
2020), online: CBC News <https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/liberals-introduce-undrip-legislation-1.5826523>
[Jones].
12
Bill C-15, An Act respecting the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 2nd Sess,
43rd Parl, 2020 at s 4(a) (assented to 21 June 2021) [Bill C-15].
13
Department of Justice, “Implementing the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous peoples
in Canada” (last visited 29 April 2021), online: Government of Canada
<https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/declaration/index.html> [Justice UNDRIP].
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“…the Court’s interpretation of FPIC is…subject to uncertainties that have enormous
implications for Canada.”14 In addition, Bill C-15 requires the federal government to ensure that
the laws of Canada are consistent with the Declaration and recognizes that measures taken to
implement UNDRIP should take Indigenous legal traditions into account.15 This recognition of
Indigenous law is commendable. However, it raises some practical questions regarding the
relationship between international law and Indigenous legal traditions as well as the extent to
which Canadian law already accounts for Indigenous systems of law within the existing duty to
consult framework.
This thesis argues that interpreting and implementing UNDRIP and specifically the articles
requiring FPIC needs to be done in a way that meaningfully engages with and incorporates the
laws of Indigenous peoples (“Indigenous Legal Traditions” or “ILTs”). Indigenous peoples
turned to the international community in order to “…decolonize the colonized Indigenous
peoples”.16 As James (Sa’ke’j) Youngblood Henderson has stated Indigenous peoples’ “…vision
of human rights was to have ourselves implement our ancient knowledge and laws in our daily
lives and struggles, through community or collective solidarity and individual sensibilities”17 and
to ensure that “all aspects of our inherent human rights belong to and serve our distinct and
diverse knowledge systems, languages and laws, rather than the artificial settler states or their

14

Canada, Senate of Canada, Submission to Senate Standing Committee on Aboriginal Peoples Re Bill C-262
(May 26, 2019), online: Senate of Canada
<https://sencanada.ca/content/sen/committee/421/APPA/Briefs/D.Newman_UofSask_e.pdf > [Newman C262].
15
Bill C15, supra note 12 at preamble, s.5.
16
James (Sa’ke’j) Youngblood Henderson, “The Art of Braiding Indigenous Peoples’ Inherent Human Rights
into the Law of Nation-States” in John Borrows et al. eds, Braiding legal orders: implementing the United
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Waterloo: Centre for International Governance
Innovation, 2019) 13 at 16 [Youngblood Braiding].
17
Ibid at 16-17.
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Eurocentric legal traditions of civil or common law.”18 For Henderson, any attempt to implement
UNDRIP must be mindful of these aspirations and avoid simply reproducing Eurocentric
approaches.19
This thesis engages with how Canadian law and the scholarship have addressed questions
surrounding FPIC in order to determine the extent to which they have meaningfully engaged
with ILTs. In particular, the thesis explores: (i) why it is essential to discuss the Declaration
through the lens of ILTs; (ii) the interpretations of FPIC offered by the scholarship and the extent
to which these interpretations account for ILTs; (iii) the extent to which ILTs are already
reflected in Canada’s duty to consult framework; and (iv) how to approach the articles
referencing FPIC in a way that acknowledges and incorporates ILTs by highlighting some
relevant Anishinaabe principles to serve as an example of the approach suggested in this
dissertation.
Chapter Overview
In order to properly assess the relationship between ILTs, FPIC, and UNDRIP, Chapter One
reviews the terms of the Declaration and its evolution, including: (i) a discussion of its
negotiation at the UN; (ii) the steps taken to achieve the endorsement of the Declaration in 2007;
and (iii) Canada’s political response to the Declaration, including legislative attempts to
implement it. This background provides necessary context to some of the scholarship that has
interpreted the FPIC articles in UNDRIP. This chapter also demonstrates why the existence and

18
19

Ibid at 18.
Ibid at 16-18.
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content of ILTs must be considered when interpreting and implementing UNDRIP and
specifically the articles referencing FPIC.
Chapter Two examines the potential interpretations of FPIC identified in the scholarship and
determines whether there are key interpretative considerations that have been ignored in the
literature. In particular, this chapter considers the extent to which the scholarship has engaged
with ILTs in the interpretation of FPIC. Its goal is to determine whether there are currently any
widely accepted interpretations of FPIC that meaningfully engage with ILTs in their interpretive
methodology.
Chapter Three examines Canada’s current duty to consult framework. Many scholars argue that
this framework is already consistent with International Human Rights Law principles as well as
what the UNDRIP articles referencing FPIC require. This chapter assesses that claim by
examining: (i) the role of consent in the duty to consult framework; (ii) the extent to which the
courts have incorporated ILTs as a part of their duty to consult analysis; and (iii) the extent to
which Canada’s duty to consult has informally embraced ILTs via provincial consultation
protocols, joint Crown-First Nations consultation protocols, the government of Canada’s
consultation protocols, and the consultation protocols of Indigenous communities.
Chapter Four provides insight into how ILTs might contribute to the interpretation of FPIC, via a
brief review and analysis of certain key Anishinaabe legal principles. This chapter introduces the
Anishinaabe legal tradition before examining some of the principles that are relevant to a
discussion of FPIC (consultation, leadership, decision-making processes, persuasive compliance,
consent, environmental stewardship, etc.).

7

Chapter Five provides some concluding remarks as well as a series of proposals to help ensure
that ILTs play a meaningful role in the interpretation and implementation of the FPIC Articles
moving forward.
Methodology
This thesis uses a doctrinal approach to provide a clear understanding of the substance of
Canada’s duty to consult framework, particularly as it relates to the honour of the Crown and
consent. I have engaged in a literature review that includes both primary and secondary legal
sources. Some of the primary legal sources include: UNDRIP itself, ILO Convention 169, ILO
Convention 107, Canadian legislation addressing UNDRIP, testimony before Parliamentary
committees, and the common law. Cases examining the duty to consult and the judicial treatment
of Indigenous legal traditions have also been examined. Relevant case law, legislation, and
international law instruments were collected by utilizing legal databases, including LexisNexis
Quicklaw and Westlaw. In terms of case law, the project primarily focused on decisions from the
Supreme Court of Canada.
I have also engaged in a review of the secondary literature on the duty to consult, the
implementation of UNDRIP, and FPIC. This thesis is focused on Canadian law. As a result, this
review focused on literature situated in the Canadian context. However, I have also examined the
work of leading scholars discussing these issues in an international context.
While I engaged primarily in legal research, it was also necessary to identify and utilize some
non-legal sources, particularly with respect to the history of UNDRIP, Canada’s political
response to UNDRIP, and the perspectives of UNDRIP espoused by activists, journalists, and

8

academics from outside the legal field. I utilized a doctrinal approach for addressing these
sources as well.
My thesis also utilizes a comparative method, albeit within a doctrinal analysis. I have engaged
with scholarship that has discussed how the international community has responded to UNDRIP,
particularly the articles requiring FPIC.
With respect to the use of Indigenous methodologies, this project is more focused on doctrinal
sources in Aboriginal law than Indigenous Law. Aboriginal law focuses on Canadian law as it is
applied to resolve legal disputes between Indigenous peoples and governments, or third parties.
In contrast, Indigenous law addresses the values, norms, worldviews, and legal traditions that
guide Indigenous Nations, in other words, the laws of Indigenous peoples. However, Aboriginal
law has begun to acknowledge the relevance of Indigenous laws in disputes before the Canadian
legal system, so to suggest that these two areas of law can be separated entirely would be
inaccurate. Furthermore, my thesis includes the work of authors who have written about
Indigenous legal traditions, with a particular focus on Anishinaabe principles as they pertain to
issues such as consent, persuasive compliance, leadership, and decision-making. I utilize a
doctrinal approach for addressing secondary sources for this part of my analysis in chapter four.
Although my methodology does not include research in Indigenous communities, all of my work
is mindful of Indigenous methodological approaches.20 As Shawn Wilson points out in his
seminal piece Research is Ceremony: Indigenous Research Methods, “…Indigenous
methodology must be a process that adheres to relational accountability. Respect, reciprocity,

20

Particularly those highlighted and described in: Shawn Wilson, Research is ceremony: indigenous research
methods (Halifax: Fernwood Pub, 2008) [Wilson]; Linda Tuhiwai Smith, Decolonizing methodologies:
research and indigenous peoples 2nd ed (London: Zed Books, 2012).

9

and responsibility are key features of any healthy relationship and must be included in an
Indigenous methodology.”21
Wilson writes that when utilizing an Indigenous methodology one should ask a series of
questions, including: “how do my methods help to build respectful relationships between the
topic that I am studying and myself as a researcher (on multiple levels)?”;22 and “Am I being
responsible in fulfilling my role and obligations to the other participants, to the topic and to all of
my relations”.23 The work that I have done with primary and secondary sources is mindful of
these questions. My approach is to incorporate Indigenous perspectives and scholarship
throughout this thesis to ensure that these principles of responsibility and respect are taken into
account.

21

Wilson, supra note 20 at 77.
Ibid at 77.
23
Ibid at 77.
22
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Chapter One
1

Introduction to UNDRIP and Indigenous Legal Traditions

In September 2007, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Declaration by a vote of
“144 states in favour, four votes against (Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States)
and 11 abstentions”.24 In contrast to a convention or treaty, the Declaration is not (in and of
itself) legally binding; however, it represents “…the dynamic development of international legal
norms and reflects the commitment of states to move in certain directions, abiding by certain
principles.”25
The Declaration includes several articles referencing the FPIC of Indigenous peoples. Some of
these articles clearly state that FPIC is required in certain circumstances, while others include
more ambiguous language. The relevant articles for the purposes of this paper are as follows:
Article 10: Indigenous peoples shall not be forcibly removed from their lands or
territories. No relocation shall take place without the free, prior and informed consent of
the indigenous peoples concerned and after agreement on just and fair compensation and,
where possible, with the option of return.
Article 19: States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples
concerned through their own representative institutions in order to obtain their free, prior
and informed consent before adopting and implementing legislative or administrative
measures that may affect them.
Article 29(2): States shall take effective measures to ensure that no storage or disposal of
hazardous materials shall take place in the lands or territories of indigenous peoples
without their free, prior and informed consent.

24

United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Indigenous Peoples, “United Nations
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples” (last visited April 23, 2021), online: United Nations
<https://www.un.org/development/desa/indigenouspeoples/declaration-on-the-rights-of-indigenouspeoples.html> [UNDRIP Website].
25
United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, “Frequently Asked Questions – Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples” (last visited April 23, 2021), online: United Nations
<https://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/FAQsindigenousdeclaration.pdf>.
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Article 32 (1) Indigenous peoples have the right to determine and develop priorities and
strategies for the development or use of their lands or territories and other resources. (2)
States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples concerned
through their own representative institutions in order to obtain their free and informed
consent prior to the approval of any project affecting their lands or territories and other
resources, particularly in connection with the development, utilization or exploitation of
mineral, water or other resources.26
This chapter sets the context for this thesis and proceeds in five parts. Part one provides a
definition of ILTs. This is essential as the bulk of this thesis is dedicated to examining how ILTs
intersect with FPIC and Canada’s duty to consult framework. Part two includes a brief history of
colonialism in Canada as well as the Crown’s early treatment of Indigenous self-determination.
This sets the context for the Indigenous rights movement that informed the development of the
Declaration. Part three covers the origins and negotiation of UNDRIP, with a particular focus on
the evolution of the FPIC Articles. This background is essential for two reasons. First, it informs
some of the scholarship that has interpreted the FPIC Articles. Second, examining the
development of UNDRIP demonstrates how issues of Indigenous sovereignty and selfdetermination lie at the heart of the Declaration. Debates over the meaning and scope of selfdetermination continue to inform responses to FPIC and impact any analysis of FPIC.
Part four covers Canada’s response to the Declaration including its concerns regarding FPIC and
the efforts to implement UNDRIP federally. This discussion provides the context for why
debates over the meaning of FPIC have come to dominate the Indigenous rights discourse in
Canada. Canada’s evolving stance from opposing to embracing UNDRIP has made it necessary
to seriously consider the proper interpretation of FPIC as well as the place of ILTs in debates
about the implementation of the Declaration.

26

UNDRIP, supra note 3 Articles 10, 19, 29.2, 32.
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Part five includes a discussion of why it is essential to examine UNDRIP through the lens of
ILTs. This thesis develops the proposition that ILTs have an essential role to play in interpreting
FPIC and this part includes a series of arguments in support of this position.
1.1

What are Indigenous Legal Traditions?

John Borrows endorses the Oxford English Dictionary definition of law as “ the body of rules,
whether proceeding from an enactment or from custom, which a particular state or community
recognizes as binding on its members or subjects.”27 Borrows has adopted John Henry
Merryman’s definition of legal traditions, which is as follows:
A legal tradition . . . is a set of deeply rooted, historically conditioned attitudes about the
nature of law, about the role of law in the society and the polity, about the proper
organization and operation of a legal system, and about the way law is or should be made,
applied, studied, perfected, and taught.28
Borrows goes on to describe legal traditions as “cultural phenomena that ‘provide categories into
which the untidy business of life may be organized’ and through which disputes may be
resolved”.29 When we are discussing a legal tradition, we are also discussing the value system,
worldviews, and moral principles that inform the legal system of an identifiable group.30 These
aspects of ILTs are discussed further in chapter four.

27
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The Federal Court has described ILTs as “the rules by which Aboriginal people have organized
themselves into distinctive societies with their own social, cultural, legal and political structures
that predated contact with the Europeans in North America”.31 Although this definition of ILTs
is accurate, it is also very generic. Anishinaabe scholar Dawnis Kennedy provides a more
meaningful reflection on what legal traditions mean from an Indigenous perspective:
The traditions of Indigenous peoples have existed within these lands for thousands of
years. They reflect Indigenous peoples’ collective understandings of creation and the
roles of individuals within creation and within community. They serve to support the
efforts of Indigenous peoples to maintain good relations in this world: relations within
communities, relations between communities, and relations with the other beings of
creation. For generations, Indigenous peoples have continued the efforts of those who
came before them, efforts to maintain their communities, their traditions, and their roles
within creation.32
Many Canadians are familiar with two legal traditions: the common law system, which applies in
most of the country, and the civil law system which applies in the Province of Quebec.
Canadians are less familiar with the legal traditions of Indigenous peoples. As Borrows has
noted, these systems of law pre-date the arrival of Europeans and are as diverse as the peoples
indigenous to this continent:
The earliest practitioners of law in North America were its original indigenous
inhabitants. These peoples are variously known as the “Aboriginal,” “Native,” or “First”
peoples of the continent and include, among others, the ancient and contemporary nations
of the Innu, Mi’kmaq, Maliseet, Cree, Montagnais, Anishinabek, Haudenosaunee,
Dakota, Lakota, Nakota, Assinaboine, Saulteaux, Blackfoot, Secwepemec, Nlha’kapmx,
Salish, Kwakwaka’wakw, Haida, Tsimshian, Gitksan, Tahltan, Gwich’in, Dene, Inuit,
Metis, etc. Indigenous peoples’ traditions can be as historically different from one
another as other nations and cultures in the world. For example, Canadian indigenous
peoples speak over fifty different Aboriginal languages from twelve distinct language
families, which have as wide a variation as do the language families of Europe and Asia.
These nations’ linguistic, genealogical, political and legal descent can be traced back
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through millennia to different regions or territories in northern North America. This
explains the wide variety of laws among indigenous groups.33
Despite their deep roots, ILTs are not simply stuck in history. There is a significant amount of
work ongoing by Indigenous peoples and scholars like Karen Drake, Hadley Friedland, John
Borrows, Aaron Mills, Val Napoleon, and Aimee Craft to revitalize ILTs and to bring them back
to the forefront both within Indigenous communities and within existing Canadian legal
structures. As Darlene Johnston noted in her welcome address at the U of T Faculty of Law,
ILTs have always been here, but work is required in order to access and study them more
closely:
Before the University was here, and before the city of Toronto was here, there was a
creek that ran from the high ground up north, all the way down to the lake. By pioneer
times, this creek was known as Taddle Creek. When Hart House was first built, the
southern part of Taddle Creek was dammed up, which resulted in quite a lovely pond.
But the creek still flowed from the north, down through what is now Philosopher’s Walk.
By the 1870s, people started to complain about the creek because it had become a sewer
for the Victorian mansions built along it. The pond was starting to smell. The city’s
solution was to bury the creek. So the creek went underground, and this facilitated the
development of other buildings on the university grounds, including a rugby field at Hart
House, our soccer pitch, and eventually the expansion of this law school. Now we are
underground in a space that used to be shared by the creek, and from time to time the
creek makes its reappearance, as anyone engaged in construction efforts in this vicinity
knows. For those of us who are familiar with the vagaries of the elevator in this building,
it is clear that Taddle Creek is still at work underground. The reason I mention the creek
is twofold: first, to situate us here in this particular landscape, and second, because it
serves as an analogy to Indigenous legal traditions. Indigenous legal traditions have also
been forced underground by the transformations that newcomers brought. We might think
that things that are buried are lost, or gone, or dead. Thus, people sometimes speak of the
work of some of our Aboriginal scholars as a type of archaeology; we are digging down
into the past to find relics or artifacts of our traditions. But the underwater creek is still a
creek; the water is still running. There is still a spirit. And insofar as our languages, our
values and our ethics are still flowing in our communities, the legal traditions of our
peoples are still alive. Our legal traditions have been overlaid with all kinds of other
constructions, but they are still flowing. Given the work that I have been able to do here
at the University of Toronto, I think of myself as a well digger. I know that our
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jurisprudential river is underground, and I am determined to get down to the level where
the waters still flow.34

1.2
Colonialism in Canada: Canada’s Historical Treatment of ILTs and Indigenous
Self-Determination
A full treatment of the history of Canada’s relationship with Indigenous peoples is beyond the
scope of this thesis. However, it is important to briefly discuss the history of settler-colonialism
in Canada in order to establish the groundwork for the movement in the 20th century supporting
self-determination and rights recognition that informed the development of UNDRIP.
It is a trite point but is worth repeating that Indigenous peoples exercised powers of governance
for millennia prior to the arrival of Europeans and others in North America. Indigenous peoples
were living here, governing themselves, forming alliances, establishing nations, and engaging in
diplomatic relations well before the arrival of the earliest settlers. This point is well established
in Canadian jurisprudence, including in R v Van Der Peet where the Supreme Court of Canada
confirmed that it was an undisputed fact that “…aboriginals lived on the land in distinctive
societies, with their own practices, traditions and cultures”.35 Indigenous peoples, both
historically and to this day, have asserted that given their history they possess an inherent right of
self-government. As Alex Christmas, a Mi’kmaq representative before Canada’s Royal
Commission on Aboriginal Peoples stated: “We see our rights of self-government as an inherent
right which does not come from other governments. It does not originate in our treaties…the
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treaties reflect the crown’s recognition that we were, and would remain self-governing, but they
did not create our nationhood”.36
Things obviously changed with the arrival of the earliest settlers in North America. Scholars like
John Borrows and Leonard Rotman have stated that it was “the arrival of others [that] challenged
the governing structures of aboriginal nations and tested their ability to perpetuate their
institutions”.37 This is not to suggest that immediately upon arriving in North America European
settlers disregarded the nationhood or self-determination of Indigenous peoples. As Borrows and
Rotman have noted, there are historical examples of a reciprocal recognition of British and
Indigenous governance in the years preceding the creation of the Dominion of Canada. This was
exemplified by the British use of diplomatic and treaty making practices that were previously
unknown to them, including gift giving, the use of wampum belts, the periodic re-affirmation of
treaties, etc.38
Furthermore, in “Wampum at Niagara”, John Borrows establishes that the Royal Proclamation
and Treaty of Niagara included an affirmation of the self-determination of Indigenous peoples.39
This was demonstrated by the words of Sir William Johnson, the British Crown’s superintendent
of Indian Affairs who in the aftermath of the Treaty of Niagara wrote about how First Nations
would not subjugate themselves to the laws of the British:
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These people had subscribed to a Treaty with me at Niagara in August last, but by the
present Treaty I find, they make expressions of subjection, which must either have arisen
from the ignorance of the Interpreter, or from some mistake; for I am well convinced,
they never mean or intend anything like it, and that they cannot be brought under our
laws, for some Centuries, neither have they any word which can convey the most distant
idea of subjection, and should it be fully explained to them, and the nature of
subordination punishment ettc [sic], defined, it might produce infinite harm ... and I dread
its consequences, as I recollect that some attempts towards Sovereignty not long ago, was
one of the principal causes of all our troubles.40
We can also observe a formal recognition of the ILTs in the earliest days of Canada in the
Connolly v Woolrich41 decision. The case involved a fur trader (Connolly) who married a Cree
woman (Suzanne). The marriage was formed under Cree law but was never solemnized by a
priest or minister. The two were married for 30 years and had six children. Connolly eventually
returned to Montreal with Suzanne and several of their children. Connolly later decided to marry
Woolrich, and decided to treat his first marriage as invalid. Suzanne left with the children to
return to Manitoba. Connolly eventually died and bequeathed all his property to Woolrich and
the children he had with her, effectively cutting Suzanne (and their children) out of his estate.
Suzanne and Connolly’s first son sued Woolrich for a share of the estate.42
One of the central questions in the case was whether or not Connolly’s first marriage to Suzanne
was valid under Cree law. The Quebec Superior Court concluded that the laws of the Cree
remained in force43 and “the marriage was valid according to those laws”.44
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So what can we conclude from all of this? It would be naïve to suggest that the early relationship
between French and English colonizers and Indigenous peoples in Canada was one built entirely
on mutual respect, dialogue, and recognition. Colonial attitudes toward Indigenous peoples were
often fueled by feelings of cultural superiority.45 However, there was at least a tacit historical
acknowledgment by the Europeans that they were treating with self-governing peoples46, with
their own practices, protocols, and laws.47 This early recognition of a right to self-determination
is something that Canada has committed to re-building.48
However, in the aftermath of Confederation what occurred in Canada can be described as a
concerted policy of control and forced assimilation, the implications of which continue to be felt
to this day. After the creation of the Dominion of Canada the treaty making process intensified.
This was an effort to acquire large areas of land49 from the traditional territories of Canada’s
Indigenous peoples. Canada also developed federal legislation regarding Indigenous peoples,
leading to the passage of the Indian Act in 1876.50
The Indian Act regulates a number of different matters regarding reserves, status, and bands,
including the establishment of band councils (and by-laws), taxation, education, etc. It does not
apply to all Indigenous peoples as it specifically excludes Métis and Inuit peoples. Several
elements of the legislation worked to undermine Indigenous laws and self-determination. One of
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the more accessible resources on this topic is Bob Joseph’s book 21 Things You May Not Know
About the Indian Act.51 Joseph highlights two aspects of the Indian Act that are relevant to this
discussion.
First, it imposed the Chief and Band Council system.52 Prior to the Indian Act, First Nations
governed themselves in accordance with traditional systems that differed significantly from
Western European representative democracy. Canada made a concerted effort to replace these
traditional methods of governance with an elective system that was more reflective of European
institutions.53 This new model bore a striking similarity nineteenth century municipal
government: the community would vote on a representative council, led by an elected Chief, that
would be responsible for making decisions on behalf of the community.54 Those First Nations
who opposed this model and wished to retain a system of governance more consistent with their
culture, customs, traditions, and laws were met with force.55 For example, in 1924, despite
repeated objections, the Government of Canada forcibly removed the confederacy council
governing Six Nations and replaced them with an elected band council. No notice was provided
to Six Nations and the RCMP seized the wampum belts used during council proceedings before
announcing imposed election dates.56 This served to undermine a governance structure that
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operated in accordance with Haudenosaunee traditional laws (the Great Law of Peace) and has
had an impact that continues to be felt today.57
Second, for decades the Indian Act declared the potlach and other cultural ceremonies to be
illegal.58 Due to this prohibition whole generations of Indigenous peoples had to live in fear that
they would be charged for participating in their cultural practices.59 This had a devastating effect
not only on the cultural practices themselves but on ILTs. Indigenous law is intimately connected
to ceremony, culture, language, and land. Ceremonies like potlatch were, and remain, a vital
regulatory institution.60
Even in the face of Canada’s assimilative policies, Indigenous peoples were steadfast that they
possessed an inherent right of self-government and would remain self-determining peoples.
Eventually, Indigenous peoples turned to the burgeoning area of international law, where their
advocacy work, while initially unsuccessful, would eventually form part of the background to the
development of the Declaration.61
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1.3

History of UNDRIP

1.3.1

Precursors to UNDRIP

Although work on the Declaration did not formally begin until the 1980s, Indigenous leaders had
been advocating for a recognition of their rights in international law since the early 20th century.
Indigenous communities continued to appeal to International law during the post-World War
Two era.62 Inspired by the creation of the UN, the UN Charter’s focus on peoplehood rather than
statehood, and a number of relevant UN studies and declarations, Indigenous peoples pushed for
recognition of their rights in the international sphere.63
This work first bore fruit with the creation of two International Labour Organization (ILO)
conventions that could be viewed as precursors to the Declaration:64 C107 and C169. C107
recognized: (i) the economic, social, territorial, and cultural rights of Indigenous peoples; and (ii)
the status of ILTs (Indigenous customary law).65 C169 built upon C10766 and recognized a right
to community decision making, which may be seen as a precursor to FPIC:
The right most relevant to FPIC and community referenda is found in the strong language
of Article 7(1): "The peoples concerned shall have the right to decide their own priorities
for the process of development as it affects their lives, beliefs, institutions and spiritual
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well-being and the lands they occupy or otherwise use, and to exercise control, to the
extent possible, over their own economic, social and cultural development.67
C107 and C169 have not been ratified by Canada and have gained limited international
support.68 Despite this fact, the principles enshrined in these conventions laid the foundation for
what was to come.
By the 1970s, there were a number of campaigns by elders, organizations, leaders, and lawyers,69
that appealed to structures within the UN in an attempt to gain recognition of Indigenous rights.70
Throughout the decade, Indigenous leaders established organizations designed to place
Indigenous issues on the UN agenda, including the International Indian Treaty Council, the
World Council of Indigenous peoples, and the Inuit Circumpolar Conference.71
1.3.2

The Creation of the WGIP

The advocacy work of Indigenous leaders resulted in the establishment of the UN Working
Group on Indigenous Populations (“WGIP”) in 1982.72 The WGIP’s initial mandate was “to
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review developments pertaining to the promotion and protection of the human rights and
fundamental freedoms of indigenous populations and to give special attention to the evolution of
standards concerning the rights of Indigenous populations”.73 In 1985, the WGIP began work on
what would eventually become the Declaration.74 According to James (Sa’ke’j) Youngblood
Henderson (“Henderson”), over time many states left the WGIP, criticizing both the discussions
and the draft declaration principles as being “…unrealistic or impractical”.75 Despite the
withdrawal of many member states, work on the draft declaration continued. In 1993 the WGIP
completed its work and submitted the draft declaration to the Sub-Commission on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities76 (“SCPDPM”) for review. In 1994, the SCPDPM
“adopted the draft version of the [D]eclaration and submitted it to the Commission on Human
Rights for consideration”.77
1.3.3

Content of the 1993 Draft78

The 1993 version of the Declaration had several similarities to the final text of UNDRIP but
there are some notable differences. There are two changes from what was initially proposed in
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1993 and what was eventually agreed to in 2007 that are relevant to the debates over the scope
and content of FPIC that will be examined in further detail in Chapter two.
First, the language regarding FPIC was quite different in the 1993 draft. For example, Article 30
in the 1993 draft, which is similar to Article 32 in the UNDRIP, included stronger language that
expressly states that the consent of Indigenous peoples is required:
Article 30: Indigenous peoples have the right to determine and develop priorities and
strategies for the development or use of their lands, territories and other resources,
including the right to require that States obtain their free and informed consent prior to
the approval of any project affecting their lands, territories and other resources,
particularly in connection with the development, utilization or exploitation of mineral,
water or other resources. Pursuant to agreement with the indigenous peoples concerned,
just and fair compensation shall be provided for any such activities and measures taken to
mitigate adverse environmental, economic, social, cultural or spiritual impact.79
Article 20 in the 1993 draft, which is similar to Article 19 in the UNDRIP, also included stronger
language requiring consent when adopting or implementing legislative or administrative
measures that may affect them:
Article 20: Indigenous peoples have the right to participate fully, if they so choose,
through procedures determined by them, in devising legislative or administrative
measures that may affect them. States shall obtain the free and informed consent of the
peoples concerned before adopting and implementing such measures.80
Second, the 1993 draft did not include an equivalent of Article 46 of the UNDRIP which
guarantees the territorial integrity and sovereignty of members states and imposes limits on the
enunciated rights:
Article 46 (1) Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State,
people, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act contrary
to the Charter of the United Nations or construed as authorizing or encouraging any
action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or
political unity of sovereign and independent States.
79
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(2) In the exercise of the rights enunciated in the present Declaration, human rights and
fundamental freedoms of all shall be respected. The exercise of the rights set forth in this
Declaration shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law and in
accordance with international human rights obligations. Any such limitations shall be
non-discriminatory and strictly necessary solely for the purpose of securing due
recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and for meeting the just and
most compelling requirements of a democratic society.
(3) The provisions set forth in this Declaration shall be interpreted in accordance with the
principles of justice, democracy, respect for human rights, equality, non-discrimination,
good governance and good faith.81
These changes inform some of the academic treatment of the interpretation of the FPIC articles
in UNDRIP, as will be seen in chapter two.
By the mid 1990s progress on the Declaration had slowed significantly and it became apparent
that there was conflict surrounding the draft declaration’s definition of Indigenous peoples, its
articles regarding self-determination, its competing conceptions of individual versus collective
rights, and its potential effect on state sovereignty.82 Work on the Declaration stalled83 until the
early 2000s when the parties began to engage in serious negotiations about potential amendments
to the draft Declaration.84 These negotiations led to a compromise final text85 and a new version
was sent to the body that later became the Human Rights Council (“UNHRC”).86
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In June 2006, after decades of work, the UN Human Rights Council adopted the draft text of the
Declaration, with only Canada and Russia voting in opposition.87 The next step was to bring the
Declaration before the General Assembly for endorsement. A resolution to defer consideration of
the Declaration at the General Assembly was passed in 2006.88 What ultimately got state actors
to drop their opposition was the inclusion of Article 46.89 Finally, the draft declaration was
adopted by the UNGA in 2007.
1.4

Canada’s Evolving Response to the Declaration

This section will examine Canada’s evolving response to UNDRIP, from its initial opposition to
its eventual endorsement and commitment to implementation. Examining Canada’s opposition to
the Declaration is essential, as the concerns raised in 2007 regarding FPIC continue to dominate
the discourse to this day.
In 2007, the four countries which voted against the Declaration all had significant Indigenous
populations: Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States. In the following 14 years,
all four countries changed their positions on the Declaration. In 2009, the Australian government
provided a formal statement of support for the Declaration90 and New Zealand followed in April
2010.91 In December 2010, then President Barack Obama announced that the United States
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would reverse its previous position and endorsed the Declaration.92 Canada endorsed the
Declaration in 2010 via a Statement of Support,93 removed its permanent objectors status in May
2016 and committed to adopting and implementing the Declaration.94
It is worth exploring why Canada initially opposed the Declaration. Canada raised a number of
concerns about the Articles in the Declaration referring to FPIC.95 Canada focused its attention
on the following Articles:
Article 19: States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples
concerned through their own representative institutions in order to obtain their free, prior
and informed consent before adopting and implementing legislative or administrative
measures that may affect them.96
Article 32 (2): States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous
peoples concerned through their own representative institutions in order to obtain their
free and informed consent prior to the approval of any project affecting their lands or
territories and other resources, particularly in connection with the development,
utilization or exploitation of mineral, water or other resources.97
Canada argued that these articles were unduly restrictive and would grant Indigenous peoples a
veto that was incompatible with Canada’s democratic institutions.98 Canada’s ambassador to the
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UN at the time, John McNee, suggested that Canada supported promoting Indigenous rights, but
that Canada had a number of significant concerns with respect to the text of the UNDRIP,
notably the articles referencing FPIC:
Similarly, some of the provisions dealing with the concept of free, prior and informed
consent were unduly restrictive, he said. Provisions in the Declaration said that States
could not act on any legislative or administrative matter that might affect indigenous
peoples without obtaining their consent. While Canada had a strong consultative process,
reinforced by the Courts as a matter of law, the establishment of complete veto power
over legislative action for a particular group would be fundamentally incompatible with
Canada’s parliamentary system.99
Paul Joffe has suggested that one of the other reasons for opposing the Declaration was due to
the fact that the Conservative government of the time “opposed the right of Indigenous peoples
to self-government”.100 This is notable, given that several of the articles specifically address
Indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination and self-government.101
1.4.1

Canada’s Lukewarm Endorsement

As noted above, Canada’s position on the Declaration changed in 2010 when the Government of
Canada released a Statement of Support of the Declaration.102 However, this support came with
significant caveats. Canada argued that the Declaration: (1) was an “aspirational document”;103
(2) was “non-legally binding”;104 (3) did “not reflect customary international law”;105 and (4) did
not “change Canadian laws”.106 Canada also reiterated its concerns about the Declaration’s
articles referencing FPIC and the possibility of these articles creating a veto power for
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Indigenous peoples.107 Canada also maintained its permanent objector status to the Declaration,
suggesting that while it supported the spirit of the Declaration, it did not intend to be bound by
its contents.
1.4.2

Trudeau Government Changes Course - 2016

Canada maintained this position until May 2016, when Minister Carolyn Bennett indicated that
Canada would remove its permanent objector status and commit to adopting and implementing
the Declaration.108 Around this time, MP Romeo Saganash introduced a private member’s bill,
Bill C-262, which sought to implement the UNDRIP in Canadian law. The Bill was passed by
the House of Commons but faced opposition by a group of Conservative Senators. Their reasons
for opposing Bill C-262 echoed the concerns expressed by the Government of Canada in 2007
and 2010, specifically that the Bill “…could give Indigenous peoples a veto over resource
development projects”.109 The Bill was procedurally delayed by the Senate until it ultimately
dropped from the order paper when the Fall 2019 federal election was called.110 In the face of
Canada’s stated commitment to UNDRIP questions continued to be raised by politicians and
commentators regarding the interpretation of FPIC as well as the impact of the Declaration on
Indigenous sovereignty and self-determination.111
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1.4.3

Canada Introduces Bill C-15 to Implement UNDRIP

On December 3, 2020, the Trudeau Government tabled Bill C-15,112 An Act respecting the
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. The legislation includes an
extensive preamble that, among other things: refers to the UNDRIP as a “framework for
reconciliation”,113 confirms that the rights in the UNDRIP are a minimum standard114 and must
be “implemented in Canada”,115 affirms that the UNDRIP emphasizes “the inherent rights of
Indigenous peoples”,116 recognizes the “right to self-determination”117 of Indigenous peoples,
and affirms the UNDRIP as “a source for the interpretation of Canadian law”.118
Bill C-15 itself is a relatively short piece of legislation. First, it affirms UNDRIP “as a universal
international human rights instrument with application in Canadian law”.119 Second, it requires
the Government of Canada to “…ensure that the laws of Canada are consistent with the
Declaration”.120 Third, it requires the Government of Canada to develop “…an action plan to
achieve the objectives of the Declaration”.121 Fourth, it requires the Government of Canada to
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report to Parliament annually on the measures taken to implement UNDRIP.122 Fifth, as noted
above, the preamble of the Declaration states that “measures to implement the Declaration in
Canada must take into account the…legal traditions of First Nations, Inuit, and the Métis and of
their institutions and governance structures, their relationships to the land and Indigenous
knowledge”.123 On June 21, 2021 Bill C-15 received Royal Assent.
1.5

Why It Is Important to Examine UNDRIP through the lens of ILTs

This thesis argues that interpreting and implementing UNDRIP and specifically the articles
referencing FPIC, needs to be done in a way that meaningfully engages with and incorporates
ILTs. I offer six arguments in support of this position.
First, it is obvious from reviewing the work of those involved in the creation of the Declaration
that their intention was to challenge the legacy of settler-colonialism and to ensure that the
culture and laws of Indigenous peoples could be protected.124 Indigenous peoples saw the UN as
a body working on the issue of decolonization125 and that the creation of the Declaration would
allow Indigenous peoples to Indigenize human rights covenants by extending “Indigenous legal
traditions to comprehend how a self-determining people or individual would behave”.126
Scholars like Youngblood Henderson considered the Declaration itself to be reflective of the
teachings from ILTs127 and this was demonstrated by the approach he and others took to the
drafting process. Youngblood Henderson described the drafting of the Declaration as being
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grounded in dialogue, mutual respect, and a recognition of the plurality of legal traditions
represented at the United Nations:
The text of the Indigenous declaration was drafted through trans-systemic legalism; it
was not the voice of a single tradition, but a voice shared through, across, and beyond
many distinct legal traditions. The process demonstrated that the human rights regime
was consistent with Indigenous legal traditions and knowledge that predated European
colonization.128
The various legal traditions represented in the United Nations, the structure and style of
the Human Rights Covenants, and distinct Indigenous traditions converged in the drafting
of the proposed declaration…The declaration was drafted to confirm the existing
international human rights standards that apply to other peoples…Eleven years in
consultation, the text was a product of wrongs committed against Indigenous peoples. It
was drafted as a dialogue between Indigenous peoples and the independent legal experts
of the Working Group.129
It would be a mistake to ignore the context in which the Declaration emerged as well as the
intentions of Indigenous peoples to ensure that International Human Rights Law was reflective
of their legal traditions. We would do well to honour those who worked tirelessly to ensure the
Declaration was adopted by embracing a meaningful role for ILTs with respect to the
interpretation and implementation of UNDRIP.
Second, the Declaration itself recognizes the right of Indigenous peoples to maintain and develop
their legal traditions, to have disputes with state actors resolved via processes that consider the
laws of indigenous peoples, and to ensure that Indigenous peoples are able to engage with state
actors through their own representative institutions:
Article 20 (1): Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and develop their political,
economic and social systems or institutions, to be secure in the enjoyment of their own
means of subsistence and development, and to engage freely in all their traditional and
other economic activities
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Article 27: States shall establish and implement, in conjunction with indigenous peoples
concerned, a fair, independent, impartial, open and transparent process, giving due
recognition to indigenous peoples’ laws, traditions, customs and land tenure systems, to
recognize and adjudicate the rights of indigenous peoples pertaining to their lands,
territories and resources, including those which were traditionally owned or otherwise
occupied or used. Indigenous peoples shall have the right to participate in this process.
Article 32 (2): States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous
peoples concerned through their own representative institutions in order to obtain their
free and informed consent prior to the approval of any project affecting their lands or
territories and other resources, particularly in connection with the development,
utilization or exploitation of mineral, water or other resources.
Article 34: Indigenous peoples have the right to promote, develop and maintain their
institutional structures and their distinctive customs, spirituality, traditions, procedures,
practices and, in the cases where they exist, juridical systems or customs, in accordance
with international human rights standards.130
As will be discussed in Chapter Two, there is broad support amongst the International Human
Rights Law scholarship for the idea that one cannot read the articles referencing FPIC in
isolation. Many now advocate for a consideration of the inter-connectedness of the issues of selfdetermination, sovereignty, land rights, and FPIC. To ignore ILTs in the interpretation of FPIC
would demonstrate a disregard for the inter-connectedness of the articles in UNDRIP, many of
which are designed to protect and uphold the laws of Indigenous peoples. Article 34, for
example, recognizes a broad right of Indigenous peoples to promote, develop, and maintain their
juridical systems or customs.131 Furthermore, Article 32(2), which includes a reference to FPIC,
specifically discusses states consulting and cooperating with Indigenous peoples through their
own representative institutions.132 These representative institutions should remain grounded in
the customary laws and practices of Indigenous peoples.133
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Third, the Government of Canada has expressly stated that to effectively implement UNDRIP, it
is essential that Canada recognize and consider ILTs. For example the preamble of Bill C-15
states:
And whereas measures to implement the Declaration in Canada must take into account
the diversity of Indigenous peoples and, in particular, the diversity of the identities,
cultures, languages, customs, practices, rights and legal traditions of First Nations, Inuit
and the Métis and of their institutions and governance structures, their relationships to the
land and Indigenous knowledge.134
Although this language is in the preamble, and not in an operative provision, Canada’s
Interpretation Act states that “The preamble of an enactment shall be read as a part of the
enactment intended to assist in explaining its purport and object”.135 Canada’s choice of language
here is sending a clear signal that ILTs are to play a role regarding the implementation of the
Declaration, even if this role is not explicitly defined. Bill C-15 requires Canada to ensure the
laws of Canada are consistent with the Declaration, suggesting that if Canada were to, for
example, engage in a review of its existing duty to consult framework in light of FPIC, there
would be an obligation to incorporate ILTs in some capacity.
Fourth, the Supreme Court of Canada has confirmed that the customary laws of Indigenous
peoples may continue to apply in Canada. In Mitchell v MNR, Chief Justice McLachlin, writing
for the majority, stated that “English law…accepted that aboriginal peoples possessed preexisting laws”136 and that these laws are presumed to survive the assertion of Crown sovereignty
to form part of the common law137 unless:
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(1) they were incompatible with the Crown’s assertion of sovereignty, (2) they were
surrendered voluntarily via the treaty process, or (3) the government extinguished them:
see B. Slattery, “Understanding Aboriginal Rights” (1987), 66 Can. Bar
Rev. 727. Barring one of these exceptions, the practices, customs and traditions that
defined the various aboriginal societies as distinctive cultures continued as part of the law
of Canada.138
If ILTs continue to operate in Canada, then it would arguably be incumbent on the Court to
consider and apply any relevant ILTs to a discussion regarding the interpretation of the articles
requiring FPIC.
Fifth, a recognition and incorporation of Indigenous perspectives, including the laws of
Indigenous peoples, is essential to the process of reconciliation. The Supreme Court of Canada
and scholars have both recognized that a respect for ILTs will further serve to advance the
reconciliation139 that Canada publicly advocates.140
Sixth, adopting an approach to interpreting FPIC that incorporates ILTs is consistent with a
purposive reading of FPIC as well as International Human Rights Law more broadly. Article
46(3) of UNDRIP states that “[t]he provisions set forth in this Declaration shall be interpreted in
accordance with the principles of justice, democracy, respect for human rights, equality, nondiscrimination, good governance and good faith”.141 This appears to establish that any
interpretation of UNDRIP should be grounded in a purposive rather than a purely textual analysis
and in such a manner that it is consistent with International Human Rights Law.142 However, a
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few questions remain. What is the purpose of UNDRIP? And what does the broader human
rights law discourse suggest regarding the relationship between ILTs and the interpretation of
UNDRIP?
Opinions on this first question may vary, but for many the promotion of Indigenous selfdetermination is at the core of the rights expressed in the Declaration143 particularly when it
comes to the right to FPIC.144 For example, in 2001 Rodolfo Stavenhagen was named the Special
Rapporteur on the rights of Indigenous peoples. In his 2003 report to the Commission on Human
Rights, he highlighted how resource development and human rights “…involves a relationship
between indigenous peoples, Governments and the private sector which must be based on the full
recognition of indigenous peoples’ rights to their lands, territories and natural resources, which
in turn implies the exercise of their right to self-determination”.145
Former Special Rapporteur James Anaya has highlighted the importance of respecting
Indigenous self-determination when discussing the consultation process. Anaya suggests that a
duty to consult Indigenous peoples derives from International Human Rights Law’s recognition
of self-determination and sovereignty146 and that the focus should remain on ensuring procedures
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are in place to avoid “…the imposition of the will of one party over the other, and…[a] striving
for mutual understanding and consensual decision-making”.147
In terms of International Human Rights Law, engagement with ILTs appears to be an essential
element to the approach International Human Rights Law has taken to the interpretation of FPIC.
For example, in discussing FPIC, the UN’s Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples (“EMRIP”) came to two notable conclusions in 2018. First, that engagements with
Indigenous peoples must be ‘free’ which should include ensuring that “Indigenous
peoples…have the freedom to be represented as traditionally required under their own laws,
customs, and protocols”148 and that they “should have the freedom to guide and direct the
process for consultation”.149 Second, the EMRIP noted that consultation with Indigenous peoples
should be informed, meaning that Indigenous peoples should be provided information relevant to
the consultation that is “culturally appropriate, [and] in accordance with their inherent
traditions”.150
Scholars writing on this subject have pointed out that “internal governance and decision-making
structures [are] central to the right to self- determination, [so] it is necessarily the case that
Indigenous peoples engaged through FPIC processes enjoy a right to be engaged through
institutions of their choosing and design”151 and that in order for these “institutions to function
and be effective, Indigenous peoples must be able to maintain their own legal systems”.152
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Other scholars have suggested: (i) that ensuring that consultations are adequately informed
requires broad input from elders and traditional knowledge holders;153 (ii) that Indigenous
peoples should be able to reach a decision on a proposed project “…in accordance with their
customary laws and practices”;154 and (iii) that any scholarship on the interpretation of FPIC
“…should be based on the actual experiences of indigenous communities and reflect their
perspectives”.155 There are also examples outside the context of the UNDRIP where International
Human Rights Law has specifically recognized the importance of incorporating ILTs, notably
the articles relating to incorporating ILTs approved by the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights:
The following articles relating to incorporating of Indigenous legal traditions and laws
were approved by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights on February 26,
1997, at its 1333rd session, 95th regular session in Geneva, Switzerland and form part of
the Proposed American Declaration On The Rights Of Indigenous Peoples: Article XVI.
Indigenous Law 1. Indigenous law shall be recognized as a part of the states' legal system
and of the framework in which the social and economic development of the states takes
place. 2. Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and reinforce their Indigenous
legal systems and also to apply them to matters within their communities, including
systems related to such matters as conflict resolution, crime prevention and maintenance
of peace and harmony. 3. In the jurisdiction of any state, procedures concerning
Indigenous peoples or their interests shall be conducted in such a way as to ensure the
right of Indigenous peoples to full representation with dignity and equality before the
law. This shall include observance of Indigenous law and custom and, where necessary,
use of their language. Article XVII. National incorporation of Indigenous legal and
organizational systems 1. The states shall facilitate the inclusion in their organizational
structures, the institutions and traditional practices of Indigenous peoples, and in
consultation and with consent of the peoples concerned. 2. State institutions relevant to
and serving Indigenous peoples shall be designed in consultation and with the
participation of the peoples concerned so as to reinforce and promote the identity,
cultures, traditions, organization and values of those peoples.156
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What this all suggests is that in order to properly interpret UNDRIP and specifically the articles
referencing FPIC, it is essential to engage with and consider the applicability of ILTs.
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Chapter Two
2.

The Meaning of FPIC and the Role of ILTs: A Review of the Existing Scholarship

As noted above, Aboriginal law scholar Dwight Newman has suggested that “…the Court’s
interpretation of FPIC is…subject to uncertainties that have enormous implications for
Canada”.157 Fortunately there is no shortage of scholarship that has tackled this interpretive
question. This chapter consists of three parts. Part 1 is an examination of how sources of
International Human Rights Law, specifically UN representatives, international law bodies,
international law tribunals, and other countries, have interpreted the UNDRIP Articles that refer
to FPIC. Part 2 assesses the current state of the scholarship regarding the meaning and role of
FPIC. This section analyzes whether the scholarship has: (i) accounted for Indigenous
perspectives on FPIC; and (ii) assessed the relevance of ILTs in the
interpretation/implementation of FPIC.
2.1

Perspectives from International Human Rights Law

Since the Declaration was endorsed in 2007, scholars and advocates working in International
Human Rights Law have provided state actors with guidance on the interpretation and
implementation of the UNDRIP articles referencing FPIC. As a reminder, the relevant articles in
the Declaration (collectively referred to as the “FPIC Articles”) are as follows:
Article 10: Indigenous peoples shall not be forcibly removed from their lands or
territories. No relocation shall take place without the free, prior and informed consent of
the indigenous peoples concerned and after agreement on just and fair compensation and,
where possible, with the option of return.
Article 19: States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples
concerned through their own representative institutions in order to obtain their free, prior
157
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and informed consent before adopting and implementing legislative or administrative
measures that may affect them.
Article 29(2): States shall take effective measures to ensure that no storage or disposal of
hazardous materials shall take place in the lands or territories of indigenous peoples
without their free, prior and informed consent.158
Article 32 (1): Indigenous peoples have the right to determine and develop priorities and
strategies for the development or use of their lands or territories and other resources. (2)
States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples concerned
through their own representative institutions in order to obtain their free and informed
consent prior to the approval of any project affecting their lands or territories and other
resources, particularly in connection with the development, utilization or exploitation of
mineral, water or other resources.159
This section will highlight some of the conclusions made by international bodies within the UN
regarding the proper interpretation of the FPIC Articles.
2.1.1

UN Special Rapporteurs

UN Special Rapporteurs are “independent experts appointed by the U.N Human Rights
Council…with the mandate to monitor, advise, and publicly report…on human rights violations
worldwide (thematic mandates)”.160 Over the past 20 years, the UN has appointed three Special
Rapporteurs on the rights of Indigenous peoples, and each has attempted to provide the
international community with guidance on the interpretation of the FPIC Articles. In 2001,
Rodolfo Stavenhagen was appointed Rapporteur and, as noted above, in his 2003 report to the
Commission on Human Rights he highlighted how resource development and human rights,
“…involves a relationship between indigenous peoples, Governments and the private sector

158

UNDRIP, supra note 3.
Ibid.
160
ACLU, “FAQs: United Nations Special Rapporteurs” (last accessed 24 June 2021), online: ACLU
<https://www.aclu.org/other/faqs-united-nations-specialrapporteurs#:~:text=Special%20Rapporteurs%20are%20prominent%20human,country%20visits%20by%20Sp
ecial%20Rapporteurs%3F>.
159

42

which must be based on the full recognition of indigenous peoples’ rights to their lands,
territories and natural resources, which in turn implies the exercise of their right to selfdetermination”.161
Stavenhagen’s view was that sustainable development would only be achieved if Indigenous
peoples are able to determine “…their own vision of development, including their right to say
no”.162 Stavenhagen’s view on FPIC is not discussed in detail in his reports but he appears to
take the position that extractive resource development can only proceed if it includes a right for
Indigenous peoples to withhold their consent to projects that affect their lands and resources.
In March 2008, S. James Anaya was appointed Special Rapporteur and during his tenure he
released a series of reports that commented on the meaning of FPIC. Anaya’s perspectives on
FPIC have been widely embraced and endorsed in the International Human Rights Law
discourse and are worth exploring in detail. Anaya has noted that that discussion of FPIC
remains contentious, with entrenched and often “…conflicting points of view”.163 In his reports
Anaya comes to several conclusions regarding the meaning of FPIC. First, he confirms the duty
to consult is grounded in several “…universally accepted human rights, including the right to
cultural integrity, the right to equality, and the right to property”.164 Anaya also concluded that a
duty to consult Indigenous peoples derives from International Human Rights Law’s recognition
of self-determination and sovereignty.165
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Second, Anaya concludes that the duty to consult should apply in a broad set of circumstances,
specifically “…whenever a State decision may affect indigenous peoples in ways not felt by
others in society”.166
Third, Anaya argues that Article 19 of the Declaration should not be regarded as granting
Indigenous peoples a veto power, but instead should be understood as establishing that consent is
the objective of consultations.167 In general, Anaya expresses concern that discussions around
the Declaration end up devolving into a discussion about a veto,168 a concern he would no doubt
share about the state of the discourse in Canada. In Anaya’s opinion, this discussion misses the
point of how FPIC has developed in International Human Rights Law and how “…the principles
of consultation and consent…have been incorporated into the Declaration”.169 As noted above,
Anaya asks that the focus remain on ensuring that procedures are in place to avoid “…the
imposition of the will of one party over the other, and…[a] striving for mutual understanding and
consensual decision-making”.170
That being said, Anaya does acknowledge that the articles in the Declaration should impose a
duty to obtain the consent of Indigenous peoples but only when a proposed project would have a
significant impact on their lives or territories or when articles 10 and 29 are engaged:171
Necessarily, the strength or importance of the objective of achieving consent varies
according to the circumstances and the indigenous interests involved. A significant, direct
impact on indigenous peoples’ lives or territories establishes a strong presumption that
the proposed measure should not go forward without indigenous peoples’ consent. In
<https://d306pr3pise04h.cloudfront.net/docs/issues_doc%2Fhuman_rights%2FIndigenousPeoples%2FBusines
sGuide.pdf> at 25.
166
Anaya 12/34, supra note 146 at para 43.
167
Ibid at para 45-46.
168
Ibid at para 48.
169
Ibid at para 48.
170
Ibid at para 49.
171
Ibid at para 47.

44

certain contexts, that presumption may harden into a prohibition of the measure or project
in the absence of indigenous consent. The Declaration recognizes two situations in which
the State is under an obligation to obtain the consent of the indigenous peoples
concerned, beyond the general obligation to have consent as the objective of
consultations. These situations include when the project will result in the relocation of a
group from its traditional lands, and in cases involving the storage or disposal of toxic
waste within indigenous lands (arts. 10 and 29, para. 2, respectively).172
…extractive activities should not take place within the territories of indigenous peoples
without their free, prior and informed consent. Indigenous peoples’ territories include
lands that are in some form titled or reserved to them by the State, lands that they
traditionally own or possess under customary tenure (whether officially titled or not), or
other areas that are of cultural or religious significance to them or in which they
traditionally have access to resources that are important to their physical well-being or
cultural practices. Indigenous consent may also be required when extractive activities
otherwise affect indigenous peoples, depending upon the nature of and potential impacts
of the activities on the exercise of their rights.173
Fourth, Anaya has maintained that even when the Declaration requires the consent of Indigenous
peoples, there are circumstances where state actors can justify proceeding with projects absent
consent. Anaya concluded that consent may not be required in cases where “…it can be
conclusively established that the activities will not substantially affect indigenous peoples in the
exercise of any of their substantive rights in relation to the lands and resources within their
territories”174 or where it would impose limits that “…are permissible within certain narrow
bounds established by international human rights law”.175 These limits would have to comply
with relevant treaties176 and “…with certain standards of necessity and proportionality with
regard to a valid public purpose, defined within an overall framework of respect for human
rights”.177 Anaya concluded that this is consistent with the inclusion of Article 46 of UNDRIP
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which specifically recognizes that the rights contained therein can be limited in certain
circumstances.178 However, Anaya expressed caution about relying on economic benefits as the
grounds for limiting a right to FPIC.179
In 2014, Victoria Tauli-Corpuz, an Indigenous leader from the Philippines, was appointed to
replace Anaya as the Special Rapporteur on the rights of Indigenous peoples. In 2020, TauliCorpuz released her final report as Special Rapporteur and commented on international standards
on FPIC by sharing her definition of prior, informed, and consent.
Tauli-Corpuz defined prior as meaning that “…consultations need to be carried out before the
adoption of a measure, the granting of authorizations and permits, or the signing of contracts or
other definite commitments by States related to activities or projects, can affect indigenous
peoples”.180 Tauli-Corpuz defined informed as meaning that Indigenous peoples would have the
“…full knowledge of the scope, nature and impacts of a proposed measure or activity before its
approval, including possible environmental, health and other risks”.181
With respect to the definition of consent Tauli-Corpuz’s conclusions largely echoed those of
Anaya. Tauli-Corpuz maintained that focusing solely on the question of a veto “…would amount
to losing sight of the spirit and character of these principles”.182 She states that FPIC “…should
be understood as the objective of consultations and as an obligation in cases of significant
impacts on the rights of indigenous peoples”.183 Tauli-Corpuz also concluded that any
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restrictions on the broad right to FPIC should be consistent with international standards of
“legality, necessity and proportionality in relation to a valid public purpose”.184
2.1.2

Other UN Commentary on FPIC

Outside of the office of the Special Rapporteur, other UN bodies have commented on the
meaning of FPIC. I will highlight three examples. First, the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples (“EMRIP”), a body tasked with “…conduct[ing] studies to advance the
promotion and protection of Indigenous peoples’ rights”,185 has largely echoed the conclusions
of the Rapporteurs regarding the interpretation of FPIC,186 notably by concluding that the
significance of the proposed impact should determine whether consent is required:187
As to impact, if a measure or project is likely to have a significant, direct impact on
indigenous peoples’ lives or land, territories or resources then consent is required (see
A/HRC/12/34, para. 47). It has been referred to as a “sliding scale approach” to the
question of indigenous participatory rights, which means that the level of effective
participation that must be guaranteed to indigenous peoples is essentially a function of
the nature and content of the rights and activities in question. This view is supported by
the Human Rights Committee, which uses the language “substantive negative impact”,
and the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.188
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The EMRIP has also opened the door to an interpretation of FPIC that embraces a role for ILTs
by suggesting that Indigenous peoples’ consent should be consistent with their “own laws,
customs, protocols and practices”.189
Second, the UN has produced a series of handbooks for Parliaments and Parliamentarians
examining a variety of UN Declarations and Conventions. In September 2015, the UN released a
handbook entitled “Implementing the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples”. The
handbook includes a chapter on FPIC and why it is important for Parliamentarians. In general,
the conclusions reached in this handbook echo the commentary of the Special Rapporteurs,
specifically that obtaining consent should always be the objective of consultations, and that
consent is required if the potential impact is severe enough.190
The handbook defines ‘free’ as meaning “no coercion, intimidation or manipulation”;191 ‘prior’
as meaning that consent needs to be “sought sufficiently in advance of any authorization or
commencement of activities and respective requirements of indigenous consultation/consensus
processes”;192 and ‘informed’ as meaning that the information provided to Indigenous peoples:
covers a range of aspects, [including, inter alia]…the nature, size, pace, reversibility and
scope of any proposed project or activity; the reason/s or purpose of the project and its
duration; locality or areas affected; a preliminary assessment of the likely economic,
social, cultural and environmental impact, including potential risks; personnel likely to be
involved in the execution of the project; and procedures the project may entail.193
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Another notable UN source is the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
(“CERD”), which has taken a particular interest in several of Canada’s resource development
projects and the effect that these have had on Indigenous communities. In late 2019, CERD
released a decision against Canada pursuant to its early-warning measures and urgent
procedures. In the decision CERD expressed concerns that the Site C Dam (British Columbia)
and Trans Mountain Pipeline Project (British Columbia and Alberta) were continuing without
FPIC and called for a cease on construction of these projects until consent was obtained.194 These
projects are significant to the Canadian economy, will cross the territories of many Indigenous
communities, and have been subject to steadfast opposition by Indigenous peoples who have yet
to provide their consent to the projects.195
Despite CERD’s concerns and in the face of Indigenous opposition, Canada has proceeded with
work on these projects. In 2020 Canada responded to CERD explaining that Canada’s
interpretation of FPIC was informed by its duty to consult framework, which mandated a process
but not a particular result. This interpretation is somewhat similar to the one advocated by Anaya
and others. In November 2020, CERD wrote to the Government of Canada expressing concern
about this approach to FPIC, stating:
The Committee regrets the State party interprets the free, prior and informed consent
principles as well as the duty to consult as a duty to engage in a meaningful and good
faith dialogue with indigenous peoples and to guarantee a process, but not a particular
194
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result. In this regard, the Committee would like to draw its attention on [sic] the
Committee’s general recommendation No. 23 (1997) on the rights of Indigenous peoples,
in which it calls upon States parties to ensure that no decisions directly relating to the
rights or interests of Indigenous peoples is [sic] taken without their informed consent.196
CERD has not explained precisely how they interpret the consent requirement, but they appear to
be applying a fairly strict standard, one that provides Indigenous peoples with a clear right to
withhold their consent.
In general, the Special Rapporteurs and the relevant UN bodies appear to interpret the FPIC
Articles as being primarily about processes with consent as the goal. However, in instances
where a proposed state action will have a significant impact, consent may be required. They have
also concluded that even a right to consent can be limited pursuant to Article 46; however, the
basis for these limits is still subject to debate. It is worth noting CERD’s response to Canada’s
recent actions in British Columbia, but it remains to be seen whether this represents a meaningful
shift in how some UN actors, including the Special Rapporteurs and the EMRIP, interpret FPIC.
2.1.3

International Developments Regarding FPIC

A full comparative analysis of how FPIC has been interpreted outside of Canada is beyond the
scope of this thesis. However, it is worth noting: (i) some of the jurisprudence of international
courts on the interpretation of FPIC; and (ii) some recent developments in countries that
committed to implementing the Declaration.
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Regarding the international jurisprudence, scholars often point to the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights (“IACHR”) as the body responsible for some of most important and interesting
developments in the area of Indigenous peoples’ rights to “lands, resources, consultation, and
consent”.197
There are two decisions of the IACHR that are worth noting. The first is Saramaka People v
Suriname. In this case, the IACHR found that the Surinamese government “had issued a number
of concessions for timber extraction to Chinese logging companies in the mid-1990s without
obtaining the consent of the Saramaka and even without consulting them”.198 The Saramaka
petitioned, and the court issued its judgment in November 2007. The Court ruled that the rights
of Indigenous peoples were not absolute and could be subject to restrictions but that safeguards
were to be put in place, including a right to participate,199 a right to benefit from plans within
their lands,200 and a right to an “environmental and social impact assessment”.201
The IACHR went on to note that “…regarding large-scale development or investment projects
that would have a major impact within Saramaka territory, the State has a duty, not only to
consult with the Saramaka, but also to obtain their free, prior, and informed consent, according to
their customs and traditions”.202 This is largely consistent with the views expressed by the
Special Rapporteurs noted above.
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The second major case was Sarayaku v Ecuador. Although the case does not add much by way
of analysis of FPIC, it did confirm “that consultations must be in good faith and with the explicit
objective to obtain consent regarding the proposed activities”.203 The court also ruled that “…the
obligations of States to consult with Indigenous peoples is [sic] now a general principle of
international law”.204
It is also worth noting some recent developments in countries that have committed to
implementing UNDRIP, specifically Chile and the Philippines.205 In November 2013, “Chile
adopted Supreme Decree No. 66/2013, which regulates the procedure for consultation with
indigenous people pursuant to the ILO Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (No.
169)”.206 At the time this decree was adopted, Chile noted that the consultation processes “…did
not include a right of Indigenous peoples to veto”.207 In 1997, the Philippine government enacted
the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA). Pursuant to the IRPA, the FPIC of Indigenous
peoples “…is needed before the implementation of any action or measure which may affect the
ICCs/IPs”.208 The Act defines FPIC as meaning:
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the consensus of all members of the ICCs/IPs [Indigenous Cultural
Communities/Indigenous Peoples] to be determined in accordance with their respective
customary laws and practices, free from any external manipulation, interference and
coercion, and obtained after fully disclosing the intent and scope of the activity, in a
language and process understandable to the community.209
Despite the broad definition of FPIC expressed in the IPRA, some authors have expressed
concerns over how it is being applied in practice.210
It appears that, in general, the jurisprudence and international developments largely echo the
approach that consent of Indigenous peoples should be the general goal that but that it will only
be required for projects that will have a major impact on them.
2.2

Literature Review

There is a substantial amount of scholarship discussing the scope and meaning of the FPIC
articles within UNDRIP, including its history and interpretation. Some of the notable scholars
who have written on this subject include: Dwight Newman, James (Sa’ke’j) Youngblood
Henderson, Gordon Christie, Karen Engle, Kenneth Deer, Erica-Irene Daes, Andrew Erueti,
Jeremie Gilbert, Mauro Barelli, Cathal Doyle, Michael Coyle, Philippe Hanna, Martin Papillon,
Roberta Rice, Jeremy Patzer, Avigail Eisenberg, Stuart Butzier, Tara Ward, Terry Mitchell, Ken
S. Coates, Blaine Favel, Kathryn Tomlinson, Val Napoleon, Thierry Rodon, S.J. Rombouts,
Nathan Yaffe, Brenda Gunn, Dominique Leydet, Jeffery Hewitt, and Claire Charters.
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This section will highlight the competing potential interpretations of FPIC identified in the
scholarship, including what the scholarship has to say about when consent is required. As a
reminder, the relevant articles in the Declaration (collectively referred to as the “FPIC
Articles”)211 are set out in full on pages 41-42.
What emerges from a review of the literature are six areas of consensus regarding the
interpretation of the FPIC Articles, and three differing schools of thought on what the FPIC
Articles require.
The first point of consensus is that you cannot read the FPIC Articles purely in isolation. Many
advocate for a consideration of the inter-connectedness of self-determination, sovereignty, land
rights, and FPIC.212 Authors like Phillipe Hanna and Frank Vanclay acknowledge that “FPIC is
intrinsically connected to the idea of self-determination, which basically argues that ‘human
beings, individually and as groups, are equally entitled to be in control of their own destinies,
and to live within governing institutional orders that are devised accordingly”.213 This is a
perspective shared by several scholars writing in the area.214
Second, although not discussed in detail in the literature, several scholars in the area have argued
that focusing solely on the debate over a veto fails to engage with the Declaration in an
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appropriate or meaningful way. This has led many to suggest that, when discussing the
interpretation of the FPIC Articles, all parties should be focused on processes and not just
outcomes.215
Third, there is a general agreement that procedures put in place to secure FPIC should ensure
Indigenous peoples’ own institutions, representatives, and decision-making processes are
respected.216 Opinions over how this can be achieved may vary,217 but there is little dispute that
Indigenous peoples “should be able to participate [in consultations] through their own freely
chosen representatives”218 and reach a decision “through their traditional decision-making
processes and…in accordance with their customary laws and practices”.219
Fourth, there appears to be no debate that Articles 10 and 29, which refer to the relocation of
Indigenous peoples and the storage of hazardous materials, includes an obligation on the part of
states to obtain the consent of Indigenous peoples in those specific circumstances.220
Fifth, the rights in the Declaration, including a right to FPIC are not absolute and can be subject
to limits. Although there is still intense disagreement about what these limits are and who should
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be determining them, there is a general consensus that, as established by Article 46(2), the
exercise of the right to FPIC will be subject to limits.221 This suggests that, in the event consent
is not obtained, it is reasonable to expect the state to be able to infringe the right to FPIC in
certain circumstances.
Sixth, despite a lack of consensus over the precise meaning of FPIC, many adopt a similar
definition of ‘free’, ‘prior’ and ‘informed’ for the purposes of the FPIC Articles.222 There is a
consensus that “free” means “no coercion, bribery, rewards, intimidation, or manipulation…not
being rushed by external timelines and that decisions are made voluntarily, with the rights
holders determining the process, timelines, and decision-making structure”.223 What constitutes
coercion is unclear but some have suggested that it includes circumstances where the state
conditions basic services like education or health care upon the acceptance of a certain project.224
Prior means that consent should be sought early in the process, before decisions have been made
on projects, and with enough time to satisfy “Indigenous consultation and consensus
processes”.225 Informed means that Indigenous communities are provided with all of the
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information needed to make a decision, but also that the “…information is accurate, objective,
and understandable”.226
Despite some areas of consensus, the scholarship is divided over the question of whether the
FPIC Articles provide Indigenous communities with a right to say no to certain projects and what
Articles 19 and 32 require state actors to do when either (i) adopting or implementing legislative
or administrative measures that may affect them; or (ii) approving projects that will affect
indigenous peoples’ lands, territories, or resources.
The literature appears particularly divided over the legal and political consequences if an
Indigenous community refuses to provide its consent. Do the FPIC Articles impose “on states an
obligation to obtain the consent of Indigenous peoples before initiating, or authorising
developments projects on their lands”?227 If so, in what circumstances? What happens if they
refuse? Are state actors obligated to respect this refusal? There are three prevailing schools of
thought addressing these interrelated questions.
The first is the process over outcome approach. This school of thought would suggest that
Articles 10 and 29(2) clearly require state actors to obtain consent, but Articles 19 and 32(2)
which contain the phrase “in order to obtain” the FPIC of Indigenous peoples, only require state
actors to engage in a good faith effort to obtain the consent of Indigenous peoples. In other
words, the later Articles establish that state actors must consult with Indigenous peoples via
processes where consent is the objective, but that there is no obligation to actually obtain
consent.
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Dwight Newman has expressed support for this interpretation in the past, stating that “the FPIC
requirement can be thought of more as a requirement to have certain types of processes in
operation”228 and that it is possible that what UNDRIP actually guarantees is access to processes
where obtaining consent is the overarching goal.229 This is also the position adopted by the
Government of Canada, which announced a set of ten principles respecting the Government of
Canada’s relationship with Indigenous peoples, one of which was a recognition “that meaningful
engagement with Indigenous peoples aims to secure their free, prior, and informed consent”.230
Notice the emphasis on consent as an objective as opposed to an outcome.
Newman has raised two arguments in support of this process over outcome interpretation of the
FPIC Articles. The first relies heavily on the drafting history of the Declaration, specifically the
fact that early and ultimately rejected drafts of UNDRIP included an express requirement to
obtain consent whereas the final version differs:231
It is important to interpret the text of the UNDRIP in accordance with international law
approaches to interpretation, and these approaches put a lot of emphasis on the wording
of the text. The drafting history of the UNDRIP actually shows the development of
wording that may not require that states obtain consent. Article 32(2) of UNDRIP, the
most commonly referenced article on FPIC in the natural resource context (along with the
more general article 19), states: States shall consult indigenous peoples in order to obtain
their free and informed consent prior to the approval of any project affecting their lands
or territories and other resources, particularly in connection with the development,
utilization or exploitation of mineral, water or other resources. The original draft of what
has become article 32(2) from 1994 read slightly differently: Indigenous peoples have the
right to determine and develop priorities and strategies for the development or use of their
lands, territories and other resources, including the right to require that States obtain their
free and informed consent prior to the approval of any project affecting their lands,
territories and other resources, particularly in connection with the development,
228
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utilization or exploitation of mineral, water or other resources. (Article 30) The 1994
draft wording said that Indigenous peoples could “require that States obtain their free and
informed consent”; the actual ultimate wording says that states “shall consult indigenous
peoples in order to obtain their free and informed consent.” This difference in wording in
a legal document is significant. The first wording, from the 1994 draft document, said
states could be required to obtain consent. The actually adopted wording says they should
take steps “in order to obtain” consent, meaning that they must try to obtain consent –
they would not violate this article if they proceed without consent after having made a
good faith effort to obtain it. Some might question whether this interpretation fits the
spirit of UNDRIP and might object to seemingly formal and legalistic readings. But if the
text was meant to be a legal text, as those arguing most strenuously for its application
claim it to be, then it must be approached as a legal text.232

Newman concludes that this change in language is essential to the proper interpretation of FPIC,
a claim that will be assessed in detail below.
Second, Newman points to the French language text of UNDRIP which clearly refers to good
faith processes rather than requiring consent to be obtained for every project.233 For example, as
Newman points out, the French-language version references “the idea of a good faith process
(“bonne foi”) and the idea of consent being an objective (“en vue d’obtenir”). The wording
actually makes clear that the actual obtaining of consent is not mandatory – what is mandatory is
a legitimate, good faith process”.234
I would challenge this strict process over outcome interpretation of FPIC for three reasons. First,
Newman seems to be suggesting it is obvious that the use of the phrase “in order to” means that
consent is not required and is simply a goal. I disagree that this is the only possible
interpretation. ‘In order to’ is a phrase usually meant to express “the purpose of something”.235 In
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its ordinary usage, the phrase ‘in order to’ can serve to tell the reader why you are doing
something without reducing the action itself to a mere aspiration. For example, in the sentence ‘I
am going to leave in 15 minutes in order to pick up my son from day care’, picking up my son is
not something I hope to accomplish. I am going to pick up my son. The inclusion of the phrase
‘in order to’ is there to connect the main and subordinate clauses;236 in other words, to tell the
reader why I am leaving in 15 minutes. It is not apparent that the inclusion of the phrase ‘in order
to’ in Articles 19 and 32(2) shifts it from a substantive right to an aspiration.
Second, an interpretation of the FPIC Articles that focuses primarily on a textual analysis of the
final language is overly formalistic and positivist in its approach, a point that Newman freely
acknowledges.237 This process over outcome approach often relies exclusively on a strict reading
of the text or the drafting history of the Declaration to support a limited scope of the right to
FPIC. Authors like Newman and Mauro Barelli do not commit themselves to this
interpretation;238 however their understanding of the Declaration is clearly greatly informed by
the negotiation of the text itself. Newman and Barelli allude to a purposive reading of the
Declaration in their work239 but it is clear that their thinking remains firmly rooted in a
discussion of the language included in the final version of the Declaration and its drafting
history.240
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While I cannot say that this approach is without merit, it is missing an essential element, a
recognition of ILTs. In his piece “Interpreting FPIC in UNDRIP”, Newman recognizes that there
are different interpretive methodologies that could be adopted when examining the Declaration.
Newman mentions a textual analysis and a purposive reading but fails to discuss the possibility
of ILTs serving as an interpretive methodology. Newman’s work is rooted in how traditional
principles of international law would approach the question of interpreting UNDRIP.241 Given
the important role that UNDRIP can play in advancing meaningful reconciliation between
Indigenous peoples and the Crown, I would argue that a textual analysis, which relies heavily on
the drafting history of the Declaration, fails to achieve this reconciliation. It fails to account for
Indigenous perspectives and, as Youngblood Henderson has noted, represents a “pre-occupation
of the nation-states with legalism…[and worrying] about the implications of indigenous
rights”.242
Third, I would echo and expand upon the concerns of Nathan Yaffe who has suggested that
conceiving of FPIC through proponent driven consultative processes can fuel what he calls
“FPIC’s normative drift”,243 whereby FPIC is separated from its normative foundation, which he
maintains is rooted in self-determination.244 In his piece “Indigenous consent: A selfdetermination perspective”, Yaffe highlights how proponents interests can result in approaches to
consultation that may serve to undermine the very reasons for FPIC’s existence.245 In conceiving
of FPIC as solely limited to a process aiming for consent rather than a substantive right to
provide or withhold consent, supporters of this process over outcome approach can also work to
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undermine FPIC’s normative basis. Processes matter, but if state actors retain the ability to act
unilaterally vis-à-vis Indigenous peoples and their consent is not a required outcome, I would
question whether it can be said that Indigenous people have any real ability to exercise selfdetermination under this interpretation of FPIC.
The second school of thought, which is widely supported in the literature, is the “sliding-scale
approach”.246 This approach maintains that the inclusion of the phrase “in order to obtain” means
that Articles 19 and 32 do not require state actors “…to obtain the consent of indigenous peoples
before implementing any project on their lands”.247 As a result, Indigenous peoples are not
granted a universal right to veto certain projects. Instead, the focus should remain on developing
processes whose objective is obtaining the consent of Indigenous peoples,248 similar to the first
school of thought discussed above. However, unlike the process over outcome approach, this
school of thought suggests that the Declaration goes further than simply ensuring Indigenous
peoples are consulted and able to actively participate in that consultation. Instead consent will be
considered essential “when there is a potential for a profound or major impact on the property
rights of an indigenous people or where their physical or cultural survival may be
endangered”.249According to Mauro Barelli:
Article 32 must be necessarily approached with a certain degree of flexibility. In
particular, it would seem difficult to argue that this provision categorically excludes that
at least under exceptional circumstances indigenous peoples might be entitled to oppose a
development project. Intuitively, the problem with such a reading is that Article 32 does
not specify under what circumstances indigenous peoples should be entitled to veto a
project.250
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In other words, this approach maintains that while there is no absolute veto found in the
Declaration, it does permit Indigenous peoples to “…refuse to grant their consent when a project
would have a significant impact”.251 This is the approach supported by the UN Special
Rapporteurs (particularly James Anaya), the International Human Rights Law Jurisprudence, and
the Expert Mechanism for the Rights of Indigenous peoples. The Expert Mechanism has stated:
..if a measure or project is likely to have a significant, direct impact on indigenous
peoples’ lives or land, territories or resources then consent is required….It has been
referred to as a “sliding scale approach” to the question of indigenous participatory rights,
which means that the level of effective participation that must be guaranteed to
indigenous peoples is essentially a function of the nature and content of the rights and
activities in question.252

This approach is also supported by Mauro Barelli, who rejects the argument some states make
that Indigenous peoples should never have the power to withhold their consent to projects253 and
instead appears to adopt the approach that: (i) consent should always be the goal;254 (ii)
“Indigenous people should always have a realistic chance to affect the outcome of the relevant
consultations”;255 and (iii) “there may be circumstances in which Indigenous peoples should have
the right not just to give consent but also to withhold it. In other words, when a project is likely
to produce a major negative impact on the lands, rights and, ultimately, lives of Indigenous
peoples, then states will have a duty, not only to consult, but also to obtain their consent”.256
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Cathal Doyle has described this interpretation of FPIC as one of the two prevailing schools of
thought on the subject.257
There are several issues with this approach to interpreting FPIC. First, simply from a textual
analysis of the Declaration, there is nothing contained within it that suggests that the identified
rights are to be interpreted, understood, or applied based on the severity of the impact of the
proposed state action. While I can appreciate the effort to avoid a narrow reading of the
Declaration that places consent as an objective rather than an outcome, to impose a sliding scale
where consent is only required in certain circumstances is not grounded in any reasonable
reading of the Declaration itself. As mentioned above, a strict reading of the Declaration carries
with it its own shortcomings, however, it is valid to consider the basis for this “sliding scale”
approach and whether it has its origins in the text of the Declaration itself.
Second, I would echo the concerns of some scholars who have pointed out that the sliding-scale
approach does not do enough to challenge the power imbalances that exist between state actors
and Indigenous peoples. For example, under this approach it is unclear who determines what
state action is severe enough to trigger an obligation to obtain consent. As Dominique Leydet has
pointed out, embracing this sliding scale approach can have consequences given that it will likely
be the state that has to make this ultimate decision regarding the potential impact:
The question of who is to determine the potential impact of a project, whether it is
important enough to trigger the requirement of consent, will now either be up to another
agent (like the government) or will involve different agents in processes of adjudication
or negotiations that may well reflect existing power imbalances. For Indigenous peoples,
this means abdicating a crucial condition of effective agency; the ability to determine for
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themselves, according to criteria that they endorse, the impact that a project may have
and whether it is acceptable.258
Although it is possible, and perhaps preferable, that Indigenous peoples should be the ones who
decide if an impact is significant enough to trigger a duty to obtain consent,259 the sliding scale
approach provides no answer to this issue, leaving open the possibility for state actors to set the
circumstances where consent is required. Furthermore, the sliding-scale approach fails to
meaningfully address the circumstances where a right to consent exists, no consent is reached,
and the state wishes to proceed anyway. As discussed above, the rights expressed in the
Declaration are subject to limits, but it is unclear who determines those limits and what grounds
could justify a limitation. If the state, whether through the judiciary or the legislature, retains the
unilateral power to determine what circumstances warrant consent and what limits on rights
should be set, then it is difficult to argue that this interpretation of FPIC serves to meaningfully
promote Indigenous self-determination.
It also raises alarm bells to observe the striking similarities between this sliding scale approach
and Canada’s current duty to consult framework. One cannot help but think about the concerns
raised by Indigenous communities about how the current framework has been applied when
evaluating this sliding-scale approach.260
As noted above, there is a consensus that self-determination, something guaranteed by several
articles in UNDRIP, is a fundamental aspect of the Declaration and a principle that informs any
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analysis of a right to FPIC. Some have argued that FPIC is essential to meaningful selfdetermination because it provides Indigenous peoples with “…the right to reject projects or
measures that direct impact on a people and thereby enable them to exercise control over their
destiny”.261
I share the concerns of scholar Joshua Nichols, who has suggested that the duty to consult
framework in Canada does not always serve to promote Indigenous self-determination but
instead can work to undermine it.262 In his testimony before the Standing Senate Committee on
Aboriginal Peoples, Nichols stated that the duty to consult case law says quite clearly that
Indigenous peoples do not have a veto but what they are really saying is that “…Indigenous
parties lack the capacity to say no because, ultimately, unilateral infringement is on the table.
That has led to a problem in the case law because if a party can’t say no to a negotiation, that’s
not a negotiation”.263
Supporters of Canada’s duty to consult framework often reject this line of argument by pointing
to the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia264 where the
court confirmed that where a group holds title over an area of land, “…governments and others
seeking to use the land must obtain the consent of the Aboriginal title holders”.265 However, this
is at best lip service to the notion of consent as the government retains the ability to unilaterally
act via the principle of justified infringement. In Tsilhqot’in the court held that if consent was
withheld, the Crown retained the ability to unilaterally act so long as the Crown discharged its
261
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duty to consult and cleared a series of legal hurdles to justify its infringement.266 While these
hurdles do provide some protection to Indigenous communities whose interests are at stake, I do
not believe this constitutes consent in any meaningful sense of the word.
For example, in its analysis the Court discusses some of the interests that could justify an
infringement on Aboriginal title. The Court concludes that:
the development of agriculture, forestry, mining, and hydroelectric power, the general
economic development of the interior of British Columbia, protection of the environment
or endangered species, the building of infrastructure and the settlement of foreign
populations to support those aims, are the kinds of objectives that are consistent with this
purpose and, in principle, can justify the infringement of [A]boriginal title.267
If the Crown retains the ability to infringe established Aboriginal title and therefore unilaterally
impose a decision based on grounds as vague as “general economic development” I would
question whether it can be properly said that Indigenous people have any real ability to withhold
consent and therefore exercise meaningful self-determination. An argument can be made that
Canada’s duty to consult framework, as currently constituted is inconsistent with the spirit and
intent of UNDRIP as it fails to promote Indigenous self-determination. To the extent this
framework shares any similarities with the “sliding-scale approach” to FPIC, I would raise
similar concerns.
The third issue with this sliding scale approach is that it also relies on an overly formalistic and
textual analysis of the Declaration. Scholars like Barelli who appear to embrace this approach
rely on the drafting history of the Declaration as the starting point for their analysis:
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The starting point should be the text of the draft declaration adopted in 1994 by the UN
Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities.
Crucially, this version of the Declaration constituted the basis for the negotiations that
took place between 1995 and 2006 at the Working Group on the Draft Declaration
(WGDD), that is, the body created by the Human Rights Commission to further elaborate
on the draft text with a view to presenting a final version of the Declaration to the
General Assembly for its adoption.268
Much like Newman’s own approach to this issue, Barelli’s conception of FPIC is based on a
rather strict reading of the text of UNDRIP and focuses far too much on the evolution of the
language within the Declaration rather than on the purpose of the Declaration itself. Given the
important role that UNDRIP can play in achieving meaningful reconciliation between
Indigenous peoples and the Crown I argue that a less strict and more purposive interpretation
should guide this analysis.
The third school of thought conceives of FPIC primarily as a tool for protecting Indigenous
sovereignty and self-determination. This approach suggests “that FPIC is required for any
project or activity affecting their [Indigenous peoples] lands, territories and resources or their
well-being”.269 No sliding-scale of impact, no guarantee of process but not outcomes, instead an
interpretation of FPIC as a universal right which ensures Indigenous peoples have the ability to
either give or withhold their consent at any time.
The reasons for embracing this approach can vary but it may stem from a belief, expressed by
Roberta Rice, that “…for a FPIC process to be genuine, it must offer the possibility of
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withholding consent”.270 Others like Cathal Doyle have suggested that an interpretation of FPIC
that requires state actors to obtain consent for all activities that may impact the lands, territories,
resources, or well-being of Indigenous people is more consistent with the principle of selfdetermination that is at the heart of UNDRIP.271 In Doyle’s view, a consultation and negotiation
regime that does not obligate the state to obtain consent “…freezes existing power relations and
leaves indigenous peoples with no leverage to influence the outcome of decision-making
processes”.272
Scholars who have written about this approach have also directly tackled the idea of FPIC as a
veto. Papillon and Rodon have stated that discussing FPIC as a veto misses the point of the
Declaration. They call for a shift in thinking to view FPIC as a relational concept, where selfdetermining partners (Indigenous peoples and the state) come together in an effort to provide
their mutual consent.273 In their view conceiving of FPIC as a veto fundamentally
misunderstands the relationship between the Crown and Indigenous peoples. They argue that
each of these parties are independent decision-makers, partners in a nation-to-nation
relationship.274 In their piece “Indigenous Consent and Natural Resource Extraction: Foundations
for a Made-in-Canada Approach” they quote Roshan Danesh who argues that: “the Crown and
Aboriginal groups are different decision-makers acting under different authorities. One does not
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‘veto’ the decision of the other. Neither has the power to reach into the other’s jurisdiction and
trump the decision of the other. The relationship is one of difference and distinction — not of
inferiority and superiority”.275 Scholars like Shin Imai have also written about how Indigenous
peoples themselves do not conceive of FPIC as a veto right, as the rights in the Declaration are
not absolute.276
In contrast, scholars like Dominique Leydet suggest that we should not shy away from
interpreting FPIC as a veto right and instead embrace this as something which Indigenous
peoples are entitled to as self-determining peoples. Leydet argues that once we accept that FPIC
means that Indigenous peoples can prevent projects from proceeding, we can turn our attention
to the circumstances where a refusal to consent could be overridden:
Cancelling the veto dimension of consent in FPIC denies Indigenous peoples the capacity
to exercise significant control over some of their most fundamental interests. Such an
interpretation is difficult to square with the basic purpose of the Declaration as expressed
in its preamble as well as with the right to self-determination affirmed in its third
operative article. Following the standard grammar, we should instead accept the veto
dimension of consent and clarify the circumstances in which a refusal to consent can be
overridden, given that rights (including Indigenous rights) are not absolute.277
Leydet’s point regarding limitations is an important one. As mentioned above, even the most
ardent supporters of a broad interpretation of FPIC acknowledge that the right is not absolute.
Scholars have written about the inclusion of Article 46(2) within UNDRIP and the circumstances
in which a right to withhold consent could be overridden. For example, Doyle has suggested that
broad appeals to public interest or national development cannot be invoked to justify limiting
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FPIC278 and that perhaps the only grounds for justifying infringement would be to ensure that
Indigenous peoples’ exercise of self-determination is consistent with the rights to selfdetermination of others in the state.279
Generally speaking, this third school of thought regarding the interpretation of FPIC seems to
strike the appropriate balance between a recognition for self-determination and the content of the
Declaration itself. It is a reading that is justifiable on the face of the text of UNDRIP and
provides the greatest support for Indigenous self-determination. However, this approach does
leave a number of important questions unaddressed. For example, whose consent is required?
What if a community is split over whether or not to provide consent to a proposed project? It also
remains to be seen what effect historic treaties might have on this conception of FPIC.280 If the
affected lands/territories were at one time the subject of a “taking up” clause, which permitted
“the ‘taking up’ of lands for non-Indigenous settlement, mining, lumbering, and other
purposes”,281 might the existence of these treaties affect the right to provide or withhold consent?
This appears to be unaddressed by the literature and remains an outstanding question that even
the most ardent defenders of a broad conception of FPIC will likely have to tackle, particularly
within the Canadian context.
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2.3

What’s Missing from the Discussion of FPIC?

2.3.1 General Approaches to ILTs When Examining FPIC
Although a significant amount has been written about the interpretation of FPIC, the scholarship,
with a few notable exceptions discussed below, has failed to account for Indigenous perspectives
and has not meaningfully assessed the relevance of ILTs in the interpretation of the FPIC
Articles. In fact, the bulk of the scholarship either ignores or makes passing reference to ILTs in
its interpretation and implementation of the FPIC Articles. Authors will instead focus on
examining corporate-generated guidelines regarding FPIC,282 the wealth of International Human
Rights Law on the subject,283 or the commentary coming out of international institutions like the
World Bank.284 This does not mean that there are not some scholars who have recognized the
importance of ILTs to this discussion. Martin Papillon has specifically commented on the
relevance of Indigenous views on consent as well as the lack of attention paid to ILTs.285 Cathal
Doyle has written about Indigenous models of FPIC albeit in fairly general terms.286 Deborah
Curran has discussed FPIC as a framework for evaluating the effect of projects on water
sustainability while relying upon ILTs.287
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Scholars like Avigail Eisenberg have argued that Indigenous claims to FPIC largely end up
getting conceptualized through the language of the state and not only does this fail to account for
ILTs but can actually distort the claims being made: “As Toby Rollo explains, Indigenous claims
are ‘transposed into a conceptual and linguistic idiom that conforms to the language of territorial
state sovereignty’. This transposition can distort Indigenous reasons for acting, especially
reasons that reject modernisation, economic development and globalisation”.288

However, at best, most of the scholarship regarding FPIC that attempts to engage with the laws
of Indigenous peoples amounts to: (i) references to a few examples of laws created by
Indigenous peoples;289 (ii) the need to include indigenous perspectives or traditions when it
comes to how consultation processes or impact assessments are designed pursuant to FPIC;290
(iii) the importance of providing culturally appropriate information during the consultation
process;291 and (iv) the need to respect customary laws and decision-making processes.292 All of
these points are relevant, but they are largely just stated without further analysis or consideration
of the precise influence that these principles should have in either interpreting or implementing
the FPIC Articles themselves.293
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Some go further and point to the fact that Indigenous led consultation protocols and processes
are being established across Canada (discussed further in chapter three) as proof that Canada’s
current approach to project consultation has a role for ILTs.294 They argue that the success of
Indigenous led impact assessments like the Woodfibre and Tlicho Nico Project are important
because they place “…indigenous laws and norms at the center of the decision-making
process”:295
Through these cases, we see there is the potential for a strong confluence of western and
Indigenous law in Indigenous-led processes. In each case, the Indigenous party identified
its knowledge base, and brought it bear to ensure that their values, language, and way of
life were considered in the review. Because of this, they also were able to ensure that
projects were changed substantially as a result of the review. Indigenous-led impact
assessment can greatly change the project in order to protect and accommodate the
culture and way of life.296
The success of these protocols is noteworthy, and it is correct to suggest that Canada is starting
to account for Indigenous traditional knowledge when engaging with Indigenous communities.297
However, the creation of Indigenous-led protocols does not necessarily amount to a recognition
and application of ILTs at the stage of interpreting FPIC itself.
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2.3.2 Examples of Applying ILTs to the Interpretation of FPIC
There are only a few examples in the scholarship of meaningful attempts to engage with ILTs in
the interpretation of the FPIC Articles. Emily Martin has written about the need to work more
closely with Indigenous communities about their understanding of FPIC and has undertaken the
work to speak with the Little Salmon Carmacks First Nation precisely about this issue.298 In
2018, she completed a Master of Arts Thesis highlighting her findings.299 Leah Temper has
discussed Wet’suewe’en traditional laws and their influence on the development of FPIC
protocols within the context of pipeline disputes in British Columbia.300 This work will be
referenced further in chapter four.
Terry Mitchell from Laurier University has begun some fairly ground-breaking work, examining
Indigenous views regarding FPIC. In her study, “Towards an Indigenous-Informed Relational
Approach to Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC)”, Mitchell and her co-authors engaged in
“…a multi-year university-community research partnership with Matawa First Nations”.301 The
study sought to understand Anishinaabe perspectives on the Declaration by meeting with chiefs,
staff, and members of several First Nations302 in order to document their understanding of FPIC.
Mitchell’s study included findings regarding the meaning of: ‘free consent’; ‘coercion’; ‘prior’;
‘consensus processes’; ‘informed’; and ‘collective decision making’. It also included a
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discussion of Indigenous values, laws, and philosophy relevant to the communities’
understanding of FPIC.
The study included first-hand accounts of the communities’ experiences with proponents, and
highlighted the importance of: (i) “honouring…Indigenous Peoples in making decisions about
their traditional lands”;303 (ii) recognizing the inherent stewardship responsibilities of the
community;304 (iii) ensuring a role for traditional knowledge;305 and (iv) recognizing the central
role of land to their communities.306 The study also concluded that the implementation and
fulfillment of FPIC will require further understanding of an Indigenous perspective on the
importance of developing and sustaining relationships.307 Despite these meaningful contributions
by Martin and Mitchell their work is only a first step in exploring this subject and will require
further elaboration and study.
Other attempts to discuss UNDRIP with reference to ILTs are not particularly substantive and
are only beginning to explore the possible relevance of Indigenous legal orders to the
interpretation of FPIC. Jeffery Hewitt contributed to one of the leading texts on Indigenous
perspectives on implementing the Declaration, Braiding Legal Orders. In his chapter, entitled
“Options for implementing UNDRIP without creating another empty box”, he discusses how the
Declaration contemplates the use of Indigenous laws within member states which have endorsed
it.308 In order to implement the Declaration in accordance with ILTs, Hewitt advocates for new
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institutions to be developed based on Indigenous systems of law that are mandated to interpret
the Declaration when it is applied in Canada.309
Another piece that also appears in Braiding Legal Orders is entitled “Braiding the
Incommensurable : Indigenous Legal Traditions and the Duty to Consult”. In this piece Sarah
Morales argues that “FPIC, as recognized in UNDRIP, could be used to braid together the duty
to consult and Indigenous legal traditions”.310 Morales does an effective job of highlighting the
role that ILTs can play when discussing the duty to consult by invoking principles from her
Coast Salish community.311 What is missing from Morales’ treatment of this issue is a detailed
consideration of whether ILTs could inform the substance of FPIC itself. Morales is effective at
summarizing the state of the discourse in International Human Rights Law regarding FPIC but
does not consider the role of ILTs in this discussion. Instead, her analysis is limited to a brief
discussion of Coast Salish principles of consensus and how broadly speaking these principles
should be considered when implementing UNDRIP.312 Despite the limited analysis, Morales’
piece represents one of the few meaningful attempts to weave together discussions of FPIC and
ILTs.
Michael Coyle has written about the relationship between FPIC and the duty to consult
framework.313 Coyle acknowledges that within Canada there is a growing recognition that
Indigenous peoples have a right to shape consultation processes314 but argues that the duty to
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consult framework “pays little heed to the interest of Aboriginal peoples in helping to shape the
process through which the dialogue will occur to ensure that it takes due consideration of their
own unique worldviews”.315 Coyle has highlighted, at least at a general level, the contribution
that Indigenous values and worldviews can have on consultation processes.316 His work is also
one of the few examples of assessing the relationship between the duty to consult and FPIC,
while referencing the importance of Indigenous customs, values, and norms to the development
of Canadian law.
Aimee Craft has highlighted the relevance of Anishinaabe law to UNDRIP in broad and general
terms, but does not specifically discuss its relevance to FPIC. Craft’s analysis has centered
around water law principles, relationality, and the relevance of ILTs to the implementation of
UNDRIP.317
Another notable attempt to connect FPIC and ILTs is Grace Nosek’s publication “Re-Imagining
Indigenous Peoples’ Role in Natural Resource Development Decision Making: Implementing
Free, Prior and Informed Consent in Canada Through Indigenous Legal Traditions”. In her piece
Nosek argues that “To fully realize FPIC’s ability to empower Indigenous peoples, each
community must be allowed to engage with its own legal traditions and define for itself the
meaning of consent”.318
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Nosek appears to put a lot of faith in what she calls the ‘FPIC regime’ and suggests that under
FPIC, indigenous viewpoints “would predominate and communities would be empowered to
make decisions about how to balance development and sustainability rather than be forced to
entreat external decision makers to understand the profound consequences of development
projects through their communities’ perspectives”.319 However, while Nosek makes a compelling
case for the implementation of FPIC in Canada, relying on human rights, environmental justice,
and economic arguments320 she does not engage with the treatment or interpretation of FPIC in
International Human Rights Law which, as identified above, may conceive of FPIC in a much
more limited way than she anticipates.
The real strength of Nosek’s work is her advocacy regarding the benefits of implementing FPIC
through ILTs. Nosek argues that embracing FPIC would support the revitalization of ILTs by
giving communities “space and financial resources to struggle through what consent looks like
through the lens of their own unique legal traditions, thereby fortifying those legal traditions in
the process”.321 Although Nosek does not go so far as to suggest any substantive applications of
ILTs to the interpretation of the Declaration, this contribution is noteworthy.
Another author writing in the area is Gordon Christie whose article “Indigenous Legal Orders,
Canadian Law and UNDRIP” explores a vision for how to meaningfully incorporate ILTs into
the process of implementing UNDRIP. Christie advocates for two changes to ensure that
UNDRIP implementation accounts for ILTs: (i) education and training for the legal profession to
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ensure a greater respect for legal pluralism;322 and (ii) improved allocation of resources to
Indigenous communities.323 Christie does not attempt to identify specific principles that may be
relevant to the interpretation of FPIC; rather, he provides a commentary on structural issues that
must be addressed in order to ensure that ILTs are treated respectfully in this process.
Christie’s other publication on this subject, “Implementation of UNDRIP within Canadian and
Indigenous Law: Assessing Challenges”, provides an excellent rebuttal to the grounds of
opposition to UNDRIP frequently invoked by conservative commentators and even Canada in its
initial opposition to UNDRIP back in 2007.324 However Christie does not choose to engage with
ILTs as a part of this discussion.
2.3.3 ILTs and the Duty to Consult
Many scholars who are writing about UNDRIP in Canada tend to ignore ILTs and focus their
attention on broader issues related to UNDRIP. Still others have refrained from examining ILTs
in the context of the interpretation of UNDRIP and have instead explored the relationship
between these systems of law and Canada’s duty to consult framework. Some of the latter
authors include Aimee Craft,325 Alan Hanna,326 Karen Drake,327 Val Napoleon,328 Brenda
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Gunn,329 Rachel Gutman, Andrew Costa, Kristen Manley-Casimir, Patricia Hania, Doug
Anderson, and Alexandra Flynn.330 Their work is notable for its contribution to the discourse
surrounding the duty to consult and often intersects with issues relevant to the debates
surrounding FPIC, including consent, reconciliation, and self-determination.
For example, in “The Trials and Tribulations of Ontario’s Mining Act: The Duty to Consult and
Anishinaabek Law”, Karen Drake highlights how Canada’s duty to consult framework might be
critically examined from an Anishinaabe legal perspective. Drake’s position is that Canada’s
duty to consult framework should be informed by ILTs331 as “the recognition of Indigenous laws
within consultation procedures would advance the goal of achieving reconciliation”.332 Drake
demonstrates how the duty to consult framework falls short of achieving this reconciliation by
examining Ontario’s Mining Act333 and some of its regulatory amendments.334 Drake argues that
the Mining Act consultation procedures conflict with Anishinaabek legal principles including:
“(i) the obligation to wait, make observations and gather information prior to making a decision;
and (ii) the obligation to engage in collective, rather than individual, decision-making”.335 She
points to the three week timeframe for responding to exploration plans and the 50-day timeframe
to respond to exploration permits in support of her conclusion.336
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Although Drake’s work does not apply these principles to a discussion of FPIC or the
Declaration, it does demonstrate, in a very concrete and practical way, precisely how ILTs could
influence Canada’s duty to consult framework. The lessons drawn from her article are equally
applicable to a discussion of the FPIC Articles and will be covered in chapter four.
Alan Hanna, in his piece “Reconciliation through relationality in Indigenous Legal Orders”,
critically examines Canada’s duty to consult framework and argues that it forces Indigenous
peoples to participate in a consultation process that: (i) will not guarantee an agreeable outcome;
and (ii) may force Indigenous peoples to risk litigating in a system that cannot grapple with their
legal traditions.337 Part of Hanna’s proposed solution is to train governments and courts on
ILTs338 however he also argues that Canada should engage with ILTs in order to appreciate
“Indigenous relationality toward peoples’ natural relations to the land”.339 Hanna highlights the
Gitxsan legal order as an example of a tradition which contains very particular conceptions of
kinship, family, accountability, and reciprocity.340 Similar to Drake, Hanna does not apply ILTs
to the interpretation of FPIC but instead focuses on the relevance of ILTs to Canada’s current
duty to consult framework.
Val Napoleon is an Indigenous scholar well known for her work on the revitalization of ILTs and
although she has yet to tackle the question of FPIC in UNDRIP in detail she has examined the
meaning of consent in Tsilqot’in law. Because debates over consent are the heart of the
scholarship regarding FPIC, her work is worth highlighting. In “Tsilhqot’in Law of Consent”,
Napoleon critically examines Canada’s duty to consult framework. She suggests that the
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framework’s treatment of consent is problematic as it leaves Indigenous peoples with a right to
consent that “may be overridden by a legal test that still considers the interests of the larger
Canadian public against the land ownership of Indigenous peoples”.341 Rather than simply
critique Canada’s duty to consult framework, Napoleon offers an alternative vision of
consultation and consent grounded in Tsilhqot’in legal traditions. Napoleon highlights how
Tsilhqot’in law “emphasizes and protects individual and collective agency, and relationships
within Tsilhqot’in society and with those outside their society”.342
Napoleon proceeds to examine “standards of consultation and consent in Tsilhqot’in law and
how they…apply to the actions of the Province of British Columbia”.343 Napoleon creates a
mock judgment from several different judges to illustrate a set of Tsilhqot’in legal principles and
how they would specifically influence the duty to consult, including:344 (i) the use of various
decision making groups in Tsilhqot’in society;345 (ii) the importance of community wide decision
making processes (in cases where the whole community may be affected by a proposed
action);346 (iii) the traditional processes for information gathering or responding to harms;347 (iv)
the importance of community safety, proportionality, and accountability;348 and (v) the four key
legal obligations that bind Tsilhqot’in people: “to protect and help one’s family and community;
to share resources and knowledge; to learn, respect, and communicate laws; and to show respect
for generosity or teachings”.349 Napoleon’s analysis begins to scratch the surface of how ILTs
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can be used to frame and understand discussions regarding consultation and consent more
broadly.
Several other authors have written about ILTs and the Duty to Consult, however their analysis
has remained quite general, leaving significant gaps in the scholarship. For example, Rachel
Gutman in her piece “The Stories We Tell: Site-C, Treaty 8, and the Duty to Accommodate”,
discusses the sources of Dane-zaa law in the context of Treaty 8 and the duty to consult.350
Andrew Costa in his piece “Across the Great Divide: Anishinaabek Legal Traditions, Treaty 9,
and Honourable Consent” begins to explore treaty interpretation through the lens of Indigenous
cultural values.351 Kristen Manley-Casimir’s PhD dissertation has offered a vision for utilizing
ILTs “to create a normative framework to guide the development of a relational approach to the
duty to consult and accommodate”.352
Patricia Hania has examined the use of Impact Benefit Agreements in the consultation process
and has argued for a greater recognition of “Indigenous governance, law, women and stories…as
a way to ground Indigenous women’s representation in IBA law-making”.353 In their article,
“Rethinking ‘Duty’: The City of Toronto, A Stretch of the Humber River, and IndigenousMunicipal Relationships”,354 Doug Anderson and Alexandra Flynn examined the relationship
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between Indigenous peoples and municipalities and the relevance of Anishinaabe laws to the
Duty to Consult.355
Despite the notable contributions of these authors, their work does not specifically engage with
Indigenous conceptions of consent or the principle of FPIC as found in UNDRIP. This has left a
significant gap in the research that this thesis is attempting to address.
2.4

Conclusion

Generally speaking, the scholarship discussing the Declaration and the FPIC Articles has failed
to meaningfully engage with ILTs. Although there are a few Indigenous and non-Indigenous
voices highlighting the relevance of ILTs to FPIC, with some going so far as to engage in
preliminary studies of the subject or offer substantive analysis of Canada’s duty to consult
framework through the lens of ILTs, the discourse is still lacking. By applying ILTs to Canada’s
well-established duty to consult framework, scholars are already attempting to fit ILTs within a
common law construct, suggesting that the duty to consult framework can be reformed rather
than re-imagined entirely, with Indigenous legal traditions at the forefront.
The leading scholarship continues to be dominated by non-Indigenous voices who interpret FPIC
and the Declaration through strict textual analysis or with refence to established principles of
international law. Little, if any attention is paid to the relevance of ILTs. Although the work of
these scholars serves an important function there is an opportunity to do more.

355

Ibid at 126.

85

Chapter Three
3.

Canada’s Duty to Consult Framework

As noted above, Canada has a well-established common law duty to consult framework. That
framework, which predates the adoption of the Declaration, has guided government, Indigenous
peoples, and industry, on consultation (and sometimes accommodation) requirements when
potential or established Aboriginal or treaty rights may be impacted by resource development
projects. Some have suggested that Canada’s framework is largely consistent with the
obligations imposed by the Declaration356 with Dwight Newman going so far as to suggest that
“one might properly draw the conclusion that the Canadian legal requirements on duty to consult
– and the role of consent in the context of established claims – already meets or exceeds the
UNDRIP’s requirements on FPIC”.357
There are several ways to critique this particular claim but in this chapter the focus will remain
on ILTs. Chapters one and two established that: (i) FPIC needs to be understood as
interconnected to Indigenous self-determination; (ii) Indigenous self-determination is interconnected with the revitalization of ILTs; (iii) there is an emerging consensus that procedures put
in place to secure FPIC should ensure Indigenous peoples’ own institutions, representatives, and
decision-making processes are respected; and (iv) interpreting and implementing UNDRIP and
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specifically the articles referencing FPIC, needs to be done in a way that meaningfully engages
with and incorporates ILTs.
If the existing duty to consult will constitute Canada’s approach to addressing the FPIC Articles
then it is worth testing the extent to which the duty, as currently developed, acknowledges,
incorporates, or otherwise makes space for ILTs. This chapter proceeds in three parts. First, I
provide an introduction to Canada’s duty to consult framework, focusing on elements directly
relevant to the FPIC Articles. Second, I review Canada’s duty to consult jurisprudence in order
to determine the extent to which Canadian courts have utilized ILTs in the formulation and
application of Canada’s duty to consult framework. Third, I consider the extent to which
Canada’s duty to consult framework has informally embraced ILTs in its consultation processes
by examining: (i) provincial consultation protocols; (ii) joint Crown-first nations consultation
protocols; (iv) the Government of Canada’s consultation protocols; and (v) the consultation
protocols of Indigenous communities.
3.1

The Duty to Consult

Broadly speaking, Canada’s duty to consult flows from the honour of the Crown in its dealings
with Indigenous peoples.358 This honour of the Crown “…recognizes that the tension between
the Crown’s assertion of sovereignty and the pre-existing sovereignty, rights and occupation of
Aboriginal peoples creates a special relationship that requires that the Crown act honourably in
its dealings with Aboriginal peoples”.359
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Pursuant to this obligation the Crown is required to consult Indigenous peoples before taking
action that may adversely affect their asserted or established rights under s.35 of the Constitution
Act, 1982.360 For example, imagine the Crown is proposing to build an oil pipeline that would
cross the traditional territories of several Indigenous communities. The duty ensures that the
Crown acts honourably by preventing it from simply making decisions unilaterally in a way that
may undermine section 35 rights.361
Section 35 of the Constitution Act recognizes and affirms the existing aboriginal and treaty rights
of Canada’s aboriginal peoples:
Recognition of existing aboriginal and treaty rights
35 (1) The existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are
hereby recognized and affirmed.
Definition of aboriginal peoples of Canada
(2) In this Act, aboriginal peoples of Canada includes the Indian, Inuit and Métis peoples
of Canada.362
Section 35 protects both historic and modern treaty rights. The content of these rights can vary
depending on the relevant treaty. However, some common treaty provisions include: land rights,
annuities, hunting/harvesting rights, the right to self-government, consultation obligations, etc.
Aboriginal rights on the other hand are subject to judicial interpretation. In R. v Van Der Peet
the Supreme Court concluded that “…in order to be an aboriginal right an activity must be an
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element of a practice, custom, or tradition integral to the distinctive culture of the aboriginal
group claiming the right”.363
In determining whether an activity satisfies this part of the test the Supreme Court made the
following observations:
•

“In assessing a claim for the existence of an aboriginal right, a court must take into
account the perspective of the aboriginal people claiming the right.”364

•

In order to be integral a practice, custom, or tradition must be “…a central and significant
part of the society's distinctive culture…in other words, that the practice, custom or
tradition was one of the things which made the culture of the society distinctive -- that it
was one of the things that truly made the society what it was”.365 The significance of the
practice, custom, or tradition to the community is an important but not determinative
consideration of whether it constitutes a section 35 right.366

•

The practice, custom, or tradition must be independently significant, meaning it cannot
simply be incidental to another practice, custom, or tradition.367

•

The practice, custom, or tradition must be distinctive, it does not need to be distinct. This
means that the practice, custom, or tradition can be shared by multiple groups so long as
it is distinguishing or characteristics of the group asserting the right.368
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•

The practices, customs, and traditions which constitute aboriginal rights must have
originated prior to contact between aboriginal and European societies.369 There must be
some continuity between these historic practices and those that exist today. This does not
mean that Indigenous peoples must provide an unbroken chain of continuity as it may be
permitted for the group to cease engaging in a practice, custom, or tradition and this is
acceptable.370

•

Asserted Aboriginal rights, while identified historically, are permitted to evolve and to be
exercised in a modern form. For example, a right to fish does not limit the group to fish
utilizing historic means, the group would be entitled to engage in the practice using
modern tools, equipment, etc.371

•

Courts should soften the rules of evidence given the difficulty in proving rights which
originate in a time with no written records.372

3.1.1

What is the Duty to Consult?

Haida Nation v British Columbia373 is considered a landmark decision regarding the duty to
consult. This 2004 Supreme Court of Canada decision involving the Haida’s claim to their
traditional territory.374 The Haida had brought a title claim for the territory but it had yet to be
heard by the courts.375 The case involved a transfer of a license to cut trees in the territory that
was approved by the relevant BC Minister without the Haida’s consent and over their
369
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objections.376 The Haida people sued seeking to have the transfer set aside.377 The Court had to
determine whether the Crown was required to consult with the Haida about their decisions, and if
so, whether they had to accommodate any of their concerns.378
The Supreme Court held that, broadly speaking, the Government had a duty to consult the Haida
however precisely what was required to satisfy this duty depended on the specific facts of the
case and would be proportionate to: (i) the strengths of the claim to Aboriginal or treaty rights;
and (ii) the seriousness of the potentially adverse impact on those rights.379 At a minimum the
duty would require the Government to give notice of the decision, disclose information, and
discuss issues raised in response to the notice.380 At the other end of the scale, “…deep
consultation aimed at finding a satisfactory interim solution, may be required”.381 The Court
even went so far as to suggest that in certain circumstances the Government may be required to
accommodate a group’s concerns over a proposed project.382
The Supreme Court has defined deep consultation as perhaps entailing “…the opportunity to
make submissions for consideration, formal participation in the decision-making process, and
provision of written reasons to show that Aboriginal concerns were considered and to reveal the
impact they had on the decision”.383
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This has been referred to as a “spectrum” analysis by the Supreme Court, where every case
should be approached individually and flexibly.384 Although the standards of consultation can
vary, the Crown is always expected to engage with Indigenous peoples in good faith385 and to
demonstrate a willingness “…to make changes based on information that emerges during the
process”.386 In other words, the expectation is that consultation will be more than “blowing off
steam” and represent a meaningful two-way dialogue.387 In terms of what might constitute a
satisfactory accommodation, again this depends on the facts of the case. However,
accommodations may include: (i) adopting mitigation strategies proposed by the effected
Indigenous peoples;388 or (ii) “changing a development project’s scope, location or timing”.389
3.1.2

When does the duty to consult arise?

Generally speaking, the duty to consult arises “when the Crown has real or constructive
knowledge of the potential existence of an Aboriginal right or title and contemplates action
which might adversely affect that right or title”.390 To satisfy the first part of this test: (i) the
Crown could have actual knowledge of a claim;391 (ii) the lands in question are “known or
reasonably suspected to have been traditionally occupied by an Aboriginal community”;392 or
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(iii) the Crown could know or reasonably anticipate that the proposed action would impact on a
groups aboriginal or treaty rights.393
The second part of the test, ‘contemplated action’ is to be interpreted broadly394 “…and is not
confined to decisions or conduct which have an immediate impact on lands and resources. A
potential for adverse impact suffices. Thus, the duty to consult extends to ‘strategic, higher level
decisions’ that may have an impact on Aboriginal claims and rights”.395 However, the Supreme
Court has also concluded that despite high level decision-making potentially triggering the duty
to consult, the duty does not apply to the development, passage, and enactment of legislation.
This was decided in Mikisew Cree First Nation v Canada (Governor General in Council)396,
which dealt with a claim regarding broad changes to Canada’s environmental protect regime that
were introduced in April 2012 via “…two pieces of omnibus legislation”.397 The Mikisew Cree
claimed that they “…were not consulted on either of these omnibus bills”398 and that a duty to
consult was owed to them.399
The majority of the court dismissed the claim and held that “the law-making process – that is, the
development, passage, and enactment of legislation – does not trigger the duty to consult”.400
The court relied on constitutional principles such as the separation of powers and parliamentary
sovereignty in support of this conclusion.401 The Court commented that “Applying the duty to
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consult doctrine during the law-making process would lead to significant judicial incursion into
the workings of the legislature, even if such a duty were only enforced post-enactment”.402
The third element of the test, adverse effect, requires claimants to “…show a causal relationship
between the proposed government conduct or decision and a potential for adverse impacts on
pending Aboriginal claims or rights. Past wrongs, including previous breaches of the duty to
consult, do not suffice”403 as the duty is not considered to be a “vehicle to address historical
grievances”.404 Speculative impacts will also not satisfy this third element of the test.405
3.1.3

Duty to Consult – Is Consent Required? Do Indigenous Peoples Have a “Veto”?

The court in Haida was quick to note that the duty to consult “…does not give Aboriginal groups
a veto over what can be done”406 and that while there was jurisprudence that suggested the duty
might require the consent of Indigenous people in certain circumstances407 this would only apply
“…in cases of established rights, and then by no means in every case”.408 In other words, the
jurisprudence has established that the duty to consult (at least as it is currently understood) does
not necessarily require the consent of Indigenous communities to be satisfied. Put differently,
“there is no ultimate duty to reach agreement”409 as the duty to consult framework guarantees a
process but not a result.410
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As noted above, in Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia411 the SCC did confirm that in cases
where Aboriginal title exists then the government may be obligated to obtain consent.412
However, the consent right may still be subject to a justified infringement analysis.413
3.1.4

Who Owes the Duty? The Role for Administrative Tribunals and Proponents

Generally speaking, the duty to consult is owed by the Crown, meaning that it “always holds
ultimate responsibility for ensuring consultation is adequate”.414 That being said there are often
scenarios in which the Provinces415, administrative tribunals416 and regulatory bodies are
engaged in the consultation process.417 The Supreme Court has affirmed that the Crown is able to
delegate some of its responsibilities in fulfilling the duty to consult,418 however, should it choose
to proceed in this manner, the Crown is expected to inform the Indigenous groups that the Crown
is doing so.419
In addition, any statutory or regulatory body that has been delegated consultation responsibility
must possess the necessary “statutory powers to do what the duty to consult requires in the
particular circumstances”.420 Ultimately, even if the regulatory tribunal has the ability to assess
the Crown’s duty to consult, the Crown still retains all of its constitutional obligations, including
the honour of the Crown.421
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Practically speaking, much of Canada’s duty to consult process has been delegated in some
capacity to relevant administrative/regulatory tribunals, but it is also important to note the
essential role that proponents (i.e. those who would like to see certain projects go ahead, such as
mining companies, oil and gas companies, etc.) play in the duty to consult framework.
Proponents are often required to conduct the actual consultation itself as a prerequisite to
regulatory approval.422 Some scholars suggest that proponents can serve an essential function in
both consultation and reconciliation, given the significant level of interaction that industry has
with Indigenous communities:
Reconciliation with Aboriginal peoples can be advanced by project proponents
themselves in the environmental assessment and regulatory review process, just as
proponents themselves can reconcile environmental protection with project development
in these processes. Industry can liaise with Aboriginal peoples well in advance, often
years in advance, of making a regulatory application. As noted, such engagement of this
kind is mandated by tribunals such as the National Energy Board. These require evidence
of Aboriginal consultation by the proponent as a precondition of making a regulatory
application.423
Proponents are often expected to reach out to Indigenous communities well in advance of a
project’s approval in order to secure their support. What this engagement looks like can vary, but
in general, they may be expected to meet with the Indigenous community, share information on
the potential impact of a proposed project, document concerns, take steps to mitigate risks posed
by the project, etc.424 It is also possible that a proponent may provide capacity funding to the
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community to support the consultation process. This may also involve funding the community’s
own environmental impact studies425 that are often reflective of ILTs.426
After engagement and negotiations proponents and Indigenous communities may also enter into
Impact Benefit Agreements (“IBAs”) as part of the consultation process. IBAs are “…negotiated,
private agreements [that] serve to document in a contractual form the benefits that a local
community can expect from the development of a local resource in exchange for its support and
cooperation”.427 All of this is done in an effort to obtain a social license (or consent) from the
community in order to satisfy the concerns of regulators and to forestall any challenges that the
duty to consult was not satisfied.428 As Dwight Newman has noted:
In part simply to face up to various legal uncertainties and in part to address any risks
arising from the duty to consult, many responsible resource companies now engage with
Aboriginal communities and pursue good relationships with the hope also of negotiating
win-win arrangements for economic development. An appropriately developed impact
benefit agreement (IBA) may provide gains for all.429
Despite some of the apparent benefits to the relationship between proponents and Indigenous
communities (negotiated benefits, consultation processes that reflect Indigenous knowledge, etc.)
there are reasons to be critical of this element of Canada’s duty to consult framework. For
example, as Papillon and Rodon have noted simply because Indigenous knowledge is
incorporated into a consultation process “there is no guarantee they will succeed in shaping the
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actual decision-making process”.430 In addition, although IBAs have a number of benefits,431
their negotiation is often carried out amongst Indigenous leadership and without input from the
community.432 These negotiations also require Indigenous communities to give up their right to
say no and therefore put FPIC rights on the table.433 The resulting agreements are not usually
public which makes it difficult for other Indigenous communities to examine and scrutinize
them.434
3.1.5

Who is entitled to be consulted?

Generally speaking, the duty to consult is owed to First Nations, Inuit, or Metis whose aboriginal
or treaty rights may be impacted by a proposed state action.435 One question that has been raised
in litigation is whether the duty is owed to every Indigenous individual in a community that may
be affected by a proposed action, or whether it is owed to the community as a whole.436 In Behn
v Moulton Contracting Ltd the Supreme Court addressed this question and concluded that the
duty is not owed to individuals but to the Indigenous community as a whole. However, the group
could authorize an individual to represent the community for the purposes of making a claim:
“The duty to consult exists to protect the collective rights of Aboriginal peoples. For this reason,
it is owed to the Aboriginal group that holds the s.35 rights, which are collective in nature…But
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an Aboriginal group can authorize an individual or an organization to represent it for the purpose
of asserting its s. 35 rights”.437
This raises a number of important, and challenging questions, such as: who is entitled to speak
for the community?438 What should the court do when multiple parties claim to speak for the
community, with some arguing the duty to consult has been satisfied, and others saying it has
not? What about instances where multiple communities have overlapping claims with respect to
a particular territory?439 A discussion of these issues is beyond the scope of this thesis but are
important practical challenges that often need to be addressed in the context of duty to consult
litigation.
3.1.6

What Does the Duty to Consult Expect from Indigenous Communities?

Canada’s duty to consult framework imposes obligations on the Crown, tribunals, and
proponents but also imposes reciprocal duties on Indigenous peoples. Indigenous peoples are
expected “to carry their end of the consultation, to make their concerns known, to respond to the
government’s attempt to meet their concerns and suggestions, and to try to reach some mutually
satisfactory solution”.440 They are also expected to act in good faith and to avoid placing
obstacles in the way of the consultation process.441 Although Indigenous peoples are permitted
to engage in hard bargaining the court will not permit Indigenous peoples to interfere with the
efforts to engage in consultation and accommodation.442
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3.1.7

What happens if the duty is breached?

Consultation processes are subject to judicial review. If the court finds that the duty to consult
has been breached the remedy ordered can vary and “range from injunctive relief against the
threatening activity altogether, to damages, to an order to carry out the consultation prior to
proceeding further with the proposed government conduct”.443
3.2

Duty to Consult, Canadian Courts, and Indigenous Legal Traditions

There is a long line of jurisprudence confirming “the important role that Aboriginal perspectives
play in establishing the existence of Aboriginal rights and in interpreting treaty rights”.444 As
John Borrows has stated “Indigenous legal traditions are inextricably intertwined with the
present-day Aboriginal customs, practices, and traditions that are now recognized and affirmed
in section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982”.445 There are court decisions: (i) establishing that
the Court will qualify witnesses to testify on ILTs;446 (ii) engaging with Anishinaabe law;447 and
(iii) acknowledging the customary law of a particular Indigenous group.448 What is less clear is the
role of ILTs with respect to the Crown’s duty to consult.
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While a compelling argument can, and in fact has been made, that “Indigenous laws should
inform…the duty to consult”,449 one cannot help but conclude that, in general, Canadian courts
have failed to meaningfully engage with ILTs in either the formulation or application of
Canada’s duty to consult framework.450
At times, the jurisprudence makes a general reference to the need to consider ILTs. For example,
in Delgamuukw v British Columbia, the Supreme Court heard an appeal of an Aboriginal title
claim in British Columbia brought on behalf of the Gitskan and Wet’suwet’en. Although the case
is primarily about Aboriginal title, the decision laid the groundwork for Canada’s duty to consult
framework that would inform the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Haida several years
later.
In its decision, the Supreme Court acknowledged that it should ensure that “…the aboriginal
perspective on their practices, customs, and traditions, and on their relationship with the land, are
given due weight by the courts”.451 The Supreme Court also considered the Adaawk and Kungax
of the Gitskan and Wet’suwet’en nations, which are oral histories that were a “recital of the most
important laws, history, traditions and traditional territory of a House”.452 These were put before
the court in part to establish proof of a system of land tenure law that pre-existed the arrival of
Europeans. The trial judge admitted the Adaawk and Kungax but afforded them no weight.453
The Supreme Court cautioned against taking this approach to law based on oral histories454 and
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suggested they should be afforded some weight.455 The Supreme Court drew no specific
conclusions on the content or persuasiveness of the Adaawk and Kungax, due in large part to the
fact that this case was sent back for another trial. However, the Supreme Court at least tacitly
acknowledged the importance of Indigenous laws in the resolution of the dispute, and the attempt
to embrace ILTs is noteworthy.
Similarly, in Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia, the Supreme Court did not provide any
specific conclusions on the place of ILTs within the duty to consult but echoed the reasoning
from Delgamuukw by noting that for the purposes of Aboriginal title claims, the aboriginal
perspective which “focuses on laws, practices, customs and traditions of the group”456 are to be
considered.457
In addition, the courts have provided some commentary on the applicability of ILTs in the
context of resource development projects in Coastal Gaslink Pipeline Ltd. v Huson (“Huson”) a
2019 decision of the Supreme Court of British Columbia458 and in the Tsleil-Waututh Nation v
Canada (Attorney General) (“Tsleil”).459 In Huson, the Coastal Gaslink Pipeline Ltd. was
seeking an interlocutory injunction preventing the defendants from blockading a service road and
bridge. This blockade was preventing the plaintiff from constructing a pipeline project. In the
case the court expressed an openness to relying on Indigenous customary law, governance
structures, and processes in the resolution of this application for injunctive relief.460 However,
the court also concluded that:
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Indigenous customary laws do not become an effectual part of Canadian common law or
Canadian domestic law until there is some means or process by which the Indigenous
customary law is recognized as being part of Canadian domestic law, either through
incorporation into treaties, court declarations, such as Aboriginal title or rights
jurisprudence or statutory provisions.461
In this case none of these things had happened so the court suggested that at best Indigenous
laws could be admitted as fact evidence of the Indigenous legal perspective but it would not be
treated as law.462 The court also pointed out that there was a lack of consensus in the community
about the project, about who spoke for the community, and the content of the relevant ILT.463 So
despite the court’s acknowledgement of the possible relevance of ILTs, the court demonstrated
an apprehension around the applicability of Indigenous customary law.
In Tsleil the Federal Court of Appeal (“FCA”) concluded that Canada had failed to satisfy the
duty to consult with respect to the Trans Mountain Pipeline Expansion project.464 In its reasons
the FCA noted the Tsleil-Waututh had conducted their own assessment of the proposed project
based on their traditional knowledge (including Tsleil-Waututh law).465 The FCA noted that the
National Energy Board failed to address the concerns raised by the assessment process and
considered this to be relevant to its determination that the duty to consult had not been
satisfied.466 Although the court did not assess the duty to consult through the lens of TsleilWaututh law, there was at least an acknowledgment of its relevance to its analysis. This case
demonstrates that the court will, to some extent, engage with ILTs, particularly in the context of
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a consideration of traditional knowledge in project assessments. This is a topic that will be
discussed in further detail later in this chapter.
There are also examples where the court will provide at least a tacit acknowledgment of some
generic principles broadly attributed to numerous ILTs. For example, in Rio Tinto Alcan Inc. v
Carrier Sekani Tribal Council467, the Supreme Court described the duty to consult as being
“…grounded in the need to protect Aboriginal rights and to preserve the future use of the
resources claimed by Aboriginal peoples”.468 One might read this statement by the Supreme
Court as some sort of acknowledgment of a responsibility to future generations or principles of
stewardship, concepts that have been identified in numerous ILTs469 and will be discussed
further in chapter four. Others may point to the court’s commitment to reconciliation and the
requirement imposed on the Crown “to adopt the attitude of honour that is essential for the
reconciliation of peoples to flourish”.470 Some authors have suggested that the court’s focus on
relationships “provides a connection to an aspect common to several Indigenous legal traditions
– that maintaining good relationships with and between communities, with all beings, and with
the land is the overall role or purpose of law”.471
Moving beyond these tacit acknowledgments of some common conceptions within ILTs I would
argue that the duty to consult framework is actually quite antagonistic towards a meaningful
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recognition of ILTs. In order to appreciate this antagonism we must first consider the interconnected nature of ILTs and self-determination. As John Borrows has stated “[w]hen
Indigenous peoples practice their own laws they identify and apply the principles they want to
guide their lives”.472 In his 2007 piece, “Culture, Self-Determination and Colonialism: Issues
Around the Revitalization of Indigenous Legal Traditions”, Gordon Christie discusses the
relationship between ILTs and self-determination.473 Christie concludes that efforts to revitalize
ILTs are part of a broader movement towards self-determination474 and the regeneration of
identity:
The reinvigoration of Indigenous legal traditions holds out the promise of being an
integral component in a modern project of regaining control over processes that not only
lead into the instantiation of certain structures and institutions (the legal and political
structures of Indigenous societies), but, more importantly, that would play a role in the
potential regeneration of Indigenous (i.e., “traditional” cultural) identities.475
Although the courts have not gone so far as to express opposition to ILTs within the duty to
consult framework, they have mischaracterized and mistreated Indigenous self-determination
within the context of the duty to consult, most notably by framing Indigenous expressions of
self-determination as: (i) an effort to establish a veto right; and/or (ii) merely the interest of a
particular group of people to be compared and balanced against other competing societal
interests.
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This is perhaps best exemplified by the Federal Court of Appeal’s decision in Coldwater First
Nation v Canada (Attorney General).476 In this case the court considered whether the duty to
consult had been satisfied in connection with the Trans Mountain Pipeline Expansion Project. In
its decision, the court noted that one of the controlling concepts in Canada’s duty to consult
framework is reconciliation477 and that even though the consultation process may not result in an
accommodation agreeable to the affected Indigenous peoples, this does not mean that
reconciliation has not been advanced.478 The court was quite clear that the need to achieve
reconciliation does not mean that a result must satisfy the Indigenous community in question
otherwise Indigenous peoples would have a veto, something the court has repeatedly rejected.479
Rather than considering the community’s opposition to the project as an expression of selfdetermination, the court seemed to frame it as an attempt to engage in tactical behaviour and veto
the project: “The applicants’ submissions are essentially that the Project cannot be approved until
all of their concerns are resolved to their satisfaction. If we accepted those submissions, as a
practical matter there would be no end to consultation, the Project would never be approved, and
the applicants would have a de facto veto right over it”.480
The Court also seems to characterize Indigenous opposition to a proposed project as merely an
“interest” to be weighed against those of the public, without regard to the fact that what was
being expressed via this opposition was self-determination: “At some juncture, a decision has to
be made about a project and the adequacy of the consultation. Where there is genuine
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disagreement about whether a project is in the public interest, the law does not require that the
interests of Indigenous peoples prevail”.481
What the Court is doing in this decision, whether intentional or not, is equating Indigenous selfdetermination with an “interest” and Indigenous peoples with stakeholders, largely
indistinguishable from other groups within Canada. The court states that the law does not require
Indigenous interests to prevail but provides no meaningful justification for why this is not the
case. There is perhaps an unintentional sleight of hand occurring in the court’s reasoning here.
By framing Indigenous opposition to a proposed project as an interest, it lends itself to being
weighed against competing interests, whether those interests are economic development, the
needs of industry, or the largely undefinable “public interest”.
I would argue that this premise mischaracterizes what is happening within the context of a duty
to consult dispute. Industry has an interest in a project (financial), the “Canadian public” may
have an interest in the project to the extent it might provide infrastructure or jobs. Indigenous
peoples, however, are claiming their human rights, notably their right to self-determination. They
may also be seen as expressing cultural values in relation to the land. As Michael Coyle has
noted:
A dialogic process that seeks to take Indigenous concerns seriously must come to grips
with a cultural reality in which one of the parties to the dialogue does not typically
conceive of development decisions concerning traditional lands as merely affecting their
rights and “interests”. For most, if not all, Aboriginal peoples in Canada, traditional
norms dictate that living properly requires a focus on maintaining proper relationships –
with other persons and with the natural and spiritual world.482
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Coyle has specifically warned against how the courts might frame Indigenous “interests” in the
context of the duty to consult, and suggests that “care must be taken to ensure that in crosscultural consultations the word “interests” is not interpreted by Crown representatives solely in
accordance with its frequent Euro-Canadian connotation of material, legal, or economic
priorities”.483 Unfortunately, the manner in which the courts have approached the duty to consult
framework appears to reduce self-determination of Indigenous peoples to the “interest” of a subgroup within Canadian society. This undermines self-determination, and indirectly diminishes
the ability of Indigenous peoples to meaningfully exercise their laws, customs, and traditions.
Beyond this more conceptual argument, the duty to consult framework’s antagonism to ILTs can
be observed by the specific consultation procedures developed by various levels of government.
Scholars like Karen Drake have been quick to note how specific consultation procedures can,
and are developed without due regard to ILTs, resulting in conflicts. For example, in her article
“The Trials and Tribulations of Ontario’s Mining Act: The Duty to Consult and Anishinaabek
Law” Drake concluded that Ontario’s Mining Act consultation procedures, designed as part of
Ontario’s approach to the duty to consult, were in conflict with Anishinaabek legal principles,
specifically: “(i) the obligation to wait, make observations and gather information prior to
making a decision, and (ii) the obligation to engage in collective, rather than individual,
decision-making”.484 What this demonstrates is that, despite the attempt by courts to
acknowledge ILTs, the practical realities of Canada’s approach to consultation often serves to
conflict with or undermine these traditions.
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3.2.1

Why the Court’s Failure to Meaningfully Engage With ILTs is Unsurprising

Although Canadian courts have failed to meaningfully engage with ILTs in the context of the
duty to consult, this should not be surprising. As Joshua Nichols and Robert Hamilton have
suggested, “while offering procedural protection for asserted claims and judicial oversight of
discretionary Crown action, the DCA [Duty to Consult and Accommodate] framework fits
awkwardly with Indigenous understandings of international norms and Indigenous peoples’ own
inherent jurisdiction”.485 Indigenous legal scholar Hadley Friedland has also pointed out that the
framework is a creation of the Canadian legal system and not intended to be reflective of
Indigenous systems of law:
Many have criticized how the duty to consult is implemented in practice, but for our
purposes, what is crucial to underscore, again, is that it is Canadian law, as opposed to the
many Indigenous legal traditions across the country, that defines what consultation looks
like and, most problematically, when and how it is necessary or fulfilled. The Supreme
Court has referred to pre-existing Indigenous law in Aboriginal rights cases, and we can
imagine conversations that include Secwépemc law in these spaces of engagement.
However, they should not be confused with interactions between legal traditions that
could exist within horizontal, Nation-to-Nation relationships.486
Still others, like Aaron Mills, would suggest that the duty to consult could not be reflective of
ILTs, given that the entirety of Canadian aboriginal law operates in tension with Indigenous legal
interests:
Canadian law regulating relationships to land in which the Anishinaabek and other
indigenous peoples have an interest (and for the Crown, a constitutional obligation) is
articulated primarily in respect of the doctrines associated with s. 35 rights, and the
correlative doctrines of consultation and accommodation emergent from this
485
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jurisprudence. Regardless of which specific legal doctrines are relevant in a given
circumstance, this entire area of Canadian law (generally termed "aboriginal law"
because of the definition of "aboriginal peoples" provided in s. 35(2) of the Constitution
Act, 1982) is limited in scope to land over which a state-recognized aboriginal group has
proven (or has a reasonable future claim to) unextinguished aboriginal rights (including
aboriginal title) or treaty rights pursuant to the respective legal tests established in the
case law. However even at the broadest, most general level of abstraction, neither the
concept of aboriginal rights nor of aboriginal title fits comfortably with the Anishinaabe
foundations we've explored for Anishinaabe legal interests in their territory and its
resources.487
Critics like Mills and others essentially conclude that given this tension, the duty to consult, like
much of Canadian Aboriginal law, can at best “offer Indigenous laws and legal orders a severely
restricted role within Euro-derived legal orders, [and that] this role is affirmed only when it is in
accordance with colonial law”.488 If we accept this premise then it is perhaps unsurprising that
Canada’s duty to consult framework has not meaningfully incorporated ILTs.
In fact, even if we do not accept the conclusions drawn by Friedland, Mills, and others, I suggest
that the failure to meaningfully incorporate ILTs into Canada’s duty to consult framework is
unsurprising for several other reasons. First, when we speak of ILTs it is important to recall that
we are not discussing a singular or monolithic legal tradition. As John Borrows has pointed out,
“Indigenous peoples’ traditions can be as historically differently from one another as other
nations and cultures in the world”.489 When being asked to articulate a broad duty to consult in
Canadian law the Supreme Court was in a position where it was attempting to generate a legal
standard applicable throughout Canada. It would be impossible to generate a framework with
broad applicability that accounts for the diversity of ILTs that exists in this country. This is not to
excuse the Court for its failure to account for ILTs. There are ways in which the Supreme Court
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could have generated a broadly applicable standard that better respects ILTs. For example, the
Court could have mandated that in all instances of consultation the sufficiency of the
consultation will be measured with reference to the relevant legal principles of the community
being consulted. I am only suggesting that the Supreme Court’s response is unsurprising given
the tendency to want to articulate broad legal standards that could direct the Crown, proponents,
and Indigenous peoples moving forward.
Second, there continues to exist a divide over whether the judiciary should even attempt to
engage with indigenous legal principles,490 largely due the judiciary’s inability to speak the
relevant languages and a lack of exposure to the culture of the peoples whose ILTs may be
relevant. There are also those like Alan Hanna, Assistant Professor at the University of Victoria,
who argues that any attempts to turn to court-made legal frameworks may prove fruitless, simply
because courts are unable to meaningfully engage with ILTs. Hanna argues that rather than
provide Indigenous peoples with legal recourse that is representative of their values, all the duty
to consult framework does is force Indigenous peoples into a consultation process that will either
result in their agreement or force them to litigate491 under a system that “is ill equipped to
grapple with the complexity and interconnected relationality regulated under First Nations legal
orders”.492 Given the fact that the judiciary is not well equipped to engage with ILTs, it may
come as no surprise that they have been hesitant to integrate them into the formulation of
something like the duty to consult.
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Third, the judiciary has, in the past, expressed the need to acknowledge Indigenous perspectives
but to do so in ways which are “cognizable to the Canadian legal and constitutional structure”.493
Given this fact, it is not surprising that the Supreme Court would establish a duty to consult
framework whose approach shares similarities to other frameworks within Canadian common
law, including the spectrum analysis regarding the severity of the impact on rights and the
analytical framework for justifying infringement. These will both be discussed in the conclusions
section below.
3.3

Duty to Consult and ILTs (Outside the Courtroom)

In order to accurately capture the extent to which Canada’s duty to consult framework has
accounted for ILTs it is necessary to look beyond the jurisprudence and examine the extent to
which ILTs have been incorporated into: (i) provincial consultation protocols; (ii) joint CrownFirst Nations consultation protocols; (iv) the Government of Canada’s consultation protocols;
and (v) the consultation protocols of Indigenous communities.
3.3.1

Provincial Consultation Protocols

As Michael Coyle has noted, “current federal and provincial consultation policies rarely require
the participation of Aboriginal groups in the design of the processes through which their
concerns will be discussed”.494 However, there are some provincial jurisdictions that have begun
to embrace Indigenous traditional knowledge, laws, customs, and interests in their environmental
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assessment processes.495 For example, in British Columbia the Environmental Assessment Act496
expresses support for the implementation of the Declaration497 and commits to utilizing
Indigenous knowledge.498 In fact, the Environmental Assessment Office there has provided
guidance regarding consensus-seeking under the Act which states that, among other things: (i)
“Participating Indigenous nations make decisions on consent based on their own laws and
traditions; this is an expression of their right to Indigenous self-determination and selfgovernment”;499 and (ii) “A participating Indigenous nation may choose to provide a notification
of consent or lack of consent and reasons (through the authorized representative of the
participating Indigenous nation) and following the nation’s own governance and procedural
requirements”.500
All that being said, in general, provincial consultation protocols and guidelines do not expressly
define the role of ILTs in the consultation process, rather they tend to re-iterate the Supreme
Court’s guidance regarding the duty to consult. For example, in Nova Scotia, the Policy and
Guidelines for Consultation with the Mi’kmaq do not mention any relevant Mi’kmaq legal
principles, rather it re-states leading case law on the duty to consult.501 The aspects of the
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provincial protocols and guidelines that account for the perspective of Indigenous communities
tend to take the form of: (i) a general acknowledgment that internal deliberations within the
community should be done in accordance with a format and methodology that they decide;502 (ii)
references to the importance of incorporating ‘traditional knowledge’ or land use studies,
regarding the environmental or ecological impacts of proposed projects;503 (iii) a general
commitment to “consider[ing] the perspectives of the Aboriginal community or communities to
be consulted”504 and to have “…discussions with the affected Aboriginal community or
communities, to determine what processes or approaches should be used to consult with the
communities”;505 and (iv) in the case of some provinces, a commitment to ensuring Aboriginal
communities have a role in the creation of consultation processes.506
3.3.2

Joint Crown-First Nation Consultation Protocols

In discussing the duty to consult, the Crown is quick to point to the number of joint consultation
protocols entered into with Indigenous communities. There are dozens of examples of these
types of consultation protocols, including one between the Government of Canada and the Metis
Nation of Alberta, the Mi'kmaq Wolastoqiyik, and the Mississaugas of the New Credit First
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Nations507. These consultation protocols are valuable for establishing an agreed upon process for
engaging in consultation with communities. They bring a certain amount of clarity and certainty
to consultation on proposed projects, especially since they often impose a set of key
responsibilities.508 However, for the most part, these consultation protocols are silent on the role
for ILTs in the consultation process. The notable exceptions may be some of the modern treaties,
for example, the Tsawwassen Consultation Protocols as these were agreed to pursuant to their
self-government agreements, which include specific provisions regarding the law-making
authority of this community.509
3.3.3

Government of Canada and the Impact Assessment Act

In 2019 Canada introduced the Impact Assessment Act510 (“IAA”). This legislation and its
regulations “establish[ed] the legislative basis for the federal impact assessment process”511 and
created the Impact Assessment Agency of Canada (the “Agency”) which is responsible for
“deliver[ing] high-quality impact assessments that contribute to informed decision making on
major projects in support of sustainable development”.512 The Agency is responsible for leading
and managing the impact assessment process for all federally designated major projects which
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may include mining operations, oil or gas pipelines, or nuclear projects.513 When the IAA was
introduced in 2019 it incorporated a consideration of Indigenous knowledge and culture into the
assessment process:514
Canada’s Impact Assessment Act
22 (1) The impact assessment of a designated project, whether it is conducted by the
Agency or a review panel, must take into account the following factors:
(g) Indigenous knowledge provided with respect to the designated project;
(l) considerations related to Indigenous cultures raised with respect to the designated
project.515
In recent years the Government of Canada has gone beyond what is provided in the IAA and has
stated that: (i) Canada’s impact assessment regime should be taking Indigenous customs into
account;516 and (ii) the IAA will “work with Indigenous communities to find opportunities for
innovative engagement practices that reflect the needs of communities and respect Indigenous
cultures, traditions, customary laws and protocols”.517 In its guidance for proponents, Canada has
also expressed the need to consider Indigenous knowledge during an impact assessment and that
proponents should include Indigenous knowledge, including “Indigenous governance, traditional
laws, customs and use of resources”518 when engaging in a technical assessment. All of this
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represents at least a stated commitment to ensuring a role for ILTs within Canada’s duty to
consult framework, despite the fact that some critics have pointed out that “embedded in the IAA
is the stark Canadian legal reality that a ‘‘no” from an Indigenous community in relation to a
designated project does not necessarily mean no under the Act”.519
3.3.4

Indigenous Consultation Protocols

Over the past 15 years, Indigenous communities have developed:
their own decision-making mechanisms, often in parallel to state-sponsored regulatory
processes. They do so through the development of community-driven impact assessment
for example, or through the negotiation of protocols and agreements with project
proponents, under which the latter recognise Indigenous ways of expressing consent as a
precondition for a project to proceed.520
As Grace Nosek as pointed out, this work on guidelines and protocols on the part of Indigenous
communities suggests an “advance towards an FPIC regime”521 in Canada.
These consultation protocols may include: (i) how the community wishes to be consulted; (ii) the
principles that would govern these consultations; and (iii) the responsibilities of various actors
participating in the consultation. Although not necessarily determinative of the substance of
consultations, these protocols are insightful as they have established a clear role for ILTs by
requiring government, proponents, and others to engage in a consultation that is reflective of
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their relevant legal traditions.522 There are a number of examples of these protocols,523 some of
which even define a vision of FPIC,524 but this thesis will focus on five of them.
First, the Federation of Sovereign Indian Nations (formerly the Federation of Saskatchewan
Indian Nations), which is an organization representing 74 First Nations in Saskatchewan, has
developed a template for consultation guidelines for its members. Part of this consultation
guideline includes a requirement that consultation processes respect First Nations decision
making processes inherent in their governance structures.525
Second, the Stk’emlupsemc te Secwepemc Nation (“SSN”) in British Columbia has developed its
own Environmental Assessment process and Plan. This was initially created in response to a
proposed mining project (the “Ajax Mine Project”), which was going to be located near a
significant historical site for the nation. This SSN-created process was designed to be pursued
alongside the federal/provincial consultation process, and allow the SSN to make a decision on a
proposed project that was, in their words “consistent with our laws, traditions, and customs and
assess project impacts in a way that respects our knowledge and perspectives”.526
This process was built on the SSN’s systems of law and included a role for elders, youths,
families, chiefs, and council.527 At the end of this assessment process the SSN would announce
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whether to give a project its FPIC.528 In the case of the Ajax Mine Project, the SSN rejected the
proposal and the study they conducted was at least partially responsible for BC’s decision to not
permit the project to go ahead. According to Minister Heyman, who was the Minister of the
Environment at the time, the SSN assessment also informed B.C’s own assessment of the
project.529 It is worth noting that this assessment has been touted by the Government of Canada
as a meaningful example of Indigenous-led Assessment processes that are reflective of
Indigenous “laws, governance, traditions, and customs”.530
Third, the Chippewas of the Thames have called upon both the Crown and project proponents to
participate in consultation in accordance with their own set of protocols. The Chippewas of the
Thames created these protocols in 2016 and maintain that they can help to guide positive
working relationships. The protocols specifically recognize that their nation’s rights and
responsibilities are recognized within traditional Anishinaabe law531 and make reference to
Anishinaabe legal principles regarding governance, communication, co-existence, and
economy.532 The protocols also require that traditional knowledge should inform the assessment
of a proposed project533 and that both government and proponents must embrace the
community’s traditional governance principles regarding internal consultation.534
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Fourth, several years ago Woodfibre LNG Limited proposed a Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG)
export facility near Squamish, British Columbia. This project would be located “in the heart of
Squamish Nation territory”.535 As a part of the consultation process, the proponent worked with
the Squamish Nation to establish its own “independent environmental review and decision
making process that [was] parallel to but separate from, the BC Environmental Assessment Act
process”.536 As a part of this process the proponent worked with the Squamish Nation to identify
a set of community values that would form the basis for the assessment. This involved
community input, working with elders and land stewards, etc.537 The Squamish eventually
agreed to the project subject to a number of conditions that would have to be met. This example
demonstrates that proponents can ensure that assessments are led by Indigenous communities
and informed by the communities’ values and principles.
A fifth example is the Tsleil-Waututh Nation’s independent environmental assessment of the
Kinder Morgan Trans Mountain Pipeline Expansion Project.538 The project was intended to
increase the capacity of an existing pipeline between Edmonton, Alberta and Burnaby BC in
addition to building new pipeline and pump stations.539 The Tsleil-Waututh Nation was
dissatisfied with the existing regulatory review process for the project and established its own
process conducted in accordance with its own laws and stewardship responsibilities.540 The
Tsleil-Waututh Nation ultimately denied approval for the project to proceed in its territory.541 In
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its final report the Tsleil-Waututh Nation highlighted that Tslieil-Waututh law: (i) would require
that the “territory be maintained and restored”;542 (ii) “includes the obligation to protect, defend,
and steward our territory”;543 and (iii) includes “the responsibility to restore the conditions that
provide the foundation our nation requires to thrive”.544 The report also concluded that the
project’s marine shipping and oil spill effects would constitute a violation of their laws.545
Despite this detailed analysis of the project through the lens of the Tsleil-Waututh’s legal
tradition, the report was insufficient to put a stop to the project546 which has continued despite
persistent and ongoing opposition.
3.4

Conclusions

Based on the foregoing, we can draw several conclusions regarding the relationship between
Canada’s duty to consult framework and ILTs. First, despite the court’s stated openness to
considering ILTs, the jurisprudence has yet to meaningfully engage with them in the formulation
or application of Canada’s duty to consult framework. The problem lies with the fact that ILTs
are not properly considered when determining: (i) what the duty requires; (ii) what principles the
duty is rooted in; or (iii) the analytical framework for assessing the sufficiency of consultations.
Nearly every significant element of the framework itself is rooted in expressions of the common
law as opposed to principles found within ILTs.
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For example, the honour of the Crown which forms the basis for the duty to consult is grounded
in a desire to reconcile “the pre-existence of aboriginal societies with the sovereignty of the
Crown”547 as well as “prior Aboriginal occupation of the land with the reality of Crown
sovereignty”.548 At this point we see that baked into the duty to consult framework is an
unquestioning belief in the validity of Crown sovereignty and the assumption that this implies a
denial of Indigenous sovereignty. This is perhaps unsurprising, as the Supreme Court is highly
unlikely to question its own validity by challenging Canada’s very foundation. In fact the
Supreme Court stated unequivocally in R. v Sparrow, that there was “never any doubt that
sovereignty and legislative power and indeed the underlying title to such lands vested in the
crown”.549
However, this has very real implications. The court does not take into consideration Indigenous
conceptions of sovereignty, the true meaning and intention behind the treaties, and never
questions whether there is an absence of Crown sovereignty in territories that were never subject
to treaties. By taking Crown sovereignty as assumed, with Indigenous peoples ultimately subject
to the will of the sovereign, it should come as no surprise that in sketching out the duty to
consult, Indigenous peoples are not permitted to “veto” government action, nor is the Crown
under a duty to reach an agreement.550
It should also come as no surprise that, in the event a project lacks the consent of Indigenous
peoples, the Crown is permitted to justify its infringement of Indigenous rights, thus retaining the
ability to act unilaterally or otherwise impose its will on Indigenous peoples. These elements of
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the duty to consult framework are a natural result of the court’s fundamental assumptions
regarding Crown sovereignty, that:
…Indigenous peoples exist within a sovereign-to-subjects relationship to the Crown;
and…Indigenous peoples’ claims are only cognizable within a contingent rights/duties
context. The unilateral assertion of Crown sovereignty could have vested legal powers
supporting these presuppositions in the Crown only if Europeans brought to North
America a system of law superior to the systems of law that already existed or if
Europeans had found a legally vacant landscape. In other words, while the DCA [Duty to
Consult and Accommodate] framework does open up the possibility of Indigenous
participation, it relies on a foundational logic that can only be supported by the doctrines
of discovery and terra nullius. Although attenuating some of the more damaging features
of these doctrines, the DCA incorporates these notions of European legal superiority,
thereby relying on a racist ideology and pernicious legal fiction that is widely considered
illegitimate.551
As Joshua Nichols and Robert Hamilton have noted, the “incongruities between international
consent-based norms, such as those articulated in UNDRIP, and Canada’s domestic consultation
framework, continues to allow the Crown to supersede Indigenous interests on the basis of
unilaterally asserted sovereign claims”.552 They maintain that a meaningful implementation of
the Declaration will only occur if these assumptions surrounding Crown sovereignty are
challenged.553 Although this is a topic beyond the scope of this thesis, their point is an important
one as assumed conceptions of Indigenous peoples as sovereign subjects does inform every
element of the duty to consult framework. This ends up influencing the extent to which the
framework can meaningfully engage with the laws of Indigenous peoples.
Other elements of the duty to consult framework are notable for how similar they are to wellestablished practices within the common law. For example, the duty to consult’s spectrum
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analysis, where the severity of the impact on an established right has a correlating effect on the
standard the Crown must meet, is a common judicial approach, particularly within the context of
fundamental rights. In the development of the Oakes test for justifying infringement of Charter
rights, the Supreme Court stated that “the more severe the deleterious effects of a measure, the
more important the objective must be if the measure is to be reasonable and demonstrably
justified in a free and democratic society”.554 Given that the duty to consult emerged as a tool by
which to protect established and asserted Aboriginal/Treaty rights, it is not surprising that the
Supreme Court has adopted a similar analytical approach, where the severity of the impact
influences what will be required of the Crown. It is also not surprising that the Supreme Court’s
approach to justifying the infringement of Charter rights is strikingly similar to the justification
for infringing established Aboriginal/Treaty rights in circumstances where Indigenous peoples
withhold their consent to a project.555
The similarities include: (i) a requirement to demonstrate a compelling and substantial
objective;556 (ii) a “requirement that the incursion is necessary to achieve the government’s
goal”;557 and (iii) a requirement of proportionality, “that the benefits that may be expected to
flow from that goal are not outweighed by adverse effects on the Aboriginal interest”.558
In summation, the formulation of the duty to consult framework is rooted in colonial and well
established common law concepts. There are elements of the duty to consult framework that
would look quite different if the Court had utilized ILTs in a meaningful way. For example, who
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the duty is owed to within Indigenous communities, how impacts are assessed, the ability for one
party to act unilaterally, all might look quite different through the lens of ILTs. This topic will be
discussed in further detail in chapter four.
In terms of the application of the duty to consult framework, subject to what I have noted above,
I am not aware of any decided cases that have suggested courts are required to apply the laws of
the impacted Indigenous community when conducting a duty to consult analysis. This is not to
suggest that ILTs are never applied or referenced within the context of the duty to consult. There
are cases that suggest the courts would look favourably on consultations that engage with things
like traditional knowledge,559 demonstrating that ILTs are at least a relevant factor for the court
to consider. In addition, there are circumstances where consultation protocols, agreements, or
legislation may require parties to engage with the traditional knowledge, laws, or customs of
Indigenous peoples. However, it is also important to note that there are instances where the court
has stated that the Crown retains the “…discretion as to how it structures the consultation
process and how the duty to consult is met…what is required is a reasonable process, not perfect
consultation”.560 This suggests that the court retains a significant amount of discretion regarding
how and when it will engage with ILTs.
I would not doubt that the court would be more likely to deem a consultation to be satisfactory if
it were conducted in such a way so as to respect and account for the laws of the relevant
Indigenous peoples. However, I am not aware of any cases establishing that this is a pre-requisite
in all circumstances.
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Some might take issue with this conclusion and suggest that Indigenous peoples can, and
frequently do, participate in assessments that rely upon traditional knowledge in determining
whether to proceed with a project. Critics might also point to recent efforts both provincially and
federally to ensure that assessment processes include a role for the laws of Indigenous peoples.
While this may all be true, we have to question whether the ability to provide feedback, request
accommodation, and express concerns which may be based on a people’s system of laws
constitutes a sufficient recognition of ILTs when the framework itself that the court is applying
in the event a project gets litigated, is not, in any meaningful way, reflective of ILTs.
As discussed above, outside the courtroom provincial and federal consultation protocols have
begun to embrace a model of consultation that acknowledges a role for Indigenous knowledge,
governance, traditional laws, and customs. Although this represents a meaningful commitment to
recognizing the validity and importance of ILTs within the consultation process, it still falls
short. As Sarah Morales has noted,
…to date, most Canadian Indigenous groups have not had a meaningful voice in impact
assessment…when Indigenous groups are included in regulatory processes, other parties
severely limit their involvement, requesting only baseline traditional knowledge…As a
result, Indigenous culture, spirituality, laws and legal processes…have not been taken
into account in the Crown-led and proponent-driven Canadian environmental assessment
processes.561

Furthermore, there are examples where an Indigenous community can formulate its own
assessment process designed in accordance with their own laws, that result in the rejection of a
project and government may still refuse to adhere to these conclusions and permit projects to
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continue.562 This demonstrates a disregard for the legally binding nature of these processes and
serves to undermine Indigenous self-determination. I am confident that Indigenous communities
will continue to try to address this issue by formulating consultation protocols and assessment
processes that reflect their worldviews, values, and systems of law. I am even confident that
these will have a meaningful impact on how consultations are conducted. However, until the
Crown and proponents treat these processes as law, the duty to consult framework cannot be said
to be integrating ILTs in any meaningful sense. This calls for a further institutionalization of
what is already occurring.
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Chapter Four
4.

Anishinaabe Law

One way to ensure that Canada’s interpretation of FPIC furthers the process of reconciliation is
by grounding this interpretation in ILTs. As demonstrated above, Canada’s current approach to
consultation through the duty to consult framework fails to meaningfully engage with ILTs.
Furthermore, although the scholarship acknowledges the need to engage with ILTs within the
context of interpreting and implementing the Declaration, few have taken the time to discuss
precisely what this could look like.
Jeffery Hewitt has advocated for new institutions to be developed based on Indigenous systems
of law that are mandated to interpret the Declaration when it is applied in Canada.563 This
suggestion raises a few questions, including, what might these institutions look like? How might
ILTs be applied when interpreting UNDRIP and specifically the FPIC Articles? The Government
of Canada has suggested that it is impossible to define FPIC564 so in order to answer these
questions it is worth exploring what contributions a specific ILT (Anishinaabe) could make to
the discussion surrounding consultation, consent, and FPIC more broadly. Put differently, how
might Anishinaabe legal principles help to define the obligations of both Indigenous peoples and
the Crown in seeking consensus about proposed resource developments? This chapter will
explore these questions in further detail.
The discourse surrounding FPIC as explored in chapter two is currently dominated by nonindigenous voices, whose analysis of FPIC is often built on common law principles that are not
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universally shared. It is worth exploring what contributions a specific ILT (Anishinaabe) can
make to the discussion surrounding consultation, consent, and FPIC more broadly. This chapter
is not proposing to provide definitive statements on the precise content of the Anishinaabe legal
tradition. I am not an Anishinaabe person and it would be inappropriate to suggest I can speak on
behalf of their communities or to provide a definitive statement on the content of this vibrant,
diverse, and complex legal tradition. However, by exploring the work of some noted
Anishinaabe scholars and their articulation of Anishinaabe principles and values I will be able to
draw some conclusions about how they may (or should) effect our understanding of FPIC.
This chapter proceeds in two parts. Part one consists of an introduction to Anishinaabe
constitutionalism with a particular focus on the work of authors like John Borrows, Karen Drake,
and Aaron Mills. Part 2 includes a high-level introduction to some notable Anishinaabe legal
principles which may be informative of how we conceive of FPIC, including: community
decision-making processes; the seven grandfather teachings; the agency of the natural world;
leadership (persuasive compliance); stewardship principles; consent; and diplomacy.
4.1

Anishinaabe Constitutionalism

4.1.1

Who are the Anishinaabe?

The Anishinaabe are an Indigenous people whose territory “span[s] a vast geographic region
from the Great Lakes to the Plains and also reside in other urban and rural communities
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throughout North America”.565 The Anishinaabe are also commonly referred to as Anishnawbe,
Anishinape, Anicinape, Neshnabe, Nishnaabe, Nishnawbe, Anishinaubae, and Nishinabe.566
Despite possessing a collective identity, “the Anishinaabe comprise distinct, separate bands that
span a vast geographic region from the Great Lakes to the Plains. Historically and today, the
Anishinaabe are a people who share many beliefs and practices, yet individual bands are
influenced by their particular histories, geographic locations, political relationships, and internal
conflicts”.567 There are many different communities throughout this territory including the
Ojibwa, Ojibwe, Chippewa, Ojibway, Saulteaux, Mississauga, Nippising, Potawatomi, and
Odawa. The language of the Anishinaabe is Anishinabemowin.
4.1.2

Sources of Anishinaabe Law

If the intention is to determine what Indigenous law has to say about FPIC, it is natural to ask
where we can look to identify these relevant legal principles. As John Borrows has noted the
sources of Indigenous law include: Sacred Law, laws that “stem from the creator, creation
stories, or revered ancient teachings”;568 Natural Law, laws found and developed “…from
observations of the physical world”;569 Deliberative Law, the law “…formed through processes
of persuasion, deliberation, council and discussion”;570 Positive Law, law made by
people/government, including “…rules, regulations, codes, teachings, and axioms that are
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regarded as binding or regulating people’s behaviour”;571 and Customary law, “…practices
developed through repetitive patterns of social interaction that are accepted as binding on those
who participate in them”.572 Val Napoleon has noted the particular importance of customary law
as “inher[ing] in each Aboriginal cultural system as a whole, forming legal orders that enable
large groups of people to live together and to manage themselves accordingly”.573
In terms of how this law might be expressed, it can be codified574 but it is also shared orally,
particularly through the use of stories. Stories are a particularly important aspect of the
Anishinaabe legal tradition:
Anishinaabeg stories are roots; they are both origins and the imaginings of what it means
to be a participant in an ever-changing and vibrant culture in humanity. In the same vein,
stories can serve as a foundation and framework for the field of Anishinaabeg Studies,
providing both a methodological and theoretical approach to our scholarship. They
embody systems that form the basis for law, values, and community. Stories are rich and
complex creations that allow for the growth and vitality of diverse and disparate ways of
understanding the world.575
In Law’s Indigenous Ethics, John Borrows describes the importance of stories by sharing
something that Anishinaabe elder Basil Johnson taught him: “There was but one abiding
principle that guided all life and that was ‘to live in harmony with the world and within one’s
being’. Instead of laws that are guidelines, our ancestors made up stories to guide us along on the
right course”.576
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Scholars like Val Napoleon and Hadley Friedland have been writing extensively about utilizing
stories as a form of legal precedent that could be relied upon to resolve disputes. They have even
begun to establish specific methods for engaging with ILTs through stories.577 These methods
involve applying a legal analysis to stories similar to how this would be done in the common law
tradition.578 Napoleon and Friedland have described bringing some groups together to analyze
Cree and Dene stories “…to collectively synthesize the principles identified through the legal
analysis of the stories”.579
Given the central importance of stories to ILTs, it should come as no surprise that the bulk of the
scholarship discussed throughout the rest of this chapter will invoke stories as the basis for legal
principles.
4.1.3

An Introduction to Anishinaabe Constitutionalism

Aaron Mills is one of the leading scholars in the area of Anishinaabe law. His work over the last
several years has primarily focused on articulating his vision of ‘Anishinaabe Constitutionalism’,
“the total relational structure that allows for Anishinaabe political communities to come into
being, to maintain their integrity over time, and to adapt to new realities”.580 In his article “The
Lifeworlds of Law: On Revitalizing Indigenous Legal Orders Today”, Mills describes his
struggles as a first year law student. Mills attributes some of these struggles to the fact that the
Canadian (liberal) legal order he was being taught differed from his foundational Anishinaabe
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understandings of the world.581 The conclusion Mills makes is a common sense, but important
one. Mills points out that all systems of law are built on constitutional foundations. They have a
world beneath them consisting of values, principles, worldviews, etc. Mills argues that only once
we accept this fact and recognize that all law, legal processes, and legal institutions are built on a
foundation that they can never separate from582 can we begin to appreciate the tensions that can
exist between Canadian law and ILTs.
In the “Lifeworlds of Law” Mills argues that Canadian law and Canada’s constitution is a
species of liberal constitutionalism that contrasts with ILTs. Mills argues that Canada’s
constitutional liberalism has specific conceptions of the individual, consent of the governed,
social contract, the rule of law, the agency of the natural world, and freedom that differ greatly
from his Anishinaabe conception of these ideas.583 For this reason he suggests that if one were to
possess a different set of worldviews, foundational values, or understanding about “what there is
and how one can know [lifeworld]”,584 the systems of law and legal institutions one would
design might look quite different.585
Mills creates an analogy between constitutional orders and a tree (specifically the roots, trunk,
branches, and leaves) to further elaborate on his argument.586 Mills conceives of the roots as
“…its lifeworld: the story it tells of creation, which reveals what there is in the world (ontology)
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and how we can know (epistemology)”.587 The trunk is a constitutional order “…the structure
generated by the roots, which organizes and manifests these understandings as political
community”.588 The branches are legal traditions, “the set of processes and institutions we
engage to create, sustain, and unmake law”.589 The leaves are the laws themselves.590
This chapter will touch on ideas that appear relevant to every aspect of Mills’ tree model but will
primarily focus on the trunk or the constitutional order, which Mills and his co-authors describe
as follows:
In a liberal democracy, the constitutional order is premised on the primacy of individual
autonomy. Individuals exercise their autonomy when they enter into a contract (the social
compact) in which they create rights and undertake obligations. The goal of entering into
a political community is to achieve a state of justice, or in other words, a just state. In
contrast, the ontological starting point of an Anishinaabe constitutional order is not
individual autonomy, but interdependence. All members of the political community—
which includes humans, animals, plants, earth and all other aspects of the natural world—
are interdependent. Because of this interdependence, the political community sustains
itself not through contract, but through mutual aid. Each member of the political
community has a responsibility to coordinate the sharing of gifts with the needs of others
within the political community. As we have said, the goal of political community is not
justice, but harmony. If all members of the political community use their gifts to meet the
needs of all others, then harmony can be achieved. Harmony does not refer to an absence
of conflict; it refers to a web of relationships (interdependence) in which each member
communicates gifts and needs.591
4.2

Anishinaabe Approaches to Defining FPIC

This chapter will not seek to provide a conclusive definition of FPIC from an Anishinaabe
perspective. It would be impossible to do so precisely given the diversity of perspectives
contained within the Anishinaabe legal tradition. Instead, the rest of this chapter is dedicated to
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examining some of the Anishinaabe principles relevant to the debates surrounding the
interpretation and implementation of the FPIC Articles to highlight how ILTs can meaningfully
influence this discourse.
There are some published examples of Anishinaabe communities defining consent. For example,
in 1997 the GCT3 National Assembly enacted the Manito Aki Inako-nigaawin which defined
consent as the “formal agreement on behalf of the Nation in accordance with traditional law”.592
Others have approached defining consent at a conceptual level, with authors like Brett Allen
Campeau stating that to interpret ‘consent’ consistently with Anishinaabe legal principles we
need to move beyond the process over outcome model described in Chapter two, where interests
can be accommodated but ultimately the Crown retains the unilateral right to act. According to
Campeau this interpretation “does not honour Indigenous conceptions of respect and
relationality”.593 Mitchell, on the other hand, determined that for the participants’ in her study the
“definition of consent is premised on the practice of Indigenous collective and consensual
decision making before their lands are accessed”.594
Except for this general guidance, I have not found declarative statements on the general meaning
of FPIC from an Anishinaabe perspective. However, it is possible to identify broadly based
Anishinaabe principles and values that appear to speak directly to: (1) the content of FPIC; and
(2) the process by which FPIC should be interpreted and implemented. The rest of this chapter
will be dedicated to exploring some of these principles and values.
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4.2.1

An Interpretation Centered on Relationships

Martin Papillon and Thierry Rodon argue that the key to FPIC is understanding it less as a veto
and more as a recognition of a relationship between “mutually consenting and self-determining
partners”,595 wherein Indigenous rights are understood relationally.596 Fortunately, Indigenous
law has always held relationships to be of central importance. As Michael Coyle has pointed out:
That focus on the primacy of relationships can be seen historically in the metaphors of
the Two Row Wampum, the Covenant Chain and the use of clan dodems, for example, as
“signatures” on the written forms of the treaties between Indigenous peoples and the
Crown. That traditional Indigenous focus on harmonious relationships generally includes
accountability to the natural world, a stewardship-like concept translated in
Anishinaabemowin, for example, as “bimeekumaugaewin”. Indeed, this relational
conception of the world often extends to the categorization of non-human entities as
“kin” to the community or to particular clans in the community.597
Scholars like Aaron Mills suggest that Canadian law places a central focus on freedom in an
individual sense, both “the self’s experience of non-interference from the choice-limiting actions
of others (negative liberty)…[and] the self’s entitlement to a specified set of collective goods
taken as necessary for establishing and securing its personal autonomy (positive liberty)”.598 One
could see how Canadian law might not be best suited for achieving a relational understanding of
FPIC if these are its underlying principles. Perhaps something can be gained by considering
FPIC through the lens of the Anishinaabe legal tradition, which: (i) conceives of law itself as
relational;599 and (ii) considers duties and obligations to be central to relationships:
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Duties or obligations are central to relationships under Anishinabek law. This is
demonstrated in formalized patterns of speech. For example, when Anishinabek people
historically met, they would first ask one another: ‘Weanaesh k’dodem?’(‘What is your
totem?’). Once clan and family were determined, people would be asked: ‘Ahniish aenanookeeyin?’ (‘What do you do for a living?’). Both of these questions are related to a
person’s responsibility within the community. A person’s dodem indicates more than
their lineage: obligations are attached to their clan affiliations. Like a dodem, a person’s
anookeewin also connotes ideas of duty and right (dae-binaewiziwin). Anishinabek
peoples have obligations (daebizitawau-gaewin) to their families and community: to
support them, to help them prosper, and to exercise their rights to live and work. In an
Anishinabek legal context, rights and responsibilities are intertwined.600
Karen Drake, in discussing the work of Mills frames this discussion of relationships around the
logic of wiidookodaadiwin (mutual aid), whereby “we each have a responsibility to identify,
develop, and use our own gifts to meet the needs of others, which entails responsibilities to
identify the needs of others as well as their gifts, and to communicate our own needs”.601
In their study, “Towards an Indigenous-Informed Relational Approach to Free, Prior, and
Informed Consent”, Mitchell and her co-authors spoke to members of the Matawa First Nation
who highlighted their disappointment with the failure of government and proponents to build a
meaningful relationship with their community.602 They concluded: “…that the implementation
and fulfillment of FPIC will require further understanding of an Indigenous perspective on the
importance of developing and sustaining relationships between communities and between
Matawa First Nations, various levels of government, industry proponents, and the earth”.603
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It is clear in reviewing this study, and the work of scholars like Aaron Mills and Karen Drake,
that Anishinaabe perspectives on relationships can differ greatly from those that underlie
Canada’s liberal constitutional order. If moving forward the intention were to interpret the FPIC
Articles in such a way as to put the relationship between Indigenous peoples and the Crown at
the forefront, it would be beneficial to consider the relevance of the Anishinaabe legal tradition,
where relationality plays a central role. Not only would this help to accommodate Anishinaabe
perspectives on relationships, which are not necessarily reflected in Canada’s legal institutions, it
could provide a roadmap for implementation of the Declaration on Anishinaabe territories in a
manner that would contribute to reconciliation.
4.2.2

How Should FPIC Be Interpreted and Who Should be Interpreting It?

As noted in Chapter Two above, scholars like Dominique Leydet have raised concerns about the
state (whether through the judiciary or through legislatures) being tasked with applying FPIC,
interpreting what it requires, and/or considering what impacts are significant enough to warrant
consent being required.604 Anishinaabe principles would suggest that the appropriate way to
approach the interpretation and application of the FPIC Articles should be through decentralized
processes where a broad range of people have a role to play, as opposed to the judiciary or the
Crown proclaiming how FPIC will be interpreted and applied. I would point to three sources in
support of this conclusion.
First, in “Indigenous Legal Traditions in Canada”, Borrows shares the story of the Creator
calling a meeting of all the Animals:
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IN THE TIME BEFORE there were human beings on Earth, the Creator called a great
meeting of the Animal People. During that period of the world’s history, the Animal
People lived harmoniously with one another and could speak to the Creator with one
mind. They were very curious about the reason for the gathering. When they had all
assembled together, the Creator spoke. “I am sending a strange new creature to live
among you,” he told the Animal People. “He is to be called Man and he is to be your
brother. “But unlike you he will have no fur on his body, will walk on two legs and will
not be able to speak with you. Because of this he will need your help in order to survive
and become who I am creating him to be. You will need to be more than brothers and
sisters, you will need to be his teachers. “Man will not be like you. He will not come into
the world like you. He will not be born knowing and understanding who and what he is.
He will have to search for that. And it is in the search that he will find himself. “He will
also have a tremendous gift that you do not have. He will have the ability to dream. With
this ability he will be able to invent great things and because of this he will move further
and further away from you and will need your help even more when this happens.
But to help him I am going to send him out into the world with one very special gift. I am
going to give him the gift of the knowledge of Truth and Justice. But like his identity it
must be a search, because if he finds this knowledge too easily he will take it for granted.
So I am going to hide it and I need your help to find a good hiding-place. That is why I
have called you here.” A great murmur ran through the crowd of Animal People. They
were excited at the prospect of welcoming a new creature into the world and they were
honoured by the Creator’s request for their help. This was truly an important day. One by
one the Animal People came forward with suggestions of where the Creator should hide
the gift of knowledge of Truth and Justice. “Give it to me, my Creator,” said the Buffalo,
“and I will carry it on my hump to the very centre of the plains and bury it there.” “A
good idea, my brother,” the Creator said, “but it is destined that Man should cover most
of the world and he would find it there too easily and take it for granted.” “Then give it to
me,” said the Salmon, “and I will carry it in my mouth to the deepest part of the ocean
and I will hide it there.” “Another excellent idea,” said the Creator, “but it is destined that
with his power to dream, Man will invent a device that will carry him there and he would
find it too easily and take it for granted.” “Then I will take it,” said the Eagle, “and carry
it in my talons and fly to the very face of the Moon and hide it there.” “No, my brother,”
said the Creator, “even there he would find it too easily because Man will one day travel
there as well.” Animal after animal came forward with marvellous suggestions on where
to hide this precious gift, and one by one the Creator turned down their ideas. Finally, just
when discouragement was about to invade their circle, a tiny voice spoke from the back
of the gathering. The Animal People were all surprised to find that the voice belonged to
the Mole. The Mole was a small creature who spent his life tunnelling through the earth
and because of this had lost most of the use of his eyes. Yet because he was always in
touch with Mother Earth, the Mole had developed true spiritual insight. The Animal
People listened respectfully when Mole began to speak. “I know where to hide it, my
Creator,” he said. “I know where to hide the gift of the knowledge of Truth and Justice.”
“Where then, my brother?” asked the Creator. “Where should I hide this gift?” “Put it
inside them,” said the Mole. “Put it inside them because then only the wisest and purest
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of heart will have the courage to look there.” And that is where the Creator placed the gift
of the knowledge of Truth and Justice.605

Borrows suggests that the story “…teaches the importance of participation in the interpretation
of indigenous legal traditions”606 as well as the importance of ensuring that powers of legal
interpretation and judgment are not vested solely in greater beings, namely legislators or
judges.607 Borrows advocates for those in society with less formal power having a role in
decision making as opposed to decisions being made by those who are “distant, professionalized
and impersonal”.608
Second, Mills and his co-authors make related points when discussing the dissemination of
knowledge. They highlight a story shared by Lana Ray and Paul Nicolas Cormier in their article
“Killing the Weendigo with Maple Syrup: Anishinaabeg Pedagogy and Post-Secondary
Research”:
A long time ago when the world was new, Gitche Manitou made things so that life was
very easy for the people. There were plenty of animals, good weather, and the maple trees
were filled with thick, sweet syrup; they just had to break off a twig and collect it as it
dropped off. Nanaboozhoo went to go see his friends the Anishinaabe, but when he
arrived there was no one around – they were not fishing, working in the fields, or
gathering berries. Nanaboozhoo finally found them in a grove of maple trees, lying on
their backs with their mouths open, letting the maple syrup drip into their mouths. Upon
seeing this, Nanaboozhoo said, “This will not do.” He went down to the river and took a
big basket made of birch bark, bringing back many buckets of water. He went to the top
of the maple trees and poured the water in so that it thinned out, making the syrup thin
and watery and just barely sweet to the taste. “This is how it will be from now on”, he
said. “No longer will syrup drip from the maple trees. Now there will be only watery sap.
When people want to make maple syrup they will have to gather many buckets full of the
sap in the birch bark baskets like mine. They will have to gather wood and make fires to
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heat the stones to drop into the baskets. They will have to boil the water with the heated
stones for a long time to make even a little maple syrup.609
Mills and his co-authors describe how this story analogizes maple syrup to knowledge and argue
how approaches to learning utilized in higher education can lose their personal elements and
context.610 They allude to a shift in focus toward more active engagement with respect to
learning.611
Third, authors like Campeau, Johnston, Drake, and Mills have pointed out how “Indigenous
governance traditionally relies on persuasive authority in tight knit community groups…[where]
leadership was predicated on persuasion”.612 Basil Johnston analogized this to the leadership
demonstrated among migratory birds, where the “safety and autonomy of the species is best
served by following diverse paths in small units”.613 Johnston also described leadership positions
to be more of a burden than something to be desired.614 Mills and his co-authors have raised the
story of the “Beaver Gives a Feast”615 as an authority for persuasive compliance over coercive
authority in the Anishinaabe tradition, where top-down force is not exercised, authority rests
with community members, and leaders serve the role of facilitator or coordinator.616
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So what might this mean for the interpretation of FPIC? First, the foregoing principles suggest
that any new institutions that are developed to interpret the Declaration, in order to respect
Anishinaabe legal traditions, would have to ensure a decentralized role for decision makers. It
would be essential not to rely solely on the judiciary or formally trained lawyers in determining
the precise meaning and application of FPIC. As it currently stands, the interpretation of FPIC
will likely rest in the hands of the judiciary, offering a top-down determination of when consent
is required, to whom it is owed, what occurs if consent is not obtained, etc. If we truly want to
build an interpretation of FPIC that is reflective of ILTs we should consider the possibility of
building new institutions whereby interpretations can be made by community members most
directly affected, alongside “a commitment to enhanced local consensus-building, akin to
traditional persuasive authority models”.617 Karen Drake has proposed such an institution in the
past. Drake has written about the usefulness of talking circles, grounded in Anishinaabe
constitutionalism, and suggests that they would create “…space and time for the voices of all
those potentially affected by the dispute to be heard”.618
Second, as Karen Drake has noted, there would likely be significant contributions that
Anishinaabe law could make in tackling the key interpretive question of a “veto” over resource
development projects. Drake has indicated that in her proposed forum for addressing legal
disputes, one that is grounded in Anishinaabe constitutionalism, the principle of persuasive
compliance would suggest that a veto power would not exist:
…an Anishinaabe nation would not possess a right to unqualifiedly quash a proposed
project that being said, an Anishinaabe nation would be warranted in declining to consent
to a proposed project within their territory for any reason that resonates within
Anishinaabe constitutionalism (eg, if the project would prevent the nation from upholding
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their responsibilities including their responsibilities to the land, or if the federal and/or
provincial government has not demonstrated a persuasive need for the project). But
declining to give consent in this way is not a veto, as it would be open to Canadian
governments to move a project to a different location or otherwise amend it to comply
with our responsibilities within Anishinaabe constitutionalism. A veto is inconsistent
with persuasive compliance.619
Although Drake discusses this point seemingly within the context of the duty to consult, one
could extend this logic to a discussion surrounding FPIC, in order to ground the interpretation of
FPIC in principles of Anishinaabe Constitutionalism.
4.2.3

Conservation and Stewardship Principles

Principles of stewardship are central to the Anishinaabe legal tradition. As the Ontario Superior
Court noted in Restoule v Canada: “In the Anishinaabe tradition, wherever a potential right
exists, a correlative obligation can usually be found based on the individual’s relationship with
the other orders of the world. These are stewardship-like concepts (bimeekumaugaewin) and
apply to the Anishinaabe’s engagement with the land, plants, and other beings”.620

This is rooted in Anishinaabe stories including “The Year the Roses Died”, where “…we learn
that the gift of creation requires careful stewardship”.621 This principle may find its origins in
what Mills and others describe as one of the structural features of Anishinaabe constitutionalism,
interdependence and the reality that humans do not dominate the natural world.622 Terry Mitchell
and her co-authors captured this point quite well, quoting a member of the Matawa First Nation:
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My understanding as an Anishinaabe is that we have sacred connection to the land, we
are connected to everything, and that is my belief. That’s something that I cherish, that is
something that I carry with me every day. We are connected to the land. And like one of
my colleagues said, money will run out. But our connection to the land as well as our
stewardship to the land is something that we really need to look at when making our
decisions in the future because we’re only borrowing the land. We’re only using it
temporarily because we have to leave the rest to our children, for those that are going to
live in the future.623
This principle of stewardship manifests itself in several important ways. First, it structures
Anishinaabe conceptions of ownership. According to John Borrows Anishinaabe law does not
conceive of ownership in the same way as other legal traditions.624 Borrows highlights that for
something like land use, a trustee-like arrangement, although imperfect, is a more appropriate
way of understanding Anishinaabe relationships with land:
Nevertheless, the analogy of a trustee when explaining limitations concerning
Anishinabek land use is somewhat helpful in understanding Anishinabek law. A trust in
equity, as merged through the common law, is a right held by one person (the trustee) for
the benefit of another person (the beneficiary).Under Anishinabek law, land is held by the
present generation for future generations. Land does not ultimately belong to a person or
people in the sense that they have absolute discretion and control; land is provisionally
held for (con)temporary sustenance and for those unborn.625
Second, many Anishinaabe characterize the earth as having its own agency626 whereby the “earth
has a soul (chejauk) that animates its many moods and activities”.627 This is grounded in the
Anishinabemowin language which is verb-oriented and results in describing the natural world in
an active and living sense.628 As a result, many Anishinaabe prioritize “consult[ing] with the
Earth’s Creator and…seek[ing] the Earth’s receptiveness before important decisions are
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made”.629 As former Anishinaabe chief Gary Potts has put it, “the land is boss in our
development decision-making”.630 This extends even to rocks, which have their own agency that
needs to be respected. According to Borrows, “it would be inappropriate to use rocks without
their acquiescence and participation because….it would be considered akin to using another
person against his or he will”.631
Aimee Craft makes a similar point in discussing Anishinaabe Nibi Inaakonigewin (Water Law
Principles) and states that “[i]n other systems of law, water is treated as a subject or object, often
to be owned and used. In inaakonigewin, nibi (water) is treated as an actor in a relationship”.632
So what might this mean for the interpretation of FPIC? First, if our understanding of FPIC is to
respect this principle of Anishinaabe law, Canadian law would need to change. As noted above,
the Supreme Court of Canada has established a broad range of grounds for justifying the
infringement of Aboriginal title:
the development of agriculture, forestry, mining, and hydroelectric power, the general
economic development of the interior of British Columbia, protection of the environment
or endangered species, the building of infrastructure and the settlement of foreign
populations to support those aims, are the kinds of objectives that are consistent with this
purpose and, in principle, can justify the infringement of [A]boriginal title.633
As discussed in Chapter two, there is a broad consensus that the right to FPIC is subject to limits,
in accordance with Article 42 of the Declaration. The Anishinaabe legal tradition would likely
reject broad grounds like economic development, mining, forestry, and hydroelectric power, as
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grounds that could justify an infringement of the right to FPIC. Given the central importance of
stewardship and the agency of the natural world in the Anishinaabe tradition, it may be
inconceivable to permit the unilateral infringement of this agency through the sort of justification
analysis Canadian courts have adopted to date.
Second, I would argue that if we are to respect Anishinaabe legal principles we should not apply
the sliding scale of impact approach to FPIC that scholars and UN representatives have
supported. As a reminder, this approach suggests that only those decisions which will have a
significant impact on Indigenous land rights should trigger a requirement to obtain the consent of
those affected. If this approach is adopted and the power to determine what constitutes a
“significant” impact is left in the hands of those outside of the community, one could argue that
this would undermine the agency of the earth described by Borrows and others. Perhaps the only
way to bridge this while respecting Anishinaabe law would be for the Indigenous community
itself to be empowered to make the determination of what would constitute a severe impact. As
the ones with the knowledge necessary to meaningfully consult with all members of their
community, including the natural world, they may be the only ones positioned to ensure that its
agency is properly respected. It may also require, as Campeau has suggested, embracing
“Indigenous veto power for projects that would significantly affect Indigenous lands”634. Even if
those outside the communities feel the impact is minimal, if after consultation it is determined
that the proposed impact is inconsistent with Indigenous stewardship responsibilities, the project
would not be permitted to proceed.
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Third, a shift towards a focus on stewardship principles would likely require Indigenous
knowledge and protocols to be meaningfully integrated into any FPIC regime.635 Although we
can already see this occurring in the context of the duty to consult via Indigenous-led
consultation protocols and assessment processes, formalizing a role for Indigenous traditional
knowledge in the interpretation or implementation of FPIC would help to ensure respect for
Anishinaabe legal principles.
4.2.4

Seven Grandmother/Grandfather Teachings

The seven grandmother/grandfather teachings are foundational in Anishinaabe culture, and have
been described by Borrows as principles that could “…apply to Indigenous peoples’ relationship
with the Canadian state and those of the broader world”.636 The seven teachings are: Love, Truth,
Bravery, Humility, Wisdom, Honesty, and Respect. Borrows describes these as broad, general
aspirations that might be ambiguous but should be aimed towards.637 It is possible to ground the
work of interpreting and implementing FPIC in these seven foundational principles. For
example, the City of Sarnia has established a working group whose mandate is to develop a plan
to advance the implementation of UNDRIP within the City. Part of their terms of reference
includes instructions to the group to act consistently with the seven grandfather teachings.638
Bill C-15 requires the Government of Canada to consult and cooperate with Indigenous peoples
to prepare an action plan that will achieve the objectives of the Declaration.639 Grounding this
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work in the values of Indigenous communities would help to ensure that whatever plan of action
is taken is reflective of Indigenous worldviews and consistent with these teachings. The seven
grandmother/grandfather teachings are just one example of a set of values that could inform the
work of interpreting and implementing FPIC, but it would represent a significant shift in thinking
if the judiciary and Parliament worked to ground their approach to the Declaration in these, and
other, Indigenous teachings.
4.2.5

Decision-Making Processes

The Anishinaabe legal tradition has a lot to say about the manner in which decisions are to be
made. As noted earlier, in her article “The Trials and Tribulations of Ontario’s Mining Act: The
Duty to Consult and Anishinaabek Law”, Karen Drake identifies two interrelated Anishinaabek
legal principles relevant to consultation procedures: “(i) the obligation to wait, make
observations and gather information prior to making a decision; and (ii) the obligation to engage
in collective, rather than individual, decision-making”:640
John Borrows identifies these principles operating within an 1838 account of a man from
French River, Ontario, who was said to have become a windigo. The account was
recorded by William Jarvis, Superintendent of Indian Affairs at the time. Over a period of
weeks, the man in question gradually exhibited signs of becoming a windigo. Eventually,
the Anishinaabek people, along with this man, set out to join other members of their
community, walking through deep snow to get to them. They then formed a council to
decide what to do. Jarvis emphasizes that the decision reached was “the deliberate act of
this tribe in council.” Borrows notes that in this account, the group did not take action
right away; even though the man was becoming dangerous, the group waited for two
or three weeks, continuing to collect information by observing his behavior, before
acting. The willingness to wait in order to continue to collect information in the face of
growing danger illustrates the strength of this obligation.641
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The importance of collective decision making is also demonstrated by John Borrows story about
his community, the Chippewas of the Nawash, deliberating about the site of a pow-wow on their
reserve:642
A move was contemplated to accommodate the increasing numbers of park users during
this annual event. One suggestion was to move the pow-wow to ‘the prairie,’ a broad,
flat, and largely treeless stretch of land lying below Jones Bluff just beyond the shores of
Sydney Bay. The prairie had the advantage of being able to accommodate large crowds
and offered easy access from the main road…However, when it became apparent that a
road would be built to facilitate access to the prairie, a significant community movement
developed that drew on Anishinabek legal principles. The land is host to a significant
alvar, a rock-barren or natural pavement-like feature with little or no brush or tree
cover… For many Anishinabek, the alvar is a storyteller who recounts the time when the
land was younger and was covered by shallow tropical seas…The alvar is also home to
spiritually significant ‘spirit trails’ that wend their way through the area.643

As a result, the community engaged in consultation, debate, discussion, direct experience on the
land, prayer, and persuasion when deciding about the use of the alvar:
Scientists and Anishinabek lawyers, band councillors, grand-mothers, Elders, artists,
medicine people, community employees, and others participated in a process that drew
strongly on Anishinabek law respecting Anishinabek spiritual beliefs. Ceremonies were
conducted and traditional teachings reviewed. This…led to a decision to stop the prairie’s
development. Community deliberation, naturalistic observations drawn from scientists
and Elders and sacred teachings were all drawn upon to respect and show reverence
towards the life force of what others might regard as barren rock. This led to a positivist
law resolution whereby the band declared that the alvar would not host our annual powwows in the community.644
According to Borrows this story demonstrates “that Anishinabek beliefs concerning the Earth as
a living being can be legally recognized and affirmed. It also shows how Anishinabek law can

642

Lindsay Borrows, “Accessing Justice and Reconciliation: Anishinabek Legal Summary” (last accessed 24
June 2021), online: Indigenous Bar Association <https://indigenousbar.ca/indigenouslaw/wpcontent/uploads/2012/12/anishinabek_summary.pdf> at 5.
643
Borrows Constitution, supra note 445 at 247.
644
Ibid at 248.

149

lead to land being accorded political citizenship with its other close relations. Attentiveness to
the land’s character and sacred power gives the Earth an important place within this
jurisprudential system”.645 The importance of collective decision making was also highlighted in
Terry Mitchell’s work with Matawa First Nations where she heard that “decisions that arise from
a consensus building process are needed for community stability”.646
What might this suggest about the proper interpretation or implementation of FPIC? First, it
highlights that in order for consent to be properly obtained Indigenous communities must have:
(i) the time they need to make decisions; and (ii) the opportunity/resources to have all relevant
participants from the community contribute to the decision-making processes. These
Anishinaabe principles would suggest that consent for the purposes of FPIC can only be obtained
if it is provided after sufficient time and with the input of a wide variety of actors. As Drake has
pointed out the manner in which consultations are carried out do not always ensure that these two
Anishinaabe principles are respected647, so it would be beneficial for the courts to interpret and
understand FPIC as including a pre-requisite to satisfy these conditions in order to obtain
consent.
Second, it would likely require a broader understanding of whose consent is required in order to
obtain FPIC. At the moment it is not clear that any reading of FPIC extends legal recognition to
the natural world itself. However, if we embrace an interpretation of FPIC that accounts for ILTs
then expanding the interpretation of consent to include non-human members of a particular
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community may become necessary. This will likely mean a shift in thinking regarding
environmental considerations, from a factor to be weighed in assessment processes, to an actual
party whose consent must be obtained.
Third, when attempting to obtain consent from Indigenous communities, all parties (the Federal
Government, Provincial Governments, proponents) will need to ensure that traditional methods
of consultation are respected and that decisions are made by the entire community and not
simply elected band council leadership. As was discussed above in Chapter two in the context of
IBA negotiations many have noted that engagements between proponents and Indigenous
communities occur at the senior level and without input from the community.648 Any process for
interpreting or implementing FPIC should be mindful of the importance of collective decision
making and ensure this is a pre-requisite to obtaining consent.
4.2.6

Principles of International Diplomacy

The Government of Canada has frequently described its relationship with Indigenous peoples as
being one between nations. If we accept that the government is genuine in its commitment to a
nation-to-nation relationship it is worth exploring Anishinaabe principles that govern relations
between nations to observe if there is anything it might say that is relevant to the discourse
surrounding consultation, consent, etc.
According to Leanne Simpson, a noted Anishinaabe scholar, “the ethics of respect and
reciprocity were reflected in international Nishnaabeg diplomatic relations through the process
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known as “waiting in the woods” or “waiting at the woods’ edge”.649 Essentially this protocol
established that “[i]t would have been expected that upon leaving one’s own territory to cross
into someone else’s territory, that an individual or a group would build a fire to announce that
they were waiting in the woods”.650 A delegation would then be sent out to welcome visitors, a
feast would be prepared, and gifts would have been exchanged.651
Heidi Bohaker in her book Doodem and Council Fire: Anishinaabe Governance Through
Alliance also discussed Anishinaabe diplomacy and noted that:
Alliances, as consensual relationships, required mutual approval of changes. This was a
central principle of Anishinaabe law with respect to alliance relationships. Unilateral
changes could potentially harm the alliance. This practice of seeking consent from each
other allowed allies to identify possible problems and to ensure that the alliance
relationship remained strong.652

So what would be the relevance of these principles to FPIC? Interpretations could obviously vary
but one might conclude that this demonstrates a need for Canada to approach engagements with
Indigenous communities by: (i) recognizing that they are visitors to a particular nation’s
traditional territory; (ii) recognizing their sovereignty; and (iii) waiting to be invited. It is worth
noting that the Wet’suwet’en share similar protocols for visitors to their land and have made
efforts to incorporate these into the protocols for visiting their camps in the context of the recent
pipeline disputes in British Columbia.653 Given these aforementioned diplomatic principles it
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would be difficult to share the conclusion of some scholars who suggest that FPIC does not
require consent, that consent is simply an objective, or that it is only required in certain
circumstances. Instead, an interpretation where FPIC is an absolute right strikes me as more
consistent with Anishinaabe diplomatic principles, where Canada and proponents are under a
duty to approach traditional territories, announce their intentions, wait to be invited, and
permitted to enter only with the knowledge and permission from the community they are in
contact with.
Second, the duty to consult would likely be examined quite differently if principles like “waiting
in the woods” were a part of the court’s consideration. For example, in Ross River Dena Council
v. Yukon654 the council was arguing that by issuing hunting licenses, Yukon was interfering with
its claimed right to exclusive use and occupation of a particular area of land. The RRDC
maintained that their claimed title could be impacted by allowing the land to be used and
occupied by people outside of the RRDC’s members. They argued that Yukon had a duty to
consult about the possibility of third parties entering RRDC’s claimed area to hunt.655
The court rejected their arguments on several grounds: (i) the RRDC had not established
Aboriginal title to the area and without an established claim the RRDC did not have an exclusive
right to control the use and occupation of the land;656 and (ii) no specific concerns had been
raised and “…without explaining how the presence of hunters on its claimed territory could
potentially adversely affect its claimed title, the duty to consult as a means to preserve interests
in the interim is not engaged”.657
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There are several concerns that one could raise regarding this decision. The treatment of title
claims is one of them. However, the case also raises the question of whether it was correct for the
court to conclude that an Indigenous community should only be able to ensure non-members
were excluded from their land if they could point to an adverse effect on title. Certainly within
the framework of established duty to consult jurisprudence this may have been a legally sound
decision but what if we were to consider ILTs as part of the analysis?
Arguably the “waiting in the woods” principle might be a relevant consideration. Is it possible
that if the court had to tackle this as an established legal principle that they might require those
from outside of the RRDC membership to avoid accessing or trespassing on these territories until
given permission? Perhaps the court would have determined that consultation should have
occurred for any decisions which might encourage or permit individuals to access the RRDC
territory in violation of this “waiting the woods” principle?
This is not to suggest that this case would have necessarily been decided differently. It is
important to note that the Ross River Dena are not Anishinaabe and may not have a similar
diplomatic principle in their legal tradition. This is just to suggest that it is quite easy to identify
examples in the duty to consult jurisprudence where a consideration of ILTs might result in very
different outcomes.
4.3

Conclusion

This chapter has established the valuable contributions that the Anishinaabe legal tradition can
make to discussions surrounding consultation, consent, and FPIC more broadly. Anishinaabe law
has engaged in a sophisticated treatment of issues regarding consent, relationship building,
environmental stewardship, and nation-to-nation relations, all of which are relevant to an
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examination of FPIC. Anishinaabe law also has a lot to say about the sort of institutions that
should be charged with interpreting FPIC as Canada moves forward with implementing the
Declaration. This is all to suggest that despite the lack of engagement with ILTs in the discourse
surrounding UNDRIP, there are practical and meaningful contributions that ILTs can and should
make moving forward.
Engaging with ILTs will pose challenges. The great diversity of ILTs amongst Indigenous
communities means that in the context of any proposed project there may be multiple ILTs that
are relevant to the interpretation and application of FPIC. Furthermore, although this chapter was
only intended to discuss the possible relevance of Anishinaabe law, it would be correct to
suggest that views on the content of Anishinaabe law may differ from community to community.
These are challenges that will require further research and analysis in order to determine the
appropriate approach to resolving these concerns.
That being said, there are also instances where ILTs will share similarities. As noted above, the
Anishinaabe and the Wet’suwet’en appear to share similar principles regarding diplomacy. As
the work to revitalize ILTs continues other similarities regarding principles of stewardship and
relationality will almost certainly be identified. This may serve to simplify some of the
challenges of meaningfully engaging with ILTs in the interpretation of FPIC.
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Chapter Five
5.

Conclusions

This thesis has highlighted the long and contentious history of UNDRIP, from its origins to its
eventual endorsement in 2007. Over the past five years Canada’s federal government has
embraced the Declaration as a roadmap for reconciliation and a standard for Indigenous rights in
this country. Implementing the Declaration will pose challenges, perhaps the most pressing of
those challenges is the interpretation and application of the FPIC Articles.
Examining the guidance provided by the UN, as well the scholarly literature on the subject, has
demonstrated that there is a lack of consensus over precisely what FPIC requires of state actors.
It has also highlighted how as a legal principle, FPIC is an imperfect tool for advancing
Indigenous self-determination and reconciliation. Its usefulness is far too dependent on one’s
interpretation of its scope and content.
This lack of clarity is a challenge, but also an opportunity. With the passage of Bill C-15 Canada
has the opportunity to embrace the Declaration and to commit to a future where UNDRIP is the
framework for reconciliation. However, if in implementing the Declaration, Canada were to
revert to past practices by suggesting that the FPIC Articles are satisfied by our current duty to
consult framework, this opportunity will be lost. It is far from certain that the duty to consult
framework is consistent with what the FPIC Articles require of state actors. Furthermore, despite
the courts’ stated openness to considering ILTs, the jurisprudence has yet to meaningfully
engage with them in the formulation or application of Canada’s duty to consult framework.
I have argued here that one way to ensure that Canada’s implementation of UNDRIP furthers the
process of reconciliation is by moving beyond the duty to consult framework into an FPIC
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regime that is grounded in ILTs. Although many acknowledge a need for engagement with ILTs
within the context of interpreting and implementing the Declaration, few have taken the time to
discuss precisely what this could look like. Chapter four of this thesis demonstrated how ILTs
could influence the interpretation and implementation of the FPIC Articles moving forward.
Further research on this issue will be required particularly to extend a consideration of ILTs and
UNDRIP outside the context of Anishinaabe legal traditions, but in the short term, Indigenous
communities should be: (i) consulted on how they believe their legal traditions should affect
Canada’s action plan on the implementation of UNDRIP; and (ii) empowered to reflect upon
their own unique legal traditions and how they may apply to the various issues raised by the
interpretation and implementation of UNDRIP.
In addition, there are several steps that could be taken at an institutional level to help ensure that
ILTs play a meaningful role in the interpretation and implementation of the FPIC Articles
moving forward. First, Canada could mandate that consultations with Indigenous communities
must be conducted in accordance with protocols negotiated with the relevant Indigenous
community that are reflective of their own unique legal traditions. Canada could consider
establishing a threshold in which the right to FPIC is only satisfied if these protocols are
reasonably respected.
Second, as some of the literature examining this issue has already suggested,658 the introduction
of mandatory cultural competency training for the legal profession (and specifically the
judiciary), with a particular focus on ILTs, would be beneficial. TRC Call to Action 27 requested
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this type of training,659 and to their credit several provincial law societies have introduced it for
their lawyers.660 However, it is essential that if the Canadian legal system is going to
meaningfully engage with ILTs, that all officers of the court be provided training to help ensure
they are engaging with ILTs in a respectful manner. As noted above, there are some who suggest
that the judiciary should not attempt to engage with indigenous legal principles,661 and that the
best option for respectfully applying ILTs is via new institutions developed wholly by and for
Indigenous peoples. Although this would be an ideal long term solution, in the near term the
judiciary is going to continue to be asked to consider and apply ILTs whenever litigation
involving Indigenous communities arises. Ensuring that the judiciary is better equipped to
address the sources and content of these ILTs respectfully will improve the judicial treatment of
these systems of law.
Third, Canada could commit to introducing stable, long-term, and guaranteed funding for the
development of Indigenous-led project assessment procedures. As noted above there are many
recent examples of assessment processes created by Indigenous communities that have been
applied to specific projects affecting their territory. These assessment processes are thoughtful,
detailed, and, most importantly, representative of the values, culture, and traditions of the
community itself. Canada could prioritize the development of similar assessment processes for
every Indigenous community in Canada. This would require a significant commitment to long
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term, guaranteed funding to ensure that all Indigenous peoples are able to assess and consider
consenting to projects based on processes that are reflective of their unique legal tradition.
These proposals are by no means exhaustive, but they represent a series of steps that could be
taken to help ensure that ILTs play a meaningful role in the interpretation and implementation of
the FPIC Articles moving forward. Canada is at an important cross-roads in its relationship with
Indigenous peoples. As noted above, the implementation of UNDRIP represents a significant
opportunity not only to recognize ILTs but to apply them to an important and emerging area of
law.
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